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comment upon contemporary  events.'  The Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution  (the Cultural Revolution)2 is  said to have  been  ignited in
the People's Republic of China (PRC) by a play3 about an autocratic
Ming dynasty (1368-1644)  Emperor that was construed  as commenting
obliquely upon Chairman Mao Zedong.4  The massive effort launched
in  1973  to  discredit  the  memory  of Mao's  designated  successor,  Lin
Biao5 and attack Premier Zhou Enlai6 took the form of a nationwide
campaign to "criticize Lin, criticize Confucius,"  even though Confucius
1.  J. PusEy, Wu HAN:  ATTACKING  THE PRESENT THROUGH THE PAST (1969); Oxnam, The
Past is Still Present, in THE  CHINA  DIFFERENCE  59  (R. Terrill  ed.  1979).  The Chinese  use the
idiom chih sang  ma hual  (literally, "to point at the mulberry and revile the ash") as a metaphor for
the practice  of commenting on the present  by analogy  to historical events or persons.  J. PusEY,
supra, at 72.
2.  The Great  Proletarian  Cultural Revolution,  which is  described in the PRC  as  having
lasted from  1966  to 1976,  is generally agreed by Chinese and Western scholars alike to have been
highly disruptive of normal political, social  and economic  life in the PRC.  See On Questions of
Party History:  Resolution on Certain  Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding
of the People's Republic of China adopted June 27,  1981  at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 1  lth
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Chinese text in Renmin Ribao [The People's
Daily], July  1,  1981,  English translation in 24 BE  WING  REv. No. 27, July 6,  1981,  at 10, 20-26.  The
Beb.ing Review is published  weekly in English and a number of other foreign  languages  by the
Chinese government  for  international  dissemination.  For further background  on the Cultural
Revolution, see  L. DITTMER,  LIU  SHAO-CH'I  AND  THE  CHINESE  CULTURAL  REVOLUTION:  THE
POLITICS  OF MASS  CRITICISM (1974).
3.  See generally J. PusEY, supra note 1.  Interestingly, the play's author, Wu Han, who was
vilified  during the  Cultural Revolution, has recently been celebrated  in the PRC  press as a "fa-
mous Marxist historian"  having "outstanding 'ethics.'"  Zhang Xikong, In Praise  of  Comrade Wu
Han's Ethics as a Historian, Renmin  Ribao  [The People's  Daily] Oct. 22,  1984 at 5,  reprinted  in
Foreign Broadcast  Information Service  Daily Report:  China, Nov.  2,  1984 at K25, K27.
4.  The definitive  biography  of Mao  Zedong  (1893-1976)  has  yet  to be  written.  Recent
works  on his life include J. CH'EN,  MAO  AND  THE  CHINESE  REVOLUTION  (1965);  L.  PYE, MAO
TSE-TUNG:  THE MAN  IN  THE LEADER  (1976);  S.  SCHRAM,  MAO  TSE-TUNG  (1968);  R. TERRILL,
MAO:  A BIOGRAPHY  (1980);  and D. WILSON,  THE  PEOPLE'S  EMPEROR  (1980).
5.  A veteran of the Long March, Lin Biao rose to prominence in Chinese Communist mili-
tary circles  as  the commander  of the celebrated  Fourth Road  Army during the  Civil War, and
subsequently held increasingly important positions, including those of Vice Premier (1954),  Field
Marshal (1955),  Politburo member (1958),  and Minister of Defense  (1959),  before  being desig-
nated  as Vice  Chairman  of the  Chinese Communist  Party  and Mao's  successor  in  1969.  Soon
therafter, he fell from favor and is said to have died in a plane crash in Mongolia in 1971, having
fled after an abortive effort to seize power.  I. Hs0, THE RISE OF MODERN  CHINA 620, 649, 712-22
(3d ed. 1983); M. MEISNER, MAO'S CHINA:  A HISTORY  OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  362-75 (1977).
See generally Wu TIEN-WEI,  LIN  BIAO  AND  THE  GANG  OF  FOUR  (1983);  YAO  MING-LE,  THE
CONSPIRACY  AND  DEATH  OF LIN BIAO  (1983).
6.  Born into a gentry family in  1899 and educated in China, Japan and France, Zhou Enlai
served as Premier of the PRC from its establishment in 1949 until his death in  1976 and as Foreign
Minister  from  1949  to  1958.  Notwithstanding  Zhou Enlai's  long tenure  in these  positions and
apparent broad support among the populace, the criticisms made of Confucius  during the p! Lin,
piKongmovement are believed to have been an effort "to harass [him] by allusion."  I. HsO, supra
note  5,  at 776;  Gray,  Chou En-lat  in CAMBRIDGE  ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF  CHINA  280 (B.  Hook ed.
1982); Wren, China  Embraces  a Heritage  Once Banned  as  Reactionary: A Return to the Thoughts of
Confucius, N.Y. Times, Oct.  14,  1984, at E7.CALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
had been dead for more than 2500 years.7  And when the  Guangming
Ribao (The  Enlightenment Daily)8  wished  last  year  to  counsel  that
China be more demanding in its dealings with foreign business, it chose
to make its point by praising Wei Yuan, a conservative  scholar-official
of the nineteenth century known for advocating a policy of controlling
one  set  of  so-called  "barbarians"  with  skills  learned  from  other
"barbarians."
9
For centuries, China's long legal history was hardly a favored ve-
hicle  for latter-day  political  comment  by  Chinese  observers,  be  they
Confucian or Communist in orientation.  Of late, however, both high-
level officials  and political commentators, writing with the blessing of
the government, have seen fit to buttress their arguments about the con-
temporary  scene with brief discourses  on the nature  of China's  legal
tradition.'0  In an apparent  effort to distance the present government
from the excesses  of the Cultural Revolution and to justify current  ef-
forts to develop the PRC's formal criminal justice process,'l these corn-
7.  Confucius was born in 551 B.C. and died in 479 B.C.  During the course of the campaign
against Lin Biao and Confucius, Mao Zedong raised not a few eyebrows in the PRC and sent not
a  few Western  "Pekingologists"  scurrying to their history  books when,  endeavoring  to make  a
point regarding  current  political  affairs,  he  declared  that Ch'in Shih-huang-ti, the  long-loathed
first emperor  of China, was really not so bad, after all.  Almost as mysteriously  as it began, the
campaign against Lin and Confucius ended in March  1974.  Lin Biao continues to be excoriated,
but of late, the virtues of Confucius  have again been extolled.  See Wren, supra note 6,  at E7.
8.  Guangming Ribao is considered  "a newspaper for more educated  readers."  Id
9.  Parks,  Critics Blast China Policy on Investing: Lively,  Debate over  'Open-Door' Stance
Stalls Needed Rule, L.A. Times, Oct. 24,  1983,  § IV, at 1, col.  I.  Wei Yuan  (1794-1856)  is  best
known for compiling in 1844 what Professor Immanuel Hs(i has called "the first significant  Chi-
nese work  on the West"--HAI-Kuo T'u-CHm  [AN  ILLUSTRATED  GAZETrEER  OF  THE  MARITIME
COUNTRIES].  I. HsO, supra  note 5, at 275-77.  At the outset of that encyclopedic work, Wei Yuan
asks rhetorically why  he undertook this massive  study and answers  his own  question  by saying
that "[iut is for the purpose of using barbarians to attack barbarians, using barbarians to negotiate
with barbarians,  and learning the superior  techniques of the barbarians  to control the barbarians."
Id. at 276 (I. Hsti trans.) (emphasis in Hstl translation).  The use of the term "barbarians"  to refer
to foreigners  emanates from  long-standing Chinese notions of cultural superiority.  See generally
THE  CHINESE  WORLD ORDER:  TRADITIONAL CHINA'S  FOREIGN RELATIONS  (J.  Fairbank  ed.
1968).
10.  See, ag., Address of Peng Zhen, entitled Explanation  on Seven Laws, delivered at  the
Second  Session  of the Fifth  National  People's Congress on June  26,  1979,  English  translation
published in 22 BEIING  REv. No. 28, July  13,  1979,  at 8; Zhu Yuanshi,  The Causes of the "Cul-
tural  Revolution," 24 BEIJING  REV.  No. 37,  Sept. 14,  1981,  at 15; Prospect  and  Retrospect: China's
Socialist  Legal System, 22 BEIJNG REV. No. 2, Jan. 12,  1979, at 25; see also Cohen, Introduction  to
ESSAYS  ON CHINA'S  LEGAL TRADITION  3, 4 (J. Cohen, R.  Edwards & F. Chang Chen eds.  1980)
[hereinafter cited  as Cohen, Introduction].
11.  The leading Western work on the criminal justice process during the early years of the
PRC is J. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS  IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  OF  CHINA,  1949-1963:  AN
INTRODUCTION  (1968)  [hereinafter  cited as J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL PROCESS].  Also particularly use-
ful for that period, although quite different  in their orientation, are  LENG  SHAO-CHUAN,  JUSTICE
IN COMMUNIST  CHINA (1967); V. LI, LAW WrrHOUT LAWYERS:  A COMPARATIVE  VIEW OF  LAW IN
CHINA AND  THE UNITED  STATES  (1978); and Lubman, Form  and  Function in the Chinese Criminal
Process,  69 COLUM.  L. REv. 535 (1969).  Among  the most thoughtful accounts of the PRC's recent
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mentators have  told an international  audience that the success of Lin
Biao and the "Gang of Four"'2  was largely attributable  to a tradition
of using law as a tool to repress, rather than promote, individual justice
and freedom. 3  In the words of one noted PRC legal historian, China's
legal heritage, and particularly that of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1912),
has left her with  an "arduous  task different  from  [that  of]  other...
socialist countries."'
14
efforts to  develop further  her criminal justice process  are Gelatt, The People's Republic of China
and the Presumption of Innocence,  73 J. CRIM.  L. & CRIMINOLOGY  259  (1982);  Leng,  Crime and
Punishment in Post-Mao China,  CHINA L. REP., Spring  1982, at 5; Lubman, Emerging Functions  of
Formal Legal Institutions in China'r Modernization, in  CHINA  UNDER THE  FOUR  MODERNIZA-
TIONS:  PART  II-SELECTED  PAPERS  SUBMITTED  TO  THE  JOINT ECONOMIC  COMMITTEE  OF  THE
CONGRESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  235  (J.  Hardt  ed.  1982);  and  R.  Baum, China's  Post-Mao
Legal  Reforms in Historical and Comparative Perspective  (June 1984)  (unpublished paper avail-
able at the U.C.L.A.  Law Library).
12.  Soon after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong on September  9, 1976,  his successor Hua
Guofeng  ordered the  arrest of four political  figures prominent in the Cultural Revolution.  The
most notorious member of this group, which the Chinese press soon labeled the "Gang of Four,"
was  Mao's widow,  Jiang  Qing.  Its three  other members were  Zhang Chunqiao,  who served  as
Vice  Premier, Politburo member,  and Mayor of Shanghai;  Wang  Hongwen, the young factory
worker who became a ranking Politburo member and who was at one time spoken of as a poten-
tial successor  to Mao;  and Yao  Wenyuan, who  was Shanghai  Party Secretary  and head of the
central government's propaganda  apparatus.  Yao's denunciation of Hai  Rui  Dismissed  From Of-
fice, the play by Wu Han alluded to supra in note 3, is said to have launched the Cultural Revolu-
tion.
After almost four years of detention, Jiang,  Zhang, Wang and Yao were placed on trial to-
gether with six other figures  active during the Cultural Revolution-Chen  Boda, Huang  Yong-
sheng, Wu  Faxian,  Qiu Huizuo, Jiang  Tengjiao,  and Li Zuopeng-for allegedly  committing  a
variety of counterrevolutionary  acts.  On January 23,  1981,  each defendant was found guilty of the
principal charges of  which he or she stood accused, although some were acquitted of certain of the
lesser charges.  Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were each given a sentence of "death with a two-
year reprieve" which,  after the two years  expired, was converted to life imprisonment.  This unu-
sual sentence,  which has antecedents  in Chinese legal history back to the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-
220 A.D.) provided that the death sentence be suspended for a two-year period in order to give the
convicted the opportunity  to reform sufficiently to merit a lesser penalty than death.  The other
eight defendants received sentences of imprisonment ranging from  17  to 20 years.  The trial itself
is discussed in A GREAT TRIAL IN  CHINESE  HISTORY  (1981);  Edwards, Introduction  to The Gang
of  Four Trial- Chinese Criminal  Justice in Practice,  CHINA  L.  REP.,  Fall  1981,  at  173; Goodstadt,
The Trial of  the "Lin-Jiang  Cliques  China's  Return to the Rule of  Lawg  12 HONG  KONG  L.J.  31
(1982);  Symposiun  The  Trial of the "Gang of Four"  and Its Implication in China, in  3 OccA-
SIONAL  PAPERS/REPRINT  SERIES  IN  CONTEMPORARY  ASIAN STUDIES  (J. Hsiung ed. 1981).
13.  See commentaries cited supra in note  10.
14.  Zhang Guohua, Chinese Legal Thought Before the Twentieth Century  13  (unpublished
manuscript available at the U.C.L.A. Law Library) [hereinafter cited as Zhang Guohua, Chinese
Legal Thought].
The views of Professor  Zhang, who is one of the PRC's most eminent scholars of the history
of Chinese legal  thought, are set  out at greater length  in such works  as Zhang  Guohua,  Cong
lishishang  tan  fazhi de liangge wenti [4 Discussion of Two Questions Concerning  the Legal  System
from the Viewpoint of  HistorA, in 1 FALfOSHI LUNCONG  [COLLECTED ESSAYS  ON  LEGAL HISTORY]
27  (1981)  and in  ZHONGGUO  FALO  SIXIANG  SHI  [A  HISTORY  OF  CHINESE  LEGAL  THOUGHT]
(Zhang Guohua ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ZRANG  GUOHUA, HISTORY  OF LEGAL THOUGHT].
His critique ofjustice provided by the imperial state, particularly during later years of the Ch'ing
dynasty (which ruled China from  1644-1912 A.D.), ought not to lead us to infer that he believesCALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  72:1180
Comparable  views have also had wide currency  in academic  and
popular circles in the West for much of the past two centuries.I s  Lead-
ing authorities on Chinese law,  16 eminent general historians of China, 17
and influential nonsinologists8  continue to portray the formal criminal
China's legal tradition to have been wholly bleak.  He has words of praise, for example, for indi-
viduals  he views  as progressive,  such  as the late  Ming, early Ch'ing  thinker, Huang  Tsung-hsi.
See Zhang Guohua, Chinese Legal Thought, supra,  at 4-5.  Professor Zhang's characterization  of
the quality of late Ch'ing justice is shared by many other distinguished PRC legal historians.  See,
eg., ZHANG  DEzE,  QINGDAI  GuoJiA  JIGUAN  KAOLUE  [A  BRIEF  EXAMINATION  OF  QINo  DY-
NASTY GOVERNMENT  ORGANIZATION]  1 (1981)  (written  before the  Cultural Revolution  but not
published until  1981); ZHANG  JINFAN,  ZHANG  XIPO  &  ZENG  XIANYI,  I ZHONGGUO  FAZHI  SI
[CHINESE LEGAL  HISTORY]  408-56  (1981).
15.  See infra notes  16-18,  54-97 and accompanying text.
16.  See J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL  PROCESS,  supra note  11,  at  5-7; Cohen,  Chinese Mediation on
the Eve of  Modernization,  54  CALIF. L. REV.  1201,  1212-15  (1966)  [hereinafter  cited  as Cohen,
Chinese Mediation]; Cohen, Introduction,  supra note  10,  at 7-8.  But see Cohen, Due Process?,  in
THE  CHINA  DIFFERENCE, supra note  1,  at 237,  256-57.  For other authorities'  portrayals  of the
imperial criminal process  as essentially an instrument of state  control little concerned  with indi-
vidual justice, see J. BRADY, JUSTICE AND POLITICS  IN  PEOPLE'S  CHINA 34-37 (1982);  S.  VAN  DER
SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS  IN MANCHU  CHINA 66-79 (1962);  Barlow & Wagner, Public Or-
der and  Internal  Security, in CHINA:  A COUNTRY  STUDY 427 (F. Bunge  & R. Shinn eds.  1981);
Gelatt, supra  note  11,  at 263-65,  307; Jones, Theft in the Qing Code, 30 AM. J. COMP.  L. 499, 501
(1982);  Lubman,  Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55
CALIF.  L. REV.  1284,  1290-91  (1969);  Tay, Law in Communist China-Part , 6 SYDNEY  L.  REV.
153  (1969);  see also Kamenka  &  Tay, Social Traditions, Legal Traditions, in  LAW  AND  SOCIAL
CONTROL  3, 21-24 (E. Kamenka &  A. Tay eds.  1980).  Ch't  T'ung-tsu's highly useful work, Law
and  Society in Traditional  China,  should also be included in this group.  Although an earlier ver-
sion was published  in China in  1947,  the version most  influential  in the  West was subsequently
revised and published by Dr. Ch'(1 in the United States.  CH'0 T'UNG-TSU,  LAW AND  SOCIETY IN
TRADITIONAL  CHINA  283-87  (1959)  [hereinafter  cited as CH'0  I'UNO-TSU,  LAW  AND  SOCIETY].
Interestingly,  in his other important work in English, CH'0 T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL GOVERNMENT  IN
CHINA  UNDER THE  CH'ING (1962)  [hereinafter cited as CH'0 TUNG-TSU,  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT],
Professor Ch'it is far less judgmental in discussing imperial legal history.  Whether that is attribu-
table to its different focus (legal  administration rather than substantive law) or to later authorship
is unclear.
17.  See, e.g., J. FAIRBANK,  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  CHINA  117-23  (4th ed. 1979);  I. Hso,
supra note 5,  at 52-53;  L.  PY, CHINA:  AN  INTRODUCTION  60-61,  71  (2d ed.  1978);  R.  SMITH,
CHINA'S  CULTURAL  HERITAGE:  THE CH'ING  DYNASTY 1644-1912,  at 42, 240 (1983);  L.  STOVER,
THE  CULTURAL  ECOLOGY  OF  CHINESE  CIVILIZATION  89-94  (1974);  K. WITrFOOEL,  ORIENTAL
DESPOTISM:  A COMPARATIVE  STUDY  OF  TOTAL POWER  1, 131-33,  144-45,  158-59  (1959);  Mote,
Political  Structure,  in THE MODERNIZATION  OF CHINA 47, 97-99 (G. Rozman ed.  1981); Schwartz,
On Attitudes TowardLaw  in  China, in GOVERNMENT  UNDER  LAW  AND  THE INDIVIDUAL  27, pas-
sim (M. Katz ed.  1957); see also  J.  CH'EN, CHINA AND  THE WEST:  SOCIETY  AND CULTURE  1815-
1937,  at 316,  324-27 (1979);  M. HUNT, THE  MAKING OF  A SPECIAL  RELATIONSHIP:  THE  UNITED
STATES AND CHINA TO  1914,  at  1-2 (1983).
18.  See, e.g.,  A.  BOZEMAN,  THE  FUTURE  OF  LAW  IN  A  MULTICULTURAL  WORLD  140-47
(1971);  R. DAVID  & J. BRIERLY,  MAJOR  LEGAL  SYSTEMS  IN  THE  WORLD TODAY  28-29  (2d ed.
1978); R. UNGER,  LAW  IN  MODERN  SOCIETY:  TOWARD  A CRITICISM  OF SOCIAL  THEORY 48-110
(1976);  Forte,  Western Law and  Communist Dictatorship,  32 EMORY  L.J. 135 (1983);  Kamenka  &
Tay, supra note  16,  at 22-24;  Noda,  The Far  Eastern Conception of Law, in  2  INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF  COMPARATIVE  LAW  ch.  1, at  120,  126-27  (1975).  Many of the  foregoing  au-
thors treat imperial Chinese legal history in broad sweeps as if it were a single unified whole, with
little distinction either among periods or between substance and procedure.  For example, Roberto
Unger claims at one point to be focusing chiefly upon the period prior to the unification of China
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justice process' 9 in late imperial China2"  as having been  essentially an
instrument  of state  control  little concerned  with  individual justice.2'
To be sure, many of these scholars have  greatly advanced  our under-
standing of China's law and legal history through their work.  Still, in
so doing, whether explicitly or otherwise,22 they have painted a picture
of Ch'ing "law and legal institutions.  . . principally as instruments for
maintaining  the power of the state rather than enhancing the sense  of
security of its citizens."23
Ironically, for all the certainty with which the late imperial crimi-
nal justice process  has been  presented  in the West over the past two
centuries,24 we still know far too little about either the theory or opera-
tion of that process.25  This may be attributable to the lingering effects
in  221  B.C.,  R. UNGER,  supra, at 87,  but  he has  no  hesitancy  at other  points in extending  his
generalizations, at least by implication,  to cover essentially the following two millenia of Chinese
legal  history.  Id.  at  86  (suggesting that China and the rest of the non-European  world stayed
mired in "customary law" or "bureaucratic  law" until modem Europe was sufficiently generous to
spread what he describes as the concept of a "legal  order" to the godless).  It is encouraging to see
that Professor  Unger  has  made at least a  modest start  in his most  recent work  at  righting the
distorted  picture he  imparted of the  Chinese  past in Law in Modern Society.  See R. UNGER,
PASSION:  AN  ESSAY  ON PERSONALITY  64-69 (1984).  I address Professor Unger's treatment of the
Chinese past at length in a manuscript now in progress.
19.  As used in this Article  with respect  to imperial  China, the term  formal criminal justice
process refers to the process by which disputes involving the public, positive criminal laws of the
imperial Chinese state were adjudicated by imperial officials pursuant to procedural and adminis-
trative  rules of the state, in contrast  to unofficial  dispute resolution  conducted  by persons other
than officials.
20.  China's imperial  period is  typically dated  from  the unification  of China by  the Ch'in
dynasty (221  B.C.)  to the Revolution  of 1911  A.D., which toppled the  Ch'ing dynasty  in  1912.
The  late imperial period upon which this Article is focused may be thought of as approximately
the last century  of Ch'ing rule.
Scholars  disagree  about  when  written  law  first  arose  in  China.  The noted  archaeologist
Chang  Kwang-chih  suggests  that  elements of a legal system  may have existed  in what was to
become  China as  early as the Shang  dynasty  (1766-1122  B.C.).  CHANG  KWANG-CHIH,  SHANG
CIVILIZATION 200-01  (1980).  The historian Herrlee Creel believes that a comprehensive  legal sys-
tem developed  during  the Western  Chou dynasty  (1122-771  B.C.).  H. CREEL,  THE  ORIGINS  OF
STATECRAFT  IN CHINA:  THE  WESTERN  CHOU  EMPIRE  161-95  (1970).  Still others look to later
dates.  In  any event, it is clear from  The Analects of Confucius that at least by  the sixth century
B.C. the notion of formal written law was widespread.  See, e.g., THE  ANALECTS  OF CONFUCIUS
Books  11-3,  XII-12,  XII-13, XIII-3 (A. Waley trans.  1938).
21.  Although there is as yet no fully satisfactory definition of justice  in imperial China, for
purposes of this Article justice  will be assumed to consist of the conviction of the guilty and the
acquittal of the  innocent.  See J. Wu,  Chinese Legal and Political  Philosophy, in  THE  CHINESE
MIND:  ESSENTIALS  OF  CHINESE  PHILOSOPHY  AND  CULTURE  213,  228  (C. Moore  ed.  1967).
22.  For example, many have focused  upon the absence or relative unimportance in imperial
China of aspects of criminal justice processes in the West widely thought to be vital to the attain-
ment of justice.  For a more  complete  discussion of such  features,  see  infra text accompanying
notes  58-80.
23.  Cohen, Introductio4 supra note  10, at 7-8.
24.  See supra notes  16-18; infra notes 39-46,  48 and accompanying  text.
25.  Lubman,  Western  Scholarship on  Chinese Law:  Past Accomplishments  and Present
Challenges, 22 COLUM.  J. TRANSNAT'L L. 83 (1983)  and Jones, Book Review, 30 AM.  J. COMP.  L.CALIFOATIA  LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1180
of  the  seeming  disdain  of  Confucian-oriented  scholar-officials  for
law,26  to the  absence  of systematic,  official  case reporting,27  or to the
sheer difficulty of securing, reading, and evaluating the pertinent origi-
nal source materials.28  But whatever its cause, notwithstanding the im-
portant  efforts  of  a  small  number  of  specialists  both  here29  and
555  (1982)  (reviewing ESSAYS ON  CHINA's  LEGAL TRADITION  (J. Cohen, R. Edwards & F. Chang
Chen eds.  1980))  usefully discuss the  state of current Western scholarship  in the  field of Chinese
legal  studies.  See also J.  FAIRBANK,  supra note  17,  at  107;  Zhang  Guohua,  Chinese  Legal
Thought,  supra  note  14,  at  1-2.
26.  D.  BODDE & C.  MORRIS,  LAW  IN IMPERIAL CHINA  19-23  (1967).
27.  Id.  at 144-59.
28.  Scholars of American  law accustomed  to finding neatly printed  comprehensive  collec-
tions of cases, statutes, and related materials in a law library might initially find it hard to compre-
hend the bibliographic efforts involved in undertaking serious work in Chinese legal history.  The
Chinese did maintain detailed records of imperial activities, such as the Tung-hua lu [Recordsfrom
Within the Tung-hua Gate], see infra note 32 and Appendix A, and the Shih lu [  Veritable Records],
see infra Appendix  4.  Such  voluminous  collections  of official  documents,  which have  neither
tables of contents nor indexes, by  no means,  however,  discuss  all  legal matters outside the Em-
peror's immediate purview.  As a consequence, it is necessary for a scholar wishing to cover virtu-
ally any  area of Chinese  legal history in  any depth  to have  recourse  to a  range of additional
materials, access to which--or even the existence of which-is not always certain.  Too often, such
materials are scattered throughout the world, assembled  chronologically (if at all) and handwrit-
ten, rather than printed.  For a  discussion of the range of materials  utilized in  undertaking the
research for this Article, see  infra Appendix A.
Once the necessary documents have been assembled,  one's work really begins, in part owing
to linguistic difficulties.  See D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,  supra  note 26, at 3.  Official imperial  docu-
ments were written in classical  Chinese, a complex allusion-filled  language bearing  a relation to
contemporary  Chinese roughly  akin to that Latin  bears to  Italian.  Unofficial  sources  including
confessions, diaries,  and novels often  contain colloquial language  peculiar to the speaker or au-
thor's native region and period which pose their own difficulties of translation and interpretation.
Further complicating the picture with respect  to either type of document is the fact that there still
is no good Chinese-English legal dictionary dealing with matters of legal history  that might com-
plement  Philip  Bilancia's  excellent  work  focused  on  the  period  from  1939  to  1977.  See P.
BILANCIA,  DICTIONARY  OF  CHINESE  LAW  AND  GOVERNMENT  (1981);  see also D.  BODDE  & C.
MORRIS,  supra note 26,  at  156-59.  In the  absence of a comprehensive  dictionary  for matters  of
legal history, the most useful works  available  are P. BILANCIA,  supra; CH'ING  ADMINISTRATIVE
TERMS:  A TRANSLATION  OF THE TERMINOLOGY  OF THE Six BOARDS  WITH EXPLANATORY  NOTES
(E-tu  Zen Sun  trans. & ed.  1961)  [hereinafter  cited as E.Z. SUN,  CH'ING  TERMS];  W. MAYERS,
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.  A MANUAL  OF CHINESE TITLES,  CATEGORICALLY  ARRANGED AND
EXPLAINED (3d ed.  1896); PRESENT DAY  POLITICAL ORGANIZATION  OF  CHINA (H. Brunnert & V.
Hagelstrom trans. 1912).  E-tu Zen Sun's work is a translation of Liu-pu chleng-yll chu-chieh [Ter-
minology of  the Six Boards with Explanatory  Note], which was a dictionary of terms and phrases
used in the conduct of the imperial  bureaucracy  during the Ch'ing dynasty.  E.Z.  SUN,  CH'ING
TERMS,  supra,  at xvii.  The glossaries found in D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,  supra note 26, at 577-93;
ESSAYS  ON CHINA'S  LEGAL TRADITION,  supra  note  10, at 395-423; and T. METZGER,  THE INTER-
NAL ORGANIZATION  OF THE CH'ING BUREAUCRACY:  LEGAL,  NORMATIVE  AND  COMMUNICATION
ASPECTS  451-65  (1973)  are also very helpful.
29.  See, ag, D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,  supra note 26; T. METZGER,  supra note 28; J. OCKO,
BUREAUCRATIC  REFORM  IN  PROVINCIAL CHINA:  TING  JIH-CH'ANG  IN RESTORATION  KIANOSU,
1867-1870 (1982);  J. WATT, THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE  IN LATE  IMPERIAL CHINA (1972);  Fu-mei
Chang Chen,  The Influence of  Shen  Chih-ch'i's Chi Chu  Commentary upon  Ch'ing Judicial Deci-
sions, in ESSAYS  ON  CHINA'S  LEGAL TRADITION,  supra note 10, at 170 [hereinafter cited as Chen,
Shen Chih-ch'i];  Fu-mei Chang Chen,  On Analogy in Ch'ing  Law, 30 HARV.  J. ASIATIC STUD.  212
(1970)  [hereinafter cited as Chen, On Analogy]; Edwards,  Ch'ing Legal Jurisdiction  over Foreign-
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abroad,3"  research in Chinese legal history remains at too preliminary a
ers,  in ESSAYS  ON CHINA'S LEGAL TRADITION, supra  note 10, at 222; Ocko, Justice on Appeal  The
Capital  Appeals System in Ch'ing China,  forthcoming in LAW  AND  THE  STATE  IN TRADITIONAL
EAST  ASIA  (B.  McKnight ed.);  A.  Conner,  The  Law of Evidence  During the Ch'ing  Dynasty
(1979)  (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University)  (available from  University Micro-
films  International, Ann Arbor, Michigan).
Finally, although I take issue with their overall characterization of the formal criminal justice
process in late imperial China, Jerome Cohen, Stanley Lubman, William Jones and others among
the scholars mentioned supra  in notes 16-18 have made major contributions to our understanding
of traditional  and contemporary Chinese  law.  Indeed, without the ground-breaking scholarship
and ongoing unselfish encouragement of younger scholars by Messrs. Cohen, Lubman and Jones,
among others, articles such as this would not be possible.
30.  The most notable such work abroad has taken place on Taiwan and in Japan.  Typical of
the most  important scholarship  undertaken  on Taiwan  are:  1 CHANG  WEJEN,  CH'ING-TAI  FA-
CHIH YEN-CHIU  [RESEARCH  ON  THE  LEGAL SYSTEM  OF  THE  CH'ING  DYNASTY]  (3  vols.  1983)
[hereinafter cited as CHANG WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM];  HSU DAU-LIN,  CHUNG-KUO  FA-CHIH-SHIH
LUN-CHI  [COLLECTED  ESSAYS  ON  CHINESE  LEGAL HISTORY]  (posthumously published  in 1975);
r'Ao HSI-SHENG,  CH'ING-TAI  CHOU-HSIEN  YAMEN  HsING-SHIH  SHEN-PAN  CHIH-TU CHI CHENG-
HSU [THE SYSTEM AND  PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING JUDICIAL MATTERS AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL
DURING  THE  CH'ING  DYNASTY]  (1972)  [hereinafter cited as TAO  HSI-SHENG,  THE  SYSTEM].
Major  Japanese  work  in  this  field  has  been  undertaken  by  Shuzo  Shiga  and  Shigeo
Nakamura.  For Shiga, see Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure  in the Ch'ing  Dynasty with Emphasis on Its
Administrative Character  and Some Allusion to Its Historical  Antecedents, in  MEMOIRS  OF  THE
RESEARCH OF THE ToYo  BUNKO No. 32, at 1 (1974)  [hereinafter cited  as Shiga,  Criminal  Proce-
dure (I)]; and id  No. 33,  at 115  (1975)  [hereinafter cited as Shiga, Criminal  Procedure  (II)], which
save for additions to its footnotes, were originally published in Japanese as Shiga, Shincho Jidaino
Keff! Saiban-Sono Gy3seiteki"  Jakkan no Enkakuteki Kasatsu o  Fukumete, in  KEIHATSU  TO
KOKKA KENRYOKI  [PUNISHMENT  AND  STATE POWER]  (Hoseishi Gakkai ed. 1960)  (Japan Legal
History Association),  and Shiga, Shindai ni Shiha no okeru Hanketsu no Seikaku-Hanketsu no
Kakutei to iu Kannen no Fusonzai  [The Nature of Judicial  Decisions in Ch'ing China: Lack of the
Concept ofRes Judicata],  in H6GAKU  KY6KAi  ZASSHI  [J. LEGAL  STUDIES] No. 91,  at 47 (1974);
and id  No. 92, at 1 (1975).  1 am indebted  to Professor Shiga for having met with me to discuss
Ch'ing legal  history.  For Nakamura, see  NAKAMURA,  SHINDAI  KEIH6  KENKYU  [STUDIES  ON
CH'ING  CRIMINAL  LAW]  (1973);  Shindai  no Hango ni Mirareru Hi no tekio  Toku ni Bukoku,
Ikakuninchishi  o Megutte [Application of Law in the Ch'ing Dynasty as Seen in Judgments, Espe-
cially Concerning Cases of False  Accusations and of Intimidation Leading Persons to Suicide], 9
H6SEI  RIRON  [LEGAL  THEORY]  1 (1976).  I am grateful  to Ms. Emily  deLeeuw of the U.C.L.A.
School of Law for drawing my attention to Professor  Nakamura's work.
Interestingly,  although the  great historian Niida  Noboru  and other Japanese  scholars have
written extensively  about pre-Ch'ing legal history,  "virtually none has devoted primary effort to
the  Ch'ing dynasty  or  in particular  codified [as  opposed  to customary]  law."  D.  BODDE  &  C.
MORRIS, supra  note 26, at 54.  Indeed, as Professors Bodde and Morris point out, even that volume
of CHOGOKU HOSEISHI KENKYU  [THE STUDY OF CHINESE  LEGAL HISTORY] (Niida's epic series on
the history of Chinese law) devoted to criminal law "says extremely little about the evolution and
structure of the Ch'ing Code...  [or] about  Ch'ing judicial  procedure,"  as it focuses  chiefly on
earlier dynasties.  D.  BODDE  & C.  MORRIS,  supra note 26, at 55.
European scholarship  on imperial  Chinese legal history  has principally been devoted  to dy-
nasties prior to the Ch'ing.  To a far greater extent than its United States counterpart, it consists of
annotated translations and focuses upon questions of substantive or customary rather than proce-
dural law.  For example, see Paul  Ch'en's reconstruction of the Ydlan Code, P. CH'EN,  CHINESE
LEGAL  TRADITION  UNDER  THE  MONGOLS  (1979);  Jean  Escarra's  overview  of Chinese  law, J.
ESCARRA,  LE DROIT CHINOIS  [CHINESE  LAW]  (1936);  Edouard Kroker's  annotated translation of
MIN-SHANG  HSI-KUAN  TIAO-CH'A  PAO-KAO  LU  [REPORT  ON  THE  INVESTIGATION  OF  CIVIL  AND
COMMERCIAL  CUSTOM],  a compilation of legal custom  published in  1930 by the Chinese govern-
ment, E. KROKER, DIE AMTLICHE  SAMMLUNG  CHINESISCHER RECHTSGEWOHNHEITEN  [THE MIN-CALIFORAZA  LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1180
stage to warrant  conclusive judgments  about the character  of the for-
mal criminal justice process.3'
This Article attempts to advance our understanding  of the formal
criminal justice process  in late imperial China  by reconstructing  from
archival  materials  and analyzing one  of the most celebrated  criminal
cases  in Chinese history-that of Yang Nai-wu  and  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai. 2
It is a sign of the state of our explorations of the Chinese legal tradition
that no Western scholar has ever written  about the case, that no  Chi-
nese scholar has produced  a definitive account of it and its overall sig-
nificance, 3  and that no scholar, Chinese or foreign, has yet charted in
ISTERIAL  COMPILATION  OF  CHINESE  LEGAL CUSTOM]  (1965);  Marinius Meijer's study of the late
Ch'ing law reform efforts, M. MELIER,  THE INTRODUCTION  OF MODERN  CRIMINAL LAW IN  CHINA
(1949);  and Frank Manzel's  annotated translation of the first section of the  hsing-fa-chih [mono-
graph  on  criminal  law]  from  the  Standard  History  of  the  Ming  Dynasty,  F.  MONZEL,
STRAFRECHT  IM  ALTEN  CHINA  NACH  DEN  STRAFRECHTSKAPITELN  IN  DEN  MING-ANNALEN
[CRIMINAL  LAW  IN  OLD  CHINA  FROM THE  MONOGRAPH  ON  CRIMINAL  LAW  OF THE  MING  AN-
NALS]  (1968).
31.  See infra  notes 306, 399-432  and accompanying  text.
32.  The case, which bears the name of its male principal, Yang Nai-wu, and a nickname  of
its  female  principal,  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai,  is  one  of four celebrated  cases  of the late  imperial  period
known as the four great injustices of the late Ch'ing dynasty.  In reconstructing this case, I have
utilized  a broad range  of sources, including  records  of the imperial  state,  diaries of prominent
officials, journalistic  accounts  of the case,  informal  contemporaneous private  treatments,  and a
wide variety of other primary and secondary  sources.  Although I urge readers to refer throughout
their reading of the Article to the bibliographic essay that constitutes Appendix A  for a full treat-
ment of the nature and relative reliability of the sources utilized, it is worth briefly describing here
the six  sources upon  which I have drawn  most heavily in reconstructing  the  case.  The  first and
most  comprehensive  is  the  KUANG-HSO  CH'AO  TUNG-HUA  LU  [RECORDS  FROM  WITHIN  THE
TUNG-HUA  GATE  FOR  THE  KUANG-HSO  REIGN]  (Chu  Shou-p'eng  ed.  1958)  (Beijing  reprint)
[hereinafter  cited  as  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS],  a  quasi-official  state  history  containing  excerpts  of
official  documents,  the utility of which  is limited by  its heavily pro-imperial  bias and  emphasis
upon the highest levels of government.  (All citations to the  Tung-hua lu  use the consecutive pagi-
nation of the 1958  edition).  The second is the HsIN-TSENG  HSING-AN  HUi-LAN  [A  NEW  SUPPLE-
MENT  TO  THE  CONSPECTUS  OF  PENAL  CASES]  (P'an Wen-fang  &  Hstl  Chien-ch'tian eds.  1886)
[hereinafter cited as A NEW  SUPPLEMENT  TO THE CONSPECTUS],  a "casebook"  put together  in the
1880's by individuals drawing  upon official archives in which this and more  than 250 other cases
are summarized.  The third and fourth  key sources  are diaries of the late  Ch'ing officials,  Weng
T'ung-ho and Li Tz'u-ming.  WENG  T'UNG-HO  JIH-CHI  [THE DIARY OF WENG  T'UNG-HO] (Chao
Chung-fu ed. 1960) (Taipei reprint)  [hereinafter cited as WENG T'UNG-HO,  DIARY];  LI  TZ'U-MING
YOEH-MAN  TANG JIH-CHI  [DIARY  OF THE YOEH-MAN  HALL] [hereinafter cited as Li TZ'U-MINO,
DIARY].  As is explained in Appendix  4,  Weng's diary is considered a better source than Li's, but
both need to be treated with a great deal of care, given Weng's involvement in the case and  Li's
provincial ties.  The fifth major source is the Shen Pao, a lively, if not always accurate, newspaper
owned by a British merchant and edited by Chinese.  Published in Shanghai,  the Shen Pao took a
strong and partisan interest in this case.  The sixth is a roughly contemporaneous  unofficial history
of administration  during the  Kuang-hsto  reign  that  draws  heavily  upon  memorials  and  other
records of officials  at the Board of Punishments.  KUANG-HS0  CHENG-YAO  [IMPORTANT POLICIES
OF THE  KUANG-HSO  REIGN]  (Shen T'ung-sheng  ed.  1969)  (Taipei reprint)  [hereinafter  cited  as
IMPORTANT  POLICIES].
33.  In  1967, Chao K'e-chtin published in Ch'n-chliu,  a Taiwan journal, the only substantial
piece  in any  language  regarding  the case.  Chao  K'e-chtln,  Ch'ing-mou isul hung-lung le 1:-tan
yltan-yA [The Most  Explosive Injustice of  the Late Ch'ing], 4 CH'ON-CH'IU [SPRING  & AUTUMN]  15
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meaningful  and explicated  detail the full course of any imperial  Chi-
nese case that traversed the entire formal criminal justice system from
the level of the district magistrate to the highest reaches of the imperial
government.
34
Obviously, one must proceed with caution when striving to gener-
alize about any legal process on the basis of a single case, even though
many contemporaneous  observers  saw it as reflecting,  albeit in a pro-
nounced  form,  difficulties plaguing  the late  imperial criminal justice
process. 35  Nonetheless,  the case  of Yang Nai-wu  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai
provides  us with  an unparalleled  opportunity  to witness  and under-
stand that process.  Replete  with allegations of adultery, murder, and
politically motivated  cover-ups,  as well  as with  courageous  efforts  to
see justice  done, the case has spawned  folktales,  short stories,  novels,
plays,  a full-length  feature  film, and  even a Peking  opera, which  are
themselves  potentially  fruitful  sources  of further  information  about
Chinese  attitudes  toward  law.36  Even  more  important,  it  prompted
both participants  and contemporaneous  outside  observers  to produce
extensive accounts of the case.37  From these accounts, along with more
skeletal  and scattered  records  available  in archives  here  and in East
Asia, it is now possible to construct  the single most comprehensive ex-
ample  of the imperial  Chinese  criminal justice  process  in  operation,
and through it to enhance our understanding of the nature of that pro-
cess generally.
Part I of this Article will examine briefly the manner in which the
formal  criminal justice  process  in late imperial  China  has  been and
continues to be portrayed today, particularly in the West.  Because  of
the complexity of the case, because that complexity helps us appreciate
the character of traditional Chinese law, and because there are no com-
parable reconstructed  examples of the imperial criminal justice process
in action, Part II of this Article will portray the full history of this case
(1967)  [hereinafter cited as Chao K'e-chtln, Injustice]. That article and others concerning  the case
are discussed  briefly in Appendix A.
34.  Jonathan  Spence's  fine study, The Death of Woman  Wang, examines the murder of a
poor peasant woman during the early Ch'ing dynasty but Professor Spence has "deliberately  tried
to keep the story both rural and local."  J. SPENCE,  THE DEATH  OF WOMAN  WANG  at xi  (1978).
Shuzo Shiga has carefully and lucidly described many features of the late imperial criminal justice
process  in Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure (I), supra note 30, and in Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure (II),
supra note 30.  The most comprehensive  general discussion of the criminal justice process  and
personnel in late  imperial China may be found in 1 CHANG  WFJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM,  supra note
30; see also the works discussed supra in notes 16-18,  29-30,  32 and in Appendix A
35.  See infra  notes 213-15,  254-57, 306, 322-23, 370-77 and accompanying text; see also Chao
K'e-chtln,  Injustice, supra  note  33,  at  15.
36.  Examples include novels such as KAG YANG,  HSIAO-PAI-TS'AI  (1975)  and HUANG  NAN-
TING,  YANG  NAI-WU  (1952),  and the Peking opera,  Yang Naiwuyu Xiao Baica4 which was per-
formed in the PRC  in  1980 and again  in 1982.
37.  See Appendix A.
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from  its  commencement  in  Yfi-hang  district,  Chekiang  province  in
1873,38  to  its conclusion  in the imperial  capital of Peking  some four
years later.  Part III of this Article utilizes the case as a vehicle to ex-
amine the late imperial formal criminal justice process  as it was meant
to work and as it actually did work.  The Article concludes by consider-
ing the case's implications for the image now prevalent in the West of
that process, and by raising many  questions that remain for scholarly
inquiry.
I
THE PREVAILING  IMAGE
We ought not to be surprised  at the prevailing image in the West
of the criminal justice process  in late imperial China as  essentially an
instrument of state control little concerned  with the attainment of indi-
vidual justice.  For most  of the  past  two  centuries,  widely  differing
commentators have characterized the process in this manner, either di-
rectly or  by treating the entire late  imperial  state  as an authoritarian
monolith essentially uninterested in law, other than as command.  The
list of these unlikely bedfellows includes:  Montesquieu 39 and others40
reacting to the largely uncritical portrayals  of China by Voltaire4' and
fellow sinophiles; 4z European  and American merchants,  missionaries,
and diplomats43 in China concerned with the potential effect of the pro-
cess upon themselves  and upon Chinese with whom they dealt;44 West-
38.  Yti-hang  is  located in the northeastern  corner of Chekiang, virtually  equidistant-70
miles-from  Hangchow  and  Shanghai.  P.  GEELAW  &  D.  TWITCHE'r,  THE  TIMES  ATLAS  OF
CHINA  51 (1974).  It is a part of the Yangtze  delta region which traditionally has been one of the
great centers of Chinese culture and an area of relative affluence.  Ho PINa-TI,  STUDIES  ON  THE
POPULATION  OF  CHINA,  1368-1953  (1959).
39.  See, e.g.,  C. MONTESQUIEU,  DE L'EsPIRIT  DES Lois  [THE  SPIRIT  OF LAws] Livre XII,
Chapitre VII (1748).
40.  SeeL. MAVERICK,  CHINA:  A MODEL FOR EUROPE  112-38 (1946);  A. REICHWEIN,  CHINA
AND  EUROPE:  INTELLECTUAL  AND  ARTISTIC  CONTACTS  IN  THE  EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  91-98
(1925).
41.  See Rowbotham,  Voltaire  sinophile, 47  PUBLICATION  MOD. LANGUAGE  A.  AM.  1050-65
(1932).
42.  The exponents of such views included  Du Halde, Leibniz, Spinoza,  and Wolff, among
others.  See R. DAwsoN, THE CHINESE  CHAMELEON:  AN  ANALYSIS  OF EUROPEAN  CONCEPTIONS
OF  CHINESE  CIVILIZATION  54-55, passim (1967);  A.  REICHWEIN, supra note 40, at 73-110.
43.  See,  e.g., J. DOOLITTLE, SOCIAL  LIFE OF THE CHINESE 335-41  (1856); R. DOUGLAS,  Socl-
ETY IN  CHINA  (1895);  C.  GUTZLAFF,  SKETCH OF  CHINESE  HISTORY  34-53  (1834);  2 M. HUC,  A
JOURNEY  THROUGH THE  CHINESE  EMPIRE  229-67  (1855);  J. MAcGOWAN,  SIDELIGHTS  ON  CHI-
NESE LIFE 272-96 (1907);  G.L. MACKAY,  FROM FAR FORMOSA  105-06 (1896);  1  S.  WILLIAMS,  THE
MIDDLE KINGDOM  507  (1883); see also Cohen, Chinese Mediation,  supra note  16,  at 1211-12.  See
generally  the accounts  of Chinese  criminal procedure  from  issues  of the  China Repository, re-
printed  in 2 G. KEETON,  THE DEVELOPMENT  OF  EXTRATERRITORIALITY  IN CHINA  229  (1928).
44.  In an  effort to  win and protect Chinese converts,  Western  missionaries  "resorted to the
practice of offering converts monetary subsidies and protection against official  and unofficial  inter-
ference  and insult .... When these converts  became  involved  in trouble and lawsuits,  the mis-
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em  governments  reluctant to  part with the  extraterritorial  privileges
enjoyed  by their nationals;45 prominent nineteenth-  and early  twenti-
eth-century Western social theorists;46 late nineteenth-  and early twen-
tieth-century  Chinese  nationalists  hoping  to  build  a  new  social  and
political order;47  and Karl Marx 4   Mao Zedong49 and others50 eager to
effect socialist revolution in China.  To be sure, during the past twenty-
five  years,  a  few  intrepid  scholarly  explorers  working  here51  and
abroad52  have unearthed evidence  suggesting that criminal law in late
imperial  China  was  richer,  more  complex,  and  less  easily  dismissed
sionaries often came to their aid, interceding with magistrates on their behalf."  I. Hsu,  supra  note
5, at 388.  As might be imagined, these converts, who were mockingly called ch'ih-chiao [literally
"eat by religion"  or "rice Christians"] were often not well-received  by their fellow Chinese.  Id  at
388, 392.
45.  To understand "extraterritoriality,"  it is necessary to review briefly the early history of
Sino-British legal relations.  The unfavorable  reaction of British merchants  and officials  during
the  late  18th and early  19th centuries  to  Chinese justice,  which  differed  appreciably  from  the
British counterpart,  was a precipitating factor  in the  Opium War (1839-1842).  Edwards, supra
note 29, at 222, 242-43, 245-52, 260.  As a consequence, in the Treaty of Nanking, which officially
ended the Opium War, the British obtained the right to have British law applied extraterritorially
in China by British officials  to British subjects  accused of having committed  crimes against Chi-
nese.  Id  at 242.  During the next half century, this principle was extended to include certain civil
disputes.  J. CH'EN, supra  note 17, at 317-19.  By virtue of the most-favored-nation  principle, bene-
fits of extraterritoriality enjoyed by one foreign nation were granted to numerous others-includ-
ing  the  United  States,  France,  Germany,  and  Russia.  W.  FISHEL,  THE  END  OF
EXTRATERRITORALrr  IN  CHINA  1-25  (1952).  The last privileges of extraterritoriality  were not
given up by the United  States until  1943.  Id  at  I.  Needless to say, extraterritoriality  was pro-
foundly humiliating to the Chinese.  See, e.g., J. Wu, The Problem of  Extraterritoriality  in China,
in THE  ART OF LAW  72 (1936).
46.  See, e.g.,  G.  HEGEL,  THE PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY  116-38  (J.  Sibree trans.  1899);  J.S.
MILL,  Letter to Edwin Chadwick (Mar.  13,  1857),  in  15  COLLECTED  WORKS  OF  JOHN  STUART
MILL  528 (F. Mineka & D. Lindley eds.  1972); M. WEBER,  WiRTSCHAFT  UND  GESELLSCHAFT (2d
ed.  1925), translated  in LAW IN ECONOMY  AND  SOcIErY 263-65  (E. Shils & M. Rheinstein  trans.,
M.  Rheinstein ed.  1954).
47.  See, e.g.,  K'ANG YU-WEI,  THE GREAT COMMONWEALTH  Book VIII, ch. 14, translated  in
TA  T'UNG-SHU,  THE ONE-WORLD  PHILOSOPHY  OF K'ANG  YU-WEI  (L. Thompson trans.  1958);
Wang  T'ao, On Domestic Administration, translated  in TENG  SSU-Yt)  & J. FAIRBANK,  CHINA'S
RESPONSE  TO  THE WEST  139  (1954)  [hereinafter cited as  CHINA'S  RESPONSE];  see also infra note
377.
48.  Marx, Revolution in China andin  Europe,  N.Y. Daily Tribune, June  14,  1853, reprinted  in
K. MARX,  ON COLONIALISM (1972).  Marx, of course, foresaw revolution coming first in the indus-
trialized West and generally viewed China as lying beyond  the civilized world.  He recognized,
however, that there had been a massive popular uprising in the mid-19th century and was hopeful
that "the Chinese revolution will throw the spark into the overloaded mine of the present indus-
trial system [which] will be closely followed by political revolutions in the [European] continent."
Id  at 24.
49.  See MAO  ZEDONG,  Report on an Investigation of  the Peasant  Movement in Hunan in  1
SELECTED WORKS  OF  MAO TSE-TUNG  23  (1967).
50.  See, e.g.,  Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Shi-hsing min-chih te chi-ch'u [The Basisfor the Realization of
DemocracA, in 7 HsIN  CH'ING-NIEN  [NEw YOUTH]  14  (1919)  and Li Ta-chao,  Ta-aip'ien [The
Great GrieJ, in Li TA-CHAO  HSOAN-CHI  [SELECTED  WORKS  OF LI  TA-CHAO]  2-3  (1959).
51.  See supra note 29.
52.  See supra note 30.CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
than  has typically been thought.  Unfortunately,  their  important find-
ings have not yet led to a transformation of the way in which the  for-
mal criminal justice process is most typically portrayed in the West.
Before turning to the case of Yang Nai-wu  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai,  it
will be  useful to survey those  aspects of the traditional  Chinese  legal
system  upon which  Western  scholars  have  focused  in portraying  the
process as a tool of state control having little to do with individual jus-
tice.53  Essentially,  these  may  be grouped  into four  broad  categories:
the intermingling  of administrative,  adjudicatory  and other authority,
particularly  in the  hands of the district  magistrates;5 4  the manner  in
which  trials were  to be conducted;5"  the tenor of the substantive laws
administered  through  the  process; 5 6  and  the  absence  of  any  belief
among the  populace  that the process  was  a  vehicle  for securing jus-
tice. 7  Because the summaries of these categories are composites drawn
from the work  of a range of scholars,  some of whom  touch upon  the
process  but briefly, it would be  a mistake to conclude that any single
scholar whose work is cited subscribes to all the views raised, or neces-
sarily even  to a majority of them.
The lack of a separation  of powers, particularly at the level of the
district magistrate, is the feature of the imperial criminal justice process
that seems to have had the greatest impact upon Western scholars criti-
cal of the process.58  Within each of the approximately  1500  districts 59
that comprised late imperial China, a single official, the district magis-
trate, presided over some 200,000 to 250,000 residents60 as the principal
embodiment of imperial authority.  The magistrate was responsible  for
all aspects of civil governance, 6' including such seemingly diverse mat-
ters as the collection of taxes, the maintenance of public order, and the
investigation,  prosecution,  and  adjudication  of criminal  matters.  To
many Western scholars, this aggregation of authority, and the concomi-
tant absence  of any independent judicial  or  administrative  official  at
the district level from whom the populace could seek recourse, carried
53.  See infra notes 54-97  and accompanying text.
54.  See infra notes  58-61  and  accompanying  text  for a brief discussion of the  position  of
district magistrate, and notes 62-68 for a consideration of the further concern  of Western scholars
about the lack of separation of powers at the magisterial  level.
55.  See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying  text.
56.  See infra notes 81-88  and accompanying text.
57.  See infra notes 89-97  and accompanying text.
58.  See, e.g.,  J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL  PROCESS, supra note  11,  at  5-7; J. FAIRBANK,  supra note
17,  at 122; I.  HsO, supra  note 5, at 52-53; S. VAN  DER  SPRENKEL, supra  note  16,  at 70; Kamenka  &
Tay, supra note 16,  at 23; Lubman, supra note  16, at  1292;  Mote, supra note  17,  at 97-98.
59.  HsIAO  KUNG-CHUAN,  RURAL  CHINA:  IMPERIAL  CONTROL  IN  THE  NINETEENTH  CEN-
TURY  3-6  (1960).  The number of districts varied among and within dynasties.
60.  See, e.g.,  Ho PING-TI, supra  note 38,  at 282,passim, for figures on late Ch'ing population.
61.  J. WATT, supra note 29, at I  1-22, passim. For more on the position of district magistrate,
see infra notes  160,  261,  292-94 and accompanying  text.
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with it enormous potential for the magistrate's unrestrained assertion of
state power.62  Some scholars believe that this potential was realized all
too often63 or that, even when it was not,  fear of its realization had a
chilling effect upon potential litigants.6 '  Actually, the Ch'ing possessed
an elaborate system of checks upon the exercise of magisterial discre-
tion, most of which operated from aboveA 5  Although they were neither
exclusively directed toward the formal criminal justice process nor nec-
essarily thought of as a group, the function of these checks  was to en-
sure  that  magistrates  properly  exercised  their  considerable
responsibilities  in this and other areas.  Whether attributable to a rela-
tive lack of familiarity with certain of these checks66 or to an inherent
skepticism about the ability of a system that had no separation of pow-
ers at its highest levels to right abuses by officials at lower levels, 6 7  few
commentators have devoted serious attention to these checks and to the
effect they may have had as mutually reinforcing restraints upon mag-
isterial behavior. 8
A second major element of the formal criminal justice process that
has inclined contemporary Western scholars to view it as an instrument
of state  control little concerned  with the attainment of individual jus-
tice  is the  manner  in which the  process  was to be  conducted  at  the
magisterial level.  Although legal matters were an important part of the
magistrate's responsibilities,69  few magistrates had any serious training
in law prior to assuming office. Legal knowledge was neither tested on
the imperial examinations to be taken by candidates for office, nor seen
as  particularly  worthy  of  study  by  would-be  scholar-officials. 7 0   A
highly detailed set of laws and rules  existed, however, to guide magis-
62.  See generally  sources  cited supra in note 58.
63.  See, e.g., J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL PROCESS,  supra note  11,  at 6.
64.  See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
65.  These checks will be described and illustrated in detail below.  See infra notes 291-305
and accompanying  text; text accompanying notes  140-290.
66.  Even the most comprehensive Western study of late imperial Chinese criminal law, Law
in Imperial China by  Derk Bodde  and Clarence Morris,  mentions the possibility  of appeals  by
litigants only in passing.  D. BODDE &  C. MORRIS,  supra note 26, at  118.
67.  See, eg., J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL PROCESS supra  note 11, at 6; S.  VAN DER SPRENKEL, supra
note  16,  at 70; Mote, supra note  17,  at 97-98.
68.  With the notable  exception of Ch't  T'ung-tsu, see CH'O  T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT, supra note 16,  none of the scholars mentioned supra in notes 16-18 devote more than pass-
ing attention  to  these procedures  and measures,  and  none suggest  that the checks  could have
imposed any  significant restraint upon magistrates exercising their authority in legal  matters.
69.  Legal matters were one important basis upon which magistrates were evaluated for pos-
sible promotion.  See J. WATT, supra note 29, at 174-75.
70.  Id  at 23-25; Cohen, Chinese  Mediation, supra  note 16,  at 1212; Lubman, supra  note 16, at
1292,  1295.  Michael Walzer has suggested that by the late Ch'ing, the imperial examination may
have  been better  at  testing  exam-taking  skills  than  knowledge  of the Confucian  Classics.  M.
WALZER,  SPHERES OF JusTICE:  A DEFENSE  OF PLURALISM AND  EQUALITY  141 (1983).  For more
on  the imperial examinations, see infra notes 105-08.
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trates in discharging their responsibilities.71  These legal guidelines pre-
scribed an inquisitorial mode of adjudication that encompassed little of
what we see today as fundamental procedural "due process. '72  Persons
accused of crimes were  not presumed to be innocent;73 nor were they
entitled to notice, either of the law74  or of their alleged crimes.75  They
were allowed neither to consult legal counselors (known as sung-kun76)
during  trial, nor to refuse  to answer  the magistrate's  inquiries.77  In-
deed, magistrates were permitted to apply torture78 in order to secure
confessions. 7 9  And neither the evidence gathered nor reports prepared
by the magistrate at trial's end were necessarily  made available to the
accused.s0
71.  See infra  notes 292-94 and accompanying  text.
72.  J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL  PROCESS, supra note  11,  at 5-7;  I. Hst,  supra note 5,  at 52; Forte,
supra  note 18, passim; Tay, supra note 16, passim.
73.  Gelatt, supra note  11,  at 263-65.
74.  Editions of imperial laws and regulations published by the state were generally for offi-
cial use only.  Although a few private editions were published as well,  these do not appear to have
been readily available  to private persons.  T. METZGER,  supra note 28, at 146-50.  In any  event,
throughout  imperial Chinese history,  a vast  majority of the population  was illiterate  (although
some imperial  edicts were read aloud from time to time by village  elders).  Contrary  to the pre-
vailing impression in the West, the Chinese took pains prior to the Opium War to give notice  of
Chinese laws to foreigners  on the supposition that such persons could  otherwise not be familiar
with them.  Edwards,  supra  note 29, at 243-45.
75.  Ch'ing law did not require  that the magistrate fully apprise  persons  before  him of the
specific  crimes of which they  stood accused.
76.  I.  HsO,  supra note 5, at 52; J. FAIRBANK,  supra note  17,  at  120.  The  term  sungpkun
(literally, "litigation cudgel," but generally translated as "litigation trickster") was a pejorative one
used to describe individuals who earned their livelihood  by preparing petitions  and other papers
for persons involved in legal matters.  They generally had no formal legal training but often either
had acquired  direct experience  with legal affairs by virtue of having worked on a magisterial staff
or had, at least, been able to educate themselves through study of various specialized private  texts
on law.  1 CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM,  supra  note 30, at  157;  infra note  109.  Some also held
imperial degrees.  See infra notes  108,  308.
In the absence  of an  officially recognized  legal profession,  the sung-kun were the  principal
private source of legal advice for the general populace.  I CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL  SYSTEM,  supra
note 30, at  157.  The official attitude toward sung-kun is reflected  in an imperial decree of 1820,
translated  in Law in Imperial  China and reproduced  by Victor  Li in Law Without Lawyers, that
calls  the sung-kun "rascally  fellows  [who]  entrap  people for the  sake  of profit.  They  fabricate
empty words and heap up false charges .... "  V.  Li, supra  note  11,  at 19-20.  Technically, it was
not against Ch'ing law for a private individual to advise "a simple and uninformed person...
and draw.  . . up an information  for him in the legal and.  . . customary manner."  TA  TsINo
LEu  LEE  [THE  CODE OF  THE GREAT  CH'ING DYNASTY]  § 340 (G. Staunton trans.  1966)  (Taipei
reprint) [hereinafter  cited as CH'NG  CODE].
77.  See, e.g., J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL  PROCESS, supra  note  I1,  at 6; R. SMITH, supra note  17,  at
42.
78.  CH'O T'UNG-Tsu,  LOCAL GOVERNMENT,  supra  note  16, at  124-26; J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL
PROCESS,  supra note  II, at  6; S.  VAN  DER  SPRENKEL,  supra note  16,  at  68.  Section  404  of the
Ch'ing Code speaks,  for example,  of categories of persons  the  magistrate  was prohibited  from
torturing.  CH'ING CODE,  supra  note 76, § 404; see also infra note 293 and accompanying text; A.
Conner, supra note 29, at 119-52.
79.  J. COHEN, CRIMINAL  PROCESS,  supra note  11,  at 6.  Put  see infra note  161.
80.  Magistrates  were required to submit written reports to their superiors in cases in which
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A  third concern  of Western scholars  has been  the nature  of the
substantive  law administered  through the process.  That  law was  not
framed in terms of individual rights  and equality.  Instead,  it largely
buttressed the authority of the imperial government and family."'  The
law  accorded  vastly  different  treatment  to  persons  depending  upon
their relative statuses,82 with the most crucial distinctions being those of
ruler-subject,  husband-wife,  and father-son.83  For example,  a father
striking a son would receive a far less severe punishment than would a
son  striking  a father, 4  even  if both  father  and  son  were  vigorous,
healthy adults.  Other features of late imperial Chinese law troubling to
Western  scholars  have  included  the  possibility  it held  for  collective
punishment, 5  its broad definition  of intent,8 6  and  its catch-all  provi-
sions  outlawing that which "ought not to  be done,"87  and permitting
the extension of criminal law by analogy.88
Finally, the fourth major dimension of the formal criminal justice
process  noted by  Western  scholars  was  the  apparent  attitude  of the
Chinese  populace  as reflected  in the writings  of Emperors  and high-
level officials,89  folk-wisdom,9"  and the observations of nineteenth-cen-
they recommended the imposition of punishments greater than bambooing, see infra note  160 and
accompanying text, but  there was no requirement  that copies of these reports be provided to the
defendant.
81.  J. FAIRBANK,  supra note 17,  at 117-23;  L. STOVER,  supra  note  17,  at 89-90.
82.  J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL  PROCESS, supra note  11,  at 6-7.
83.  D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,  supra note 26, at 33-38; CH'u T'UNG-TSU,  LAW AND  SOCIETY.
supra note  16, passim.
84.  C'HO T'UNG-TSu,  LAW  AND  SocIETY,  supra  note  16,  at 41-66; J. FAiRBANK,  supra  note
17,  at  121.
85.  In theory, at least, individuals could be punished for the misdeeds of others.  Reflecting
their lowly  position in late  imperial China,  women could, for example,  be sentenced  to banish-
ment if their husbands  received a sentence of exile.  See CH'ING CODE, supra  note 76, §  15.  Also,
under  the pao-chia system  (a system of population registration  and crime-reporting)  a person
might be punished  for failing to report  the crimes  of other families with which his family was
grouped.  HSiAo KUNrG-CHUAN, supra note 59, at 42-83.  It is not clear how often individuals were
in fact held responsible for the crimes of other persons.  Stover suggests  that it may have been  a
frequent occurrence.  L. STOVER,  supra note 17,  at 91-92.
86.  See, e.g., Forte, supra note 18,  at  156.  For an illustration of Western  concern about the
Chinese definition of intent, see the account of the Terranova case in M. HUNT, spra  note 17,  at
1-2.  Randle Edwards'  essay on Ch'ing treatment of foreigners masterfully uses both Chinese and
Western materials to portray the mutual difficulties of perception  and understanding experienced
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries as Western merchants came into contact with the Chinese.
Edwards, supra note 29, at 222.
87.  See, eg., J.  COHEN,  CRIMINAL  PROCESS,  supra note  11,  at 6-7; see also CH'ING  CODE,
supra note 76,  § 386.
88.  See, e.g.,  D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,  supra  note 26, at 32.  But see Chen, On Analogy, supra
note  29, at 212.  This provision is found in the  CH'ING CODE,  supra note 76, § 44.
89.  Particularly notorious,  although not necessarily  representative of other emperors,  is the
1670  Sheng-yf  [Sacred  Edict] of the K'ang-hsi  Emperor  which, inter  alia, harshly  denounced
those who would bring lawsuits.  A portion of the edict is translated in Cohen,  Chinese  Mediation,
supra note 16,  at  1215.  It is discussed in L. STOVER,  supra note  17,  at  90-94.
90.  Drawing  upon  the  writings  of late  19th-  and early 20th-century  observers  residing  inCALIFORNIA  LAW REVIEW
tury Western merchants, missionaries,  and diplomats.9 1  These sources
portray the populace as viewing the process with trepidation, to say the
least.92  This reaction may have arisen out of the awesomeness for most
Chinese  peasants  of encounters  with  officialdom, 93  a Confucian-ori-
ented sense that resort to a formal  legal  remedy  reflected  moral fail-
ure,94  the  corruption  and  venality  of  magisterial  subalterns,9  the
seemingly oppressive manner in which trials were to be conducted,96 or
the  severity  of the  substantive  criminal  law.9 7  Whatever  the  cause,
many  Western  scholars  have  found little  to  suggest that the  Chinese
populace  viewed  the  formal  criminal  justice  process  as  a  means
through which individual justice might be secured.
II
THE  CASE RECONSTRUCTED
A.  Murder in Yik-hang?
At midmorning  on November  28,  1873,  Ko Pin-lien took to his
bed, never  again to arise.9"  Few, if any, of his neighbors in the Yti-
hang district of Chekiang province could have imagined how the unex-
pected  death of this  lowly bean-curd  shop  attendant would  affect the
lives of his wife Hsiao-pai-ts'ai, the dashing young scholar Yang Nai-
wu, a host of imperial representatives,  and even the Emperor himself.
The story of the extraordinary chain of events set off by Ko's death
must start with his marriage to Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  some  eighteen months
earlier.99 The information available about this unschooled peasant wo-
China, Stanley Lubman and Sybille Van der Sprenkel each recount popular sayings regarding the
formal criminal justice process.  Typical of them is  the warning, "[D]on't  eat anything poisonous
and don't break the law."  S.  VAN  DER SPRENKEL, supra  note 16, at 135; Lubman, supra  note  16, at
1296;  see also 1 S.  WILLIAMS,  supra note 43.
91.  See, e.g.,  the sources  listed supra in note 43  and accompanying text.
92.  See, e.g.,  CH'O T'UNG-TsU, LAW  AND SocIETY, supra note 16, at 284-85; V. LI, SUpra  note
11,  at  14;  S.  VAN  DER  SPRENKEL,  supra note  16,  at 77-78,  135;  Gelatt, supra note 11,  at 263-65;
Lubman, supra  note  16,  at 1295-96; Schwartz,  supra note 17,  at 68.
93.  L. STOVER,  supra  note 17,  at 91;  Kamenka  & Tay, supra note  18,  at 23.
94.  J. CH'EN, supra note 17,  at 316; CH'  T'U1N-Tsu,  LAW  AND  SOCIETY,  supra note  16, at
284;  . Hs),  supra note 5,  at 52-53;  Cohen,  Chinese Mediation,  supra note  16,  at  1206-07,  1214;
Lubman,  supra note 16,  at 1291-92;  Mote, supra note  17,  at 96; Northrop,  The MediadionalAp.
proval  Theory ofLaw in American Legal Realism, 44 'VA. L. REV.  347, 349  (1958).
95.  J. COHEN, CIMINAL  PROCESS,  supra note  11,  at  6; L. STOVER,  supra note  17,  at 92-93.
Cohen, Chinese Mediation supra  note  16, at 1213-14;  Lubman, supra note 16,  at 1295-96; see also
infra  note 308.
96.  See supra  notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
97.  See supra notes 81-88  and accompanying text.
98.  See infra  Appendix B for a list of all individuals involved in this case.
99.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra note 32, at 2:2.  The account  in Important Policies of the
early aspects of the case consists of the verbatim reproduction of a final memorial  submitted  by
the Board  of Punishments  in April  of 1877  sketching briefly  the  history  of the case  before  it
reached  the provincial capital.  The memorial, most likely written by the Board President Tsao-
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man who was to become a legendary figure is, not surprisingly, sketchy
and focused chiefly on physical characteristics. I°°  Not one of the many
sources  even mentions her full name.  All  instead refer to her as Mrs.
Ko, n6e Pi, her formal married name, or, more typically, as Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai (meaning "little cabbage"'01), a suggestive nickname given her be-
cause of the resemblance her appealingly plump figure bore to that late
imperial Chinese symbol of feminine attractiveness.  Those accounts of
the case dwelling at all upon her agree that she was considered  a wo-
man  of exceptional  beauty not only by the inhabitants  of her native
YUi-hang but also by others who encountered  her during the course of
the case.'02
The marriage  of Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  to Ko P'in-lien appears  to have
been  one of convenience.  Given his lowly position, it is unlikely that
Ko  P'in-lien  could  have  secured  a  more  conventional  marriage.1 0 3
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai's  reputation  for  promiscuity  made  it  highly  doibtful
that she could have  expected a better mate than a bean-curd  shop at-
tendant.  But  whatever  their  motivations  may  have  been,  Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai's and Ko P'in-lien's marriage  soon proved to be  a troubled one.
They lived on the edge of poverty and often quarreled bitterly.
Owing to the couple's poverty and to the fact that Ko's father had
died and his mother had remarried, Ko had no family home to which
he  might  bring Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  when they wed in April  of 1872.  Ac-
cordingly,  Ko  arranged  to rent  a single room  in a three-room  house
owned by Yang Nai-wu,  a handsome thirty-four year-old who had ac-
complished the impressive task of passing the second-level imperial ex-
pao,  is  not reprinted  in either  the  Tung-hua Records or the  Veritable Records, the two  major
sources  for late  Ch'ing domestic  history.  See supra note 32;  infra Appendix  A.  It is, however,
summarized in the  Ching  Pao [Peking  Gazette], a gazette published by the imperial court contain-
ing official documents.  The North China Herald  and  Consular  Gazette, an English language news-
paper published in Shanghai,  translated and reprinted  selections from  the Ching Pao under the
heading Peking Gazette.
100.  CH'ING-TAI LI-CH'IH  TSUNG-T'AN  [A COLLECTION  OF WRITINGS  ON GOVERNMENT  AD-
MINISTRATION  DURING  THE  CH'ING  DYNASTY]  4:727-28  [hereinafter  cited as  WRITINGS  ON  AD-
MINISTRATION];  YO-HANG  TA-YU  CHI  [A  HISTORY  OF  THE  GREAT  CASE  OF  YJ-HANG]
[hereinafter  cited  as  CASE  HISTORY],  reprinted  in HUA-SUI-JEN-SHENG  AN  CHIH-I  [RECOLLEC-
TIONS  FROM  THE  HUA-SUI-JEN-SHENG  CHAMBER]  (Huang  Chiln  comp.  1965)  (Taipei  reprint)
[hereinafter cited  as CHAMBER  RECOLLECTIONS].
101.  See, e.g.,  CH'ING  PAI LEI-CH'AO  [MISCELLANEOUS  RECORDS  CONCERNING  THE  CH'ING
DYNASTY]  227 (Hs(U  K'o ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited as MISCELLANEOUS  RECORDS]; WRITINGS  ON
ADMINISTRATION,  supra note  100, at 4:728-29;  Shen  Pao, Apr. 18,  1876;  id., Mar.  3,  1877.  For a
glimpse of the enduring importance of the cabbage  in Chinese life, see Bennett,  Old Chinese Ad-
age: No Hungry Winters IfLots of Cabbage, Wall Street  J., Dec.  6,  1983,  at 1, col. 3.
102.  See, e.g.,  Shen Pao, Apr.  18,  1876.
103.  WRITINGS  ON  ADMINISTRATION,  supra note  100,  at 726.
104.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:3a.
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amination1 0 5  (the chi-jen' 06)  and was  now preparing  himself for the
third and highest level  (the chin-shih°7) in anticipation  of an  official
career.  Although himself the son of a  chaljen, Yang  had fallen upon
hard times and so found it necessary to support himself and his family
by writing complaints, petitions, and other legal  documents for the lo-
cal populace, 0 8 and renting out that part of his home vacated since he
had  sent  his  wife  and  young  child  to  stay  with  her  parents  in  the
countryside.'0 9
Yang's  work  on behalf of the  local populace  had  earned him  a
reputation  as  a  shrewd  legal craftsman  who was  not  above using his
position as a member of the local degree-holding elite to advantage  in
his  work." 0  In  so  doing,  Yang  managed  to  antagonize  both  fellow
members  of the Yut-hang  gentry and  the local magistrate and yamen
staff.II  The Yti-hang gentry apparently felt it demeaning not only that
one of their  class should earn his living writing legal complaints  but,
additionally, that he should do so in what was considered an unprinci-
pled,  unmannered  fashion.  The  local magistrate,  Liu Hsi-t'ung,  and
his staff were reportedly irritated by the frequency and indelicacy with
105.  Modem historians agree that the Chinese were the first people to use competitive exami-
nations to select officials.  Teng Ssu-ytI,  Chinese Influence on the  Western Examination System, 7
HARV. J. ASIATIC STUD.  267  (1943).  Such examinations  may have been offered as early as  1100
B.C.  Id.  at  268-70.  In any event,  they were given  during the later  Han  dynasty (25-220  A.D.),
and, after a long  interlude, on a  fairly regular  basis  from  622 A.D.  onward  to  1905.  Kracke,
Family vs. Merit in Chinese Civil Service Examinations  Under the Empire, 10  HARV.  J. ASIATIC
STUD.  103 (1947).  Teng Ssu-ytk  has traced the influence of this method of selecting officials  upon
the British and American systems of civil service examinations. Teng Ssu-ytl, supra, at 267.
106.  The chft-jen%  the second of the three major imperial degrees, was awarded  to candidates
successful on the provincial level examination.  According to a leading modem  authority on  the
imperial examination  system, "the  chf!l-en status was a crucial one  in the stratification  of Ming-
Ch'ing society," for those who held this degree were clearly marked  as individuals of consequence
within  their  communities.  Ho  PING-TI,  THE  LADDER  OF  SUCCESS  IN  IMPERIAL  CHINA  26-27
(1962).
107.  The chin-shih  was the highest of the three major imperial degrees and was awarded only
to a  select  number of individuals who  performed  with  distinction  on  an  arduous  examination
offered every third year in Peking.
108.  Yang Nai-wu was by no means the only holder of an imperial degree during this period
who  earned his living assisting the general populace  in legal matters.  Notwithstanding  the exist-
ence of legal limitations upon the extent to which holders of the sheng-ylan (the first of the three
major degrees) who were also known as licentiates, and members of the local gentry could involve
themselves in judicial  matters to which they were not  a party, many appear to have intervened.
See infra notes  139-41  and accompanying  text; see also 1 CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL  SYSTEM,  supra
note 30, at  155; J. WATT, supra  note 29,  at 223; see also supra note 76; infra note  186.
109.  LI  TZ'U-MING,  DIARY,  supra  note 32, at 4195.
110.  Id  at 4194-95;  Shen Pao, Dec. 29,  1875.
111.  LI Tz'U-MING,  DIARY, supra note 32,  at 4194-95; WRITINGS  ON ADMINISTRATION,  supra
note 100, at 4:727-28.  The term yamen refers to the magistrate's headquarters,  which included the
local court.  For more on the position of district magistrate, see supra  text accompanying notes 59-
61; infra text accompanying  notes 291-94.
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which Yang pointed out their errors and pressured them." 2
The ill will that Magistrate  Liu, his staff, and the local gentry bore
toward Yang as a result of his legal work was exacerbated  both by his
personality  and by  the way  in which  he handled  his  private  affairs.
Even accounts of the case sympathetic to Yang indicate that he was a
heady, often abrasive  individual who had won himself many enemies
in the years before his case arose.1
3  Yang also appears to have had a
reputation  in Yti-hang  for having  sown  more  than his share  of wild
oats as a young man.  The tenor of his married life did little to dispel
this reputation and, indeed, seems to have generated a series of rumors
that made the accusations  of adultery  that were later leveled  against
him appear plausible in the eyes of many Yti-hang residents." 4
Little is known about Ko P'in-lien  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai's  first few
months as tenants of Yang.  By the sixth month following her marriage,
however, Hsiao-pai-ts'ai and Yang had begun to spend a great deal of
time in conversation while Ko P'in-lien was at work.'"  In a statement
made to  officials during the case, Yang's wife said that Yang had told
her that he spent most of his time with Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  listening to her
complaints about her husband and counseling her not to abandon her
marriage.'l6  Whether this be true or not, the questionable propriety of
such  open  and  extended  meetings  between  two  married  individuals
soon became a topic of conversation  among their neighbors and, as the
stories spread, a source of suspicion to Ko." 7
In order  to  test his  suspicions,  on  at least two  occasions Ko  re-
turned from the bean-curd  shop at an earlier hour than usual and hid
outside  Yang's  house.  On  the first  occasion  Ko  overheard  Yang  at-
tempting to teach Hsiao-pai-ts'ai passages from the Classics, and on the
second  he  observed  them  eating  and  laughing  together."t8  With  his
suspicions heightened by the extraordinary  sight of a chii-jen teaching
the Classics to a poor peasant woman" 9 and by the intimacy suggested
112.  According  to one  report,  in the early  1870's Yang went  so far as to lodge  a complaint
against Liu  and his staff, accusing them of having  siphoned off portions  of the local  grain tax.
CASE  HISTORY, supra note 100, at 358.  Although there is no direct confirmation  of this incident,
the local gazetteer for Ytl-hang does indicate that Liu Hsi-t'ung failed to complete two of the three
separate terms he served as Yu-hang's  magistrate.  YO-HANG HSIEN-CHIH KAO [THE  LOCAL GAZ-
ETTEER  FOR YO-HANG  DISTRICT]  2 (Chang  Chi-an comp.  1919)  [hereinafter  cited as  YO-HANG
GAZETTEER].
113.  CASE  HISTORY,  supra note 100,  at 358; Li TZ'U-MINO,  DIARY,  supra note 32, at 4194-95.
114.  Shen Pao, May 22,  1876.
115.  A  NEW  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32,  at 15:5145-46;  IMPORTANT
POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:3a.
116.  Shen Pao, Dec. 7,  1874.
117.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra note  32, at 2:3a.
118.  Id.
119.  Regarded as a key to power and prestige throughout Chinese history, literacy-and par-
ticularly knowledge of the Classics-was largely the domain of men until the late  19th century.
During the last few decades of that century, an increasing number of women from wealthy fami-
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by their casual sharing of a meal, Ko sought the advice and assistance
of both his mother, Mrs.  Shen, n6e Y,  and his mother-in-law.  Soon
thereafter,  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai's  mother  went  to  question  her  daughter
about these  matters,  only  to  discover  her once  again  light-heartedly
sharing a meal with  Yang.  Spurred by his mother-in-law's  report and
perhaps by a recent rent increase, Ko Fin-lien decided that he and his
wife should no longer live in Yang's house.'
20
During the summer  of 1873  Ko and his wife  moved  into  a  one
room house owned by Wang Hsin-p'ei, an elderly relative of Ko's step-
father.  At Ko's urging,  Wang agreed that while  Ko was at the bean-
curd  shop, he  would  keep  an  eye upon Hsiao-pai-ts'ai. t21  Although
Wang  did not see Yang visit Hsiao-pai-ts'ai,  he did report  to Ko  that
during the daylight hours he often saw her leaving the house and  that
at times during the evening he could make out the sound  of her door
being opened and closed. 122  Agitated by this information, as well as by
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai's  recurrent complaints about their marriage, on October
15,  1873 Ko was provoked by a small, unrelated incident to denounce
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  for  infidelity. 123  When  she  denied  his  accusation,  he
beat her soundly, prompting her to cut off her hair and to declare that
she would leave him in order to become a nun.  News of that evening's
events  spread quickly, first to Ko's mother who later  scolded her son
for allowing himself to be carried  away by his suspicions, and then  to
other members  of the neighborhood  who had  by now come  to think
that this marriage  was a particularly  ill-fated one.
The marriage was soon to end.  While at home on November 26,
1873,  Ko  complained  to Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  that he felt hot and tired and
that his legs had begun to swell and discolor.' 24  Rejecting her advice
that he stay at home and rest, Ko went to work that day and each of the
next two,  although he felt worse  as time passed.  By mid-morning  on
the twenty-eighth, however, Ko felt so ill that he decided to leave work
and return to his house.  As he left the shop, Ko appeared to be in deep
pain, according to testimony later given by Shen T'i-jen, Ko's step-fa-
ther. 1 21  Similar  information  about  Ko's  condition  on  that  morning
came  from  testimony  taken  from  the  ti-pao (local  constable)  Wang
lies  began seriously  to study the Classics  and other  literature.  At  no  point in  the late  Ch'ing,
however, did the extension of literacy encompass poor peasant  women such as Hsiao-pai-ts'ai.  E.
RAwsI,  EDUCATION  AND  POPULAR  LITERACY  IN  CH'ING CHINA  6-8  (1979).
120.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra  note 32, at 2:3a.
121.  Id
122.  Shen Pao, Mar. 29,  1876.
123.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra note 32,  at 2:3a.
124.  Id
125.  Id
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Lin'26 and a bystander, both of whom saw Ko vomit on the way home,
and from Wang  Hsin-p'ei's wife, who was startled to  see him stagger
into the house shortly before noon.
After arriving home, Ko took to his bed and then ordered Hsiao-
pai-ts'ai to take 1000 cash to her father so that he might purchase dried
longans, chicken-foot  soup, and other medicinal  substances. 127  How-
ever, before Hsiao-pai-ts'ai could leave the house, Ko began  to vomit
and  gasp for breath.  Then, suddenly,  he lapsed  into semi-conscious-
ness  and began to  emit a white phlegm-like fluid  from his mouth. 28
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  was  horrified by this  sight  and let out a loud  cry that
brought Wang Hsin-p'ei and his wife running.  Sensing that Ko's con-
dition was serious, Wang immediately sent for Ko's mother, Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai's mother, and a neighborhood physician.
129  Despite their efforts,
Ko failed to regain consciousness and died early that evening.130
Although Ko's mother, Mrs. Shen, initially assumed that her son's
death had been caused by illness, she soon came to suspect foul play.
Accounts  of the  case  differ  markedly  in  their  descriptions  of what
aroused her suspicion.  One source' 3 1 indicates that Ko's body began to
decompose  at  an inordinately  rapid  rate, thus  leading his  mother to
enlist the aid of the local  constable  in preparing a petition  asking the
magistrate to help clarify the cause of her son's death.'32  Others
133 im-
plicate Magistrate  Liu's son as having implanted in the minds of Mrs.
Shen and the magistrate the idea that Ko had been poisoned.  Still an-
other 34  remarks  that  a  litigation trickster 35  named  Wang  conspired
with a local physician to persuade Ko's mother to complain to the mag-
istrate in the hope that they might extract large fees from her. And one
126.  According to Ch'% T'ung-tsu, within each neighborhood, the ti-pao essentially "served  as
the messenger to the magistrate,"  reporting local disputes and grievances.  Cif0 T'UNG-TSU,  Lo-
CAL  GOVERNMENT,  supra note  16,  at 3-4.  The  position of !i-pao is  also  discussed in  1 CHANG
WEJEN,  LEGAL  SYSTEM,  supra note 30, at  154-55.
127.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra note 32, at 2:3a.  Although the value of copper cash varied
according  to time and place, in Chekiang during the period in question,  1000 cash would not have
been an insubstantial sum for someone of Ko's position, as it was roughly equivalent to a bean-
curd shop attendant's salary  for six to ten weeks.
128.  Id  at 2:3b.
129.  Peking Gazette, Apr.  12,  1877.
130.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:3b.
131.  Id
132.  As Ch'tI T'ung-tsu reports, serious  "[c]riminal  cases, including homicide,  robbery, theft,
adultery, and kidnapping, could be reported to a magistrate at any time ......  CHI  T'UNG-TSU,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT,  supra  note  16,  at 119.  The magistrate was obligated to investigate all com-
plaints of murder and, indeed, could be punished for failure to apprehend the murderer within the
deadlines set down  by law.  Id. at  121-22.
133.  MISCELLANEOUS  RECORDS,  supra note  101,  at 227-28;  WRITINGS  ON  ADMINISTRATION,
supra note  100,  at 4:727-28.
134.  CASE  HISTORY,  supra  note  100,  at 357.
135.  See supra note 76.
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further account136 suggests that it was not until she heard rumors on the
day after her son's death about the extent of her daughter-in-law's  in-
volvement with Yang that she began to wonder.
Judging  from the wording  of Mrs.  Shen's petition  to Magistrate
Liu and from the manner in which the Board of Punishments  finally
disposed of the case, the first of these accounts  seems the most plausi-
ble. 137  The version implicating Magistrate  Liu's son is almost certainly
false, as it was later established that he had left the district long before
November  26,  1873.  It  is  almost  as  unlikely  that  Mrs.  Shen  was
prompted by a litigation trickster; first, because she was a poor woman
unlikely to know of or be of much interest to such  a person, and sec-
ond, because the Board of Punishments, which dispensed  punishments
even to individuals  having minor roles in the case, makes no mention
in its final  verdict  of any participation  by the  abhorred  sung-kun. 38
Finally, the lack of any reference  in her petition  to Yang,  Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai, poison, or even neighborhood speculation casts some doubt on the
possibility that Mrs.  Shen was motivated by local gossip.
B.  The Magisterial  Investigation and Trial
Magistrate  Liu's first step, after receiving Mrs.  Shen's petition  on
the morning of November  30,  1873,  was to speak with the licentiate139
Ch'en Chu-shan who reportedly was at the yamen to seek medical ad-
vice.' 40  One source suggests that  Ch'en and Yang were  not on good
terms, supposedly because their legal counseling had previously placed
them in opposition.' 4'  Although there is no confirmation of this antag-
onism,  some  accounts  suggest  that  Ch'en  emphasized  neighborhood
gossip  suggesting  that Ko had been  poisoned  and hinting that Yang
might be involved because  he reportedly was already having  an affair
with Ko's wife' 42
Accordingly,  that  afternoon  Liu  sent  his watchman  Shen  Ts'ai-
ch'ilan  and his coroner  Shen Hsiang  to examine the  body of the de-
ceased. 43  By  the time these two men arrived, the corpse had already
136.  Shen Pao, May 22, 1876.
137.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra  note  32,  at 2:4.
138.  A NEW  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32,  at  15:5143-47.
139.  As explained supra  in note 108, the term licentiate was used to refer to holders of the first
examination degree.
140.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra note 32,  at 2:3.
141.  Chao K'e-chtn, Injustice, supra note 33,  at  18.
142.  See, e.g., Shen Pao, May 22,  1876.
143.  During the Ch'ing, magisterial  staffs often included  several hundred runners, of which
watchmen  were one type,  CH'0 T'UNG-TsU,  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT,  supra note  16,  at 56-64,  and
from one to three coroners  depending on the size of the district. 1 CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM,
supra note 30,  at  161  n.153; see infra note  308.  Under  Ch'ing law, Magistrate  Liu should have
personally supervised the examination of Ko's corpse.  CH'ING CODE, supra  note 76, § 412.  Alison
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begun to blister and swell, particularly in the abdominal region.44  The
torso  had started to assume  a greenish-black  hue and its fingers  and
toes had taken on an ashen-grey tinge.  In addition, fluid had started to
seep into the corpse's eyes and ears, further complicating the process of
autopsy  laid  out  in  H-yian lu,
145  the  classic  Chinese  coroner's
manual.
After  a  preliminary  investigation  of  the  corpse's  exterior  but
before undertaking the required step of inserting silver probing needles
into the corpse's  cavities,  the two functionaries  began  to argue  about
possible causes of death.' 4 6  Influenced by Ch'en Chu-shan's statement,
the  watchman  contended  that  the bloating  and  discoloration  of the
corpse indicated that Ko had been a victim of arsenic poisoning.  The
coroner, however, was not inclined to agree.  As they quarreled about
the cause of death, they forgot to cleanse their silver probing needles in
the prescribed Gleditsia-based  solution prior to inserting them into Ko's
throat. 47  As  a  result,  when  the  needles  were  extracted,  they  were
coated with a greenish-black fluid which, according to the Hsi-yian lu,
suggested that death was not natural but had been caused by the intro-
duction of foreign substances.
In order to ascertain whether the foreign substance involved was a
poison, the coroner then attempted  to match the greenish-black  shad-
ing of the fluid  covering the needles with the descriptions in the coro-
ner's  manual  of the  colors  that  would  appear  had  a  poison  been
ingested.  Although the coroner was unable to make such a match and
so determine that an identifiable poison had been used, he nonetheless
concluded that the watchman's original perception had been correct.
148
Therefore,  together  with  the watchman,  he prepared  a report  on his
findings  for the magistrate indicating  that  an autopsy had been  per-
Conner suggests that "many [magistrates]  left the examination to the coroner, and filled out their
reports  according to his findings."  A. Conner, supra note 29, at 46.
144.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra note 32, at 2:3b.
145.  The  Hsi-yilan I4 (translated as  The Washing Away of Wrongs by Brian McKnight)  was
compiled during the 13th century to assist magistrates and coroners in their inspection of corpses.
THE WASHING  AWAY  OF  WRONGS:  FORENSIC  MEDICINE  IN  THIRTEENTH  CENTURY  CHINA  (B.
McKnight trans. & annot. 1981)  (an annotated translation of the Hsi-yftan Iu); The Hsi-yftan Lu or
Instructions  to Coroners  (H. Giles trans.), 3 CHINA  REV. 30-38,  92-99,  159-72 (1874-75).  Because,
as Professor  Ch'til T'ng-tsu notes, the Hsi-yan lu was considered  "the only authoritative guide-
book," officials relied on it throughout the Ch'ing.  CH'O T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL GOVERNMENT, supra
note  16, at 120; see also 1 CHANG WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 166.  The utilization of
imperial Chinese forensic techniques, as described in the Hsi-yfan lu and other sources,  is compre-
hensively discussed  in  CHUNG-KUO  KU-TMA  MING-AN  CHIEN-YEN  SHu  [THE  METHOD  OF  IN-
QUEST  IN CAPITAL CASES  IN TRADITIONAL  CHINA]  (Huang Wei-hsin ed. & annot.  1981)  (Taipei
reprint).
146.  A  NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO  THE CONSPECTUS,  supra  note 32, at 15:5144;  IMPORTANT  POLI-
CIES,  supra note 32, at 2:4a.
147.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note  32, at 2:4a.
148.  Id.
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formed according to the standards set forth in the Hsi-ykan 14 and that
death had been caused  by poisoning. 1 49
Although the report the coroner delivered  to Magistrate  Liu failed
to state the type of poison used and was later deemed by the Board of
Punishments to be muddled and unclear, Liu accepted it at face value
and immediately had Hsiao-pai-ts'ai brought to the yamen for interro-
gation."' 0  Confronted there with  the news that her husband had been
murdered, Hsiao-pai-ts'ai at first strenuously denied knowledge of that
act.  Liu, however, was not to be deterred, and ordered his staff to apply
physical torture to her, pursuant to legal limits.151
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai stood by her initial denial for a considerable period
of time, but the  torture, which  exceeded  the legal  norms,  eventually
broke  her resistance.' 52  Having  retracted  her  denial,  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai
stated that she  had poisoned  her husband by slipping arsenic into his
food.
15 3  She quickly added, however, that the poisoning had not been
her idea and had been carried out at the urging of another individual.
After hesitating as to the identity of the instigator and then finding her-
self subject to further torture, Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  at last  declared that the
person  responsible for plotting the death of her husband was  the chfi-
jen, Yang Nai-wu.'54  Yang, she hastily explained, had been her lover
ever since the time that she and her husband had rented a room in his
house.  His concern about her husband's suspicions and his anger at the
beating  her husband had given her had  finally led  him  to decide  to
have her poison Ko.  She had originally opposed the idea but Ko's con-
tinued harassment  and Yang's promise to take her as his second wife
after the deed was done had combined to persuade her to carry out his
plan.  Accordingly,  on November  24, Yang had purchased the arsenic
which  she deposited in Ko's food on November  26.
Without bothering to seek evidence corroborating Hsiao-pai-ts'ai's
charges,  Liu  immediately  had  Yang  arrested  for instigating  and  di-
recting  the  murder  of Ko P'in-lien.1 5 5  Yang  was indignant  at being
linked in any way with the death of the lowly bean-curd shop attendant
and demanded that he be freed.  At that point, Liu had Hsiao-pai-ts'ai
brought forward to repeat her story. Despite Yang's strenuous denial of
149.  A NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32,  at  15:5144.
150.  Id.
151.  Id  Although  they were often  observed in the breach,  the Ch'ing did have precise  rules
regarding  the application of torture.  For a brief description,  see T'AO  HSI-SHENO,  THE SYSTEM,
supra note 30,  at 34-36;  A.  Conner, supra note 29,  at  119-67;  infra notes  161,  292-94,  308  and
accompanying  text.
152.  A  NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32,  at  15:5144.
153.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note 32, at  2:4a.
154.  A  NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5145.
155.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note  32, at 2:4a.
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all she said, Liu had Yang placed in the yamen jail56 and on the first of
December stripped him of his degree so that he could be placed on trial
for Ko's murder.'57
Informed of the details of the charge against Yang, his brother and
brother-in-law went to the yamen to tell the magistrate that on the day
Yang had  allegedly handed  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai the poison, he had in fact
been with his wife's family in Nan-hsiang, a day's journey to the south
of Y-a-hang.  Liu heard them out but decided that they had fabricated
this alibi in order to protect their relative. 58
During the next few days, Liu continued  to take testimony  from
Wang  Hsin-p'ei,  Mrs.  Shen's  husband  Shen  T'i-jen,  and  others  ac-
quainted with the accused and the deceased.  Although this later testi-
mony  was  vague  and  contained  no  concrete  evidence  further
implicating the accused, in early December Liu formally  decided that
Yang was  guilty of the offenses  of adultery and instigating  a murder
and that Hsiao-pai-ts'ai was guilty of the offenses of adultery and mur-
dering a superior relation. 159  Magistrates  were prohibited by law, how-
ever, from passing more than provisional  sentences in cases involving
crimes  carrying  punishments  heavier than bambooing.1
60   Moreover,
proper judicial practice mandated that a suspect acknowledge his guilt
before  final judgment could be rendered.' 6'  Therefore,  after reaching
his decision, Liu began to prepare a report to be sent along with the two
prisoners  to the next level of the legal system-the Hangchow  prefec-
ture. In the first part of his report, Liu restated the findings of his coro-
ner, set forth Hsiao-pai-ts'ai's  confession and the other testimony given,
and described the confrontation between her and Yang.  In the remain-
der of his report, Liu recommended that for their crime, she should be
sliced  to death  (ling-ch'ih) and he beheaded  (hsiao-shou).62  Accord-
156.  Chao Ke-ch'ttn, Injustice, supra  note 33,  at  18.
157.  IMPORTANT POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:4a.  Although non-office holding degree recipi-
ents were not exempt from either arrest or punishment, the law did provide them with the oppor-
tunity  to  "redeem"  most  sentences  with  payments.  By  first  stripping  Yang  of  his  degrees,
Magistrate Liu effectively  denied that privilege  to Yang.  See infra text accompanying note 262.
158.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra  note 32, at 2:4a-5b.
159.  Id.
160.  After reaching a provisional sentence  (m), the  magistrate  was required to send (chieh-
shen or chao-chieh)  the accused and all necessary documents to the prefect.  Shiga, CriminalProce-
dure (I), supra note  30, at 17.
161.  Although some  authorities have stated  that  Ch'ing law required  confessions  from de-
fendants,  J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL PROCESS,  supra note  11,  at 6,  the better view is that there was no
formal legal requirement.  From T'ang times (618-907 A.D.) onward, if not earlier, however, such
acknowledgements  apparently  were  considered  essential  components  of criminal  trials.  Shiga,
Criminal  Procedure  (11),  supra note 30, at 120-22;  A. Conner, supra note 29, at  190-204.
162.  Because of the Confucian  admonition that it was unfilial to die lacking any  part of the
body with which one had been born, death by slicing and beheading  (after which the head was to
be exposed) were considered, in that order, the two most severe punishments available under the
Ch'ing Code and were  therefore to be prescribed only for the most heinous crimes.
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ingly, on December 9,  1873, Yang Nai-wu, Hsiao-pai-ts'ai, and Magis-
trate Liu's report were sent to the Hangchow prefect  Ch'en Lu.
C  A  Prefectural  Rehearing
Notwithstanding  the  dubious  quality  of  the  Yti-hang  coroner's
findings and the fact that Yang had persistently refused to confess, the
Hangchow  Prefect  Ch'en Lu chose to act upon, rather than  question,
the basic premises of Liu's report.  Instead of carrying out a fresh, com-
prehensive  investigation  of the  facts of the case  as  was required  by
law, ' 6  Ch'en  satisfied  himself with  ordering  Mrs.  Shen  to  come  to
Hangchow  and make  a  statement  about  her son's  death.'l "  By  this
time, feeling that Hsiao-pai-ts'ai and Yang Nai-wu probably had been
involved in Ko's death and being eager to seek revenge,  Ko's mother
decided to "elaborate"  on the facts contained  in the petition  that she
had initially submitted. 165  Accordingly, at Hangchow she declared that
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  and Yang Nai-wu had committed  adultery  and gener-
ally had behaved in such a way that it was certain that they  were re-
sponsible for her son's death by poisoning. 66
His initial impressions buttressed by Mrs. Shen's testimony, Ch'en
Lu  summoned  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  and  Yang  Nai-wu  for  interrogation.
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  readily  repeated her  confession.  Yang, however,  per-
sisted in proclaiming his innocence, whereupon Ch'en ordered his staff
to torture Yang. 67  After applying a variety of tortures, including beat-
ing,  stretching,  and  pressing  (between  two  wooden  boards),  Ch'en's
staff finally succeeded in extracting a statement from Yang to the effect
that he was responsible for instigating and directing the murder of Ko
P'in-lien.168  When pressured to supply further details, Yang stated that
while  on  the  road home  from  Nan-hsiang  on  November  22  he  had
stopped at a small pharmacy run by a man named Ch'ien Pao-sheng.' 69
There,  on the pretext  of needing  something  with  which  to eliminate
rats, he had purchased arsenic.  Later, continued Yang, he had supplied
this poison to Hsiao-pai-ts'ai and had instructed her how to place it in
Ko's food.
Having elicited the source of the poison, on December  16,  Prefect
Ch'en directed  Magistrate  Liu to find  the druggist Ch'ien  Pao-sheng.
163.  Prefects and higher level officials receiving cases carrying provisional sentences were ex-
pected  to carry  out  vigorous  examinations  of the relevant  individuals  and documents.  Shiga,
Criminal  Procedure (I),  supra note 30, at  17.
164.  A NEw  SUPPLEMENT TO THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5145.
165.  Id  at 15:5145;  see also IMPORTANT POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:4.
166.  A NEw  SUPPLEMENT  TO THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at  15:5144-46.
167.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:4a.
168.  Id
169.  Id.
1206 [Vol. 72:1180IMPER1AL CHINESE LEGAL PROCESS
Liu then ordered  the District  Sub-Director of Studies Chang Chtin to
find and interrogate the druggist implicated by Yang. 70  Chang found
a druggist meeting Yang's description, but named Ch'ien T'an.  Ch'ien,
however, insisted that he was not the individual being sought, that his
personal name had never been Pao-sheng, and that he had never trans-
acted business with Yang Nai-wu.t7 '  At this point, Ch'ien's  younger
brother prevailed upon the licentiate Ch'en Chu-shan to intervene.' 72
Ch'en visited the pharmacist in the yamen and was there able to per-
suade him that it would be in his best interests to cooperate.  Specifi-
cally,  Ch'en was able  to badger  the druggist  into giving  a statement
conforming with Yang Nai-wu's  assertions by  suggesting  that Ch'ien
would receive no more than a nominal punishment if he confessed and
by hinting that more might await him if he refused to cooperate. 73
It is unclear whether Ch'en Chu-shan informed Magistrate Liu of
the extent to which he had badgered  Ch'ien T'an, but after personally
interviewing Ch'ien, Liu seems to have become wary of what he might
say.
174  Instead of following the standard procedure of sending the ac-
cusing witness to the prefecture, however, he merely forwarded a tran-
script  of  Ch'ien's  testimony.  Prefect  Ch'en,  in  turn,  accepted  the
transcript and did not pursue the matter further, although under Ch'ing
law he should have  spoken  directly with the  druggist.'  Instead,  on
the basis  of the  original  report  of Magistrate  Liu,  the  transcript  of
Ch'ien  T'an's testimony,  the statement  given  by  Mrs.  Shen,  and  the
confessions  of the  two  prisoners  (with  regard  to which  he made  no
mention of torture), Prefect  Ch'en  drew up a report in which he en-
dorsed Liu's original recommendations.
76
D.  The Case Moves to the Provincial  Level
Consistent with the requirements of Ch'ing law,"'  in late Decem-
ber Ch'en Lu forwarded  his report, the other documents pertaining to
the case, and the two prisoners to the provincial Judicial Commissioner
K'uai Ho-sun. 78  After scrutinizing  the written materials  he had  re-
ceived  on  December  25  and noting  his approval  of Magistrate  Liu's
170.  A NEw  SUPPLEMENT  TO THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5144.  As District  Sub-
Director of Studies, Chang's chief responsibility consisted of overseeing  candidates for the impe-
rial examinations.
171.  Chao K'e-chtln,  Injustice,  supra note 33,  at  18.
172.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:4a.
173.  Id.
174.  Chao K'e-chtin, Injusice,  supra note 33,  at  18.
175.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure  (I), supra note 30, at  17.
176.  A NEW SUPPLEMENT  TO THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5146.
177.  Shiga, Criminal  Procedure (I), supra note 30, at  17-25.
178.  The judicial  commissioner  (an-ch'a  shih or nieh-ssu) was  in charge  of judicial affairs
within  the province.  This position was felt to be one of considerable  importance and was often
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original recommendations,  K'uai sent the case  along to the Chekiang
Governor Yang Ch'ang-chuin.179  Governor Yang made a preliminary
review  of the  comments  and then,  as  was  standard  procedure,  dis-
patched an expectant magistrate 8 0  to Yu.-hang to conduct a  secret in-
vestigation  into the facts of the case.  Wishing  to  avoid antagonizing
Governor  Yang,  the expectant  magistrate  Cheng  Hsi-kao  conducted
only the most superficial of inquiries, from which he composed a report
confirming  in all major aspects those  submitted  by  Liu and  Ch'en.'8 1
Reassured by Cheng's report, Governor Yang decided to dispense with
any questioning of the two prisoners  and to commence work immedi-
ately upon  the report to the Board of Punishments  which  the  Ch'ing
Code required in all cases carrying the death sentence. 82  While noting
a few minor factual discrepancies between the reports submitted by Liu
and Ch'en, the Governor declared that the Yii-hang coroner's findings,
the confessions, and the statements of Mrs. Shen and Ch'ien T'an taken
together  showed  that  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  and Yang  Nai-wu  were  indeed
guilty.'83  He therefore endorsed the sentences suggested by Magistrate
Liu.  As a final touch, the Governor proudly drew the Board's attention
to the  fact that his  subordinates  had  solved  this major  case  without
resort to excessive torture.
Under Ch'ing law, an individual feeling that he had received  less
than a fair hearing at the district, prefectural, or provincial levels could
filled by officials with particular skill or experience  in legal matters.  The position's responsibilities
are described  in 1 CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM,  supra note  30, at  175.
179.  Yang Ch'ang-chtln was a native of Hunan.  He rose to prominence  through his involve-
ment  in the Hung-yang Army's  campaigns against  the T'ai-p'ing  rebels and  his  links with  the
powerful Tso Tsung-t'ang.  In  1874, largely with the assistance ofTso, Yang was named Governor
of Chekiang.  CHINESE  BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY  894 (H.  Giles comp.  1898) [hereinafter  cited
as H. GILES,  BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY];  CHUNG-KUO  JEN-MING  TA TsE-TIEN  [CHINESE BIo-
GRAPHICAL DICTIONARY]  1266 (Fang I comp.  1958) (Taipei reprint) [hereinafter  cited as FANG  I,
CHINESE  BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY].
180.  A NEW SUPPLEMENT TO THE CONSPECTUS, supra note 32, at 15:5146.  During the Ch'ing,
provincial governors  generally had small official  staffs.  Successful examination candidates await-
ing permanent  assignment (known as "expectant  officials")  were  one source of manpower, espe-
cially in judicial matters.  Having passed the  chin-shih examination five to  ten years earlier  and
spent the intervening period in minor positions in the capital, these individuals were sent by  the
Board of Punishments to a province to await assignment by the provincial governor to a particular
district.  Shiga, Criminal  Procedure  (I), supra  note 30, at  13-14.  As happened  in the case of Yang
Nai-wu, the effectiveness of these officials  may have been undercut by their inexperience, lack  of
regular position, and fear of offending officials already resident  in the province where they might
well spend considerable  time.
181.  A NEw  SUPPLEMENT TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supr  note 32,  at  15:5144-46.
182.  HSOEH  YiON-SHENG,  TU-LI  Ts'UN-I  [THOUGHTS  ABOUT  UNCERTAIN  MATTERS
GLEANED  WHILE PERUSING  THE  SUBSTATUTE]  411:00  (Huang Tsing-hua  ed.  1970)  (Taipei re-
print) [hereinafter cited as  HSOEH YON-SHENG,  THOUGHTS  ABOUT  UNCERTAIN  MATTERS].  This
and  all  subsequent references  to  Thoughts About  Uncertain Matters follow  Hsteh's format  for
discussing  the statutes and  substatutes of the  Ch'ing Code.
183.  A NEw  SUPPLEMENT TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32,  at  15:5144-46.
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send a special petition (in a procedure known as ching-k'ung  or capital
appeal) 184 to  the  Censorate,  the Board  of Punishments,  or the  Com-
mandant of Gendarmerie18 5  in Peking requesting  a reexamination  of
his case.  During May  of 1874, Yang composed  a petition to be deliv-
ered  by his mother  to  the Censorate. 16   In it he first  repudiated  his
confession, stating that it had been extracted  by excessive torture, and
then listed three reasons why his case  should be  fully retried. 8 7  The
first,  he declared,  was that Magistrate  Liu's  son, Liu Tzu-han, and  a
YU-hang  resident named  Ho Ch'un-fang  had been  sexually  involved
with Hsiao-pai-ts'ai.  They should therefore be interrogated, as  should
the yamen runner Yuan Te, who had sought to extort money from the
deceased,  in order  to  determine whether  they had  influenced  Hsiao-
pai-ts'ai  to  name  Yang in  her  confession.  The  case  should  also  be
reinvestigated, said Yang, because of the possibility that Ko may have
met with violence  from Shen T'i-jen, the man Ko's widowed  mother
had  recently  married. 8   Shen, explained  Yang,  was an ill-tempered
individual who had often quarreled with Ko in the past.  Shen's violent
nature, alleged Yang, was borne out by the fact that a close relative of
his  had  died under  mysterious  circumstances  not  long  before  Ko's
death.  A  third  reason, wrote  Yang Nai-wu,  lay in the  contradictions
and other  errors contained  in the  statements given  by Hsiao-pai-ts'ai
and Ch'ien Pao-sheng.
The  Censorate did not grant Yang's  request for  a complete  new
trial.' 89  However,  as was  standard  procedure  at that time,  the  Cen-
184.  In addition to the obligatory review of cases in which a magistrate had recommended a
serious sentence, Ch'ing law at the time of Yang's  petitions to the  capital enabled  individuals to
appeal cases, provided that (I)  the case was completed at the level of the district magistrate, (2) the
case was  appealed to a provincial official with responsibility  for the official whose decision was
being challenged or to specified governmental  bodies in Peking, see infra text accompanying note
185, and (3)  the problem prompting the appeal was a serious one.  Shiga, Criminal  Procedure  (11),
supra  note  30, at 30-38; T'Ao  HSI-SHENG,  THE  SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 56-60.  The term shang-
k'ung was used to refer to such appeals generally, while  ching-k'ung [capital appeal]  was used to
refer to appeals that were made  directly to officials in Peking.  A history of the ching-k'ung  can be
found in  CH'IN-TING T AI-KUEI  [IMPERIALLY  ESTABLISHED  REGULATIONS  FOR THE CENSORATE]
(1892)  [hereinafter cited as  CENSORATE REGULATIONS].  This procedure is discussed further infra
in notes  186, 297-301,  315-32 and accompanying text.  See also Ocko, supra note 29.
185.  The Commandant of Gendarmerie (pu-ch2n t'ung-ling)  was charged, inter alia, with re-
sponsibility for much of the police work in Peking.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure  (),  supra  note 30,
at 23.
186.  Actually, Yang's sister delivered the petition for him. IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note
32, at 2:5a.  The Ch'ing Code provided that such appeals could be made on behalf of a defendant
by close relations, such as a parent or spouse.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure (I), supra note 30, at 30-
31.  Chang Wejen further suggests that sung-kun often were involved in the ching-k'ung  procedure.
I CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 30, at 224 n.106.  Such appeals could also be made
by or on behalf of persons whose complaints  initiated criminal cases (such as Mrs.  Shen).
187.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra  note 32, at 2:5a.
188.  Chao K'e-chtan, Injstice,  supra  note 33,  at  19.
189.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra  note 32, at 2:5a.
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sorate referred  the case back to Chekiang provincial  Governor  Yang
Ch'ang-chUin for further consideration. 9'  To elicit information about
the charges raised  by Yang Nai-wu in his petition,  the  Governor re-
ferred the case back to the officials beneath him who earlier had inves-
tigated  it.'9'  Prefect  Ch'en  Lu  questioned  Shen  T'i-jen  and  the
neighborhood official Wang Lin.  Both denied Yang Nai-wu's charges,
leading  Prefect Ch'en to reaffirm  his earlier findings.  This prompted
Governor Yang  subsequently  to inform the  Censorate  that a  second
look at the case had  failed to turn  up evidence  inconsistent  with the
initial verdict.
Despondent over the failure of his capital appeal, Yang resolved to
appeal at the provincial level.  In August of 1874,  he arranged  for his
wife to deliver a petition to the Chekiang Judicial Commissioner K'uai
Ho-sun1 92  asking for a reinvestigation  of his case.  When that request
was rejected, Yang decided to undertake  a second petition to  Peking.
The first petition, he reasoned, had failed because  it was not detailed
enough.19 3  In the second, which was delivered  by his wife to the Com-
mandant of Gendarmerie in October, he took pains to elaborate further
the reasons advanced in the first and to set forth four additional factors
which  he felt indicated  the need  for  a new trial.' 94  Briefly,  the new
factors were the inconsistencies  in Mrs.  Shen's two statements, the fail-
ure of the  Hangchow  Prefect  to provide him  with an opportunity  to
confront  the  druggist  Ch'ien,  Yang's  presence  in  Nan-hsiang  on  the
day  he allegedly handed  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  the poison,  and  the seeming
willingness  of higher officials hearing his case to cover up errors made
at the district and prefectural level.
After weighing  Yang's  second capital petition,  the Commandant
of Gendarmerie  in Peking  forwarded  it  to the  Throne, 95  which  in-
190.  Prior to  1882, a body receiving such a petition could either refer it back to the governor
of the province from which it came (tzu-hui) or submit it to the emperor (chft-tsou).  Shiga, CrIml-
nalProcedure  (I), supra note 30, at 33-34.
191.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra  note 32, at 2:5a.
192.  Id
193.  Shen Pao, Dec. 7,  1874.
194.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra  note 32,  at 2:5b; Shen Pao, Dec. 7,  1874;  id.,  Dec.  8, 1874.
195.  On January  12,  1875,  the T'ung-chih Emperor died childless.  In an effort to insure her
continued  access  to power, his Empress  Hsiao-ch'in broke  the  laws  of imperial succession  and
named her three-year-old cousin Tsai-t'ien as the Emperor.  Hsiao-ch'in, who  is now more  com-
monly referred  to as the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi,  also assumed the  position of regent, along
with  the  Empress Hsiao-chen.  EMINENT  CHINESE  OF  THE  CH'ING  PERIOD 295-300,  731-33  (A.
Hummel  ed.  1964)  (Taipei reprint)  [hereinafter  cited  as  EMINENT  CHINESE].  Because  of the
tender age of the new Emperor, who took the reign name Kuang-hstl,  and due to the uncertainty
of both Western  and Chinese  scholars  about the manner  in which decisions were made  in  the
court during the first years of his reign, in the remainder of this Article the term "the Throne" will
be used when reference is made to decisions taken in the name of the Kuang-hstl  Emperor while
he was still a young child.
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structed  Governor  Yang  Ch'ang-chiln  once  again  to  reconsider  the
case.  This time  Governor  Yang  appointed  a five-man  committee  to
investigate the charges made by Yang in his second capital petition. 9 6
The  committee was  headed  by  Hsi Kuang,  the  Prefect  of Hu-chou,
which bordered on Hangchow, and also  included the Shao-hsing Pre-
fect Kung  Chia-chain,  the expectant Chin-hua Prefect  Sun Hsiang-fu,
the Fu-yang  Magistrate  Hsti  Chia-te,  and the  Huang-yen  Magistrate
Ch'en Pao-shan.' 97  During  the committee's  investigation,  which  was
conducted largely behind closed doors and of which no official  record
seems to exist, Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai both repudiated their
confessions. 98  Accordingly, this group of officials  informed Governor
Yang  that they  were  unable to  reach  any conclusion. 99  Construing
this  to be  an  affirmation of his previous  conclusion,  Governor Yang
submitted a memorial to the Throne2'  stating that his second reinvesti-
gation of the case had uncovered no evidence  warranting a reversal of
the initial verdict.2 '
E.  The Case Assumes Broader  Political  Dimensions
Although  Yang  Nai-wu's  second petition failed  to produce  a re-
versal  of the  verdict  against  him,  it did generate  extensive  publicity
about the case.  In Shanghai, the fledgling newspaper Shen Pao,  which
had earlier run brief and intermittent  articles about the case, began to
devote more space to Yang's situation.  The decision of the commission
led by the Hu-chou  Prefect  Hsi Kuang to hold  its sessions in camera
stirred the paper to ask sharply whether the officials  hearing the case
were trying to withhold information from the defendants, the public, or
their  superiors. 2z 2  In particular, the  Shen Pao also  wanted  to know
why the various officials hearing the case had refused to allow Yang to
confront  the  druggist  accusing  him  of having  purchased  poison.20 3
Meanwhile,  in Peking, the case and the manner in which it had been
handled by the bureaucracy had become a source of concern to certain
196.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note  32, at 2:5a.
197.  A NEw  SUPPLEMENT TO THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5143-47.
198.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra  note  32, at 2:5a.
199.  Id
200.  Chao K'e-chtln, Injustice, supra note 33, at 20.
201.  Id
202.  Shen Pao, Apr. 12,  1875;  id,  Apr.  13,  1875.  The law did not mandate that trials be held
in public.  It was,  however,  common practice for magistrates  to allow the public to attend  trials.
CH'0 T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT,  supra  note 16,  at  125.
203.  Shen Pao, Apr. 12,  1875.  Ch'ing law did not require that the defendant have an opportu-
nity to confront his accuser although, ironically, it did require  that multiple defendants be con-
fronted  with  each other  (presumably  so  the  magistrate  could  observe  their  interaction  and
compare  their stories).  CH'ING  CODE,  supra note  76,  § 405.  Alison  Conner  indicates  that al-
though not  required by law, many Chinese  magistrates chose to confront  defendants with their
accusers "in order to compare their demeanor and testimony."  A. Conner, supra note 29, at 74-76.
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officials.  Thus, when Governor  Yang concluded  his second reinvesti-
gation by endorsing the original verdict, the censor Wang Shu-jui sub-
mitted a memorial2"  asking the Throne to remove the case from  the
Chekiang governor's jurisdiction and place it in the hands of an imperi-
ally appointed  special commissioner. 2 0 5
On May 28,  1875, the Throne responded to Wang Shu-jui's memo-
rial  by  appointing  a  special  investigating  committee  headed  by  the
Chekiang province  Literary Chancellor  Hu Jui-lan  and including the
Ning-po Prefect Pien Pao-hsien, the Chia-hsing Magistrate Lo Tzu-sen,
and  the  expectant  magistrates  Ku  Te-heng  and  Kung  Shih-t'ung.
0 6
Hu, continued  the Throne,  should be mindful in carrying  out this in-
vestigation  that  his  Emperor  desired  that  all  aspects  of the  case  be
searched out and thoroughly considered.  To accomplish  this task, Hu
and his colleagues  gathered in Hangchow  on July 21,  1875,  and began
an intensive review of the documentary materials related to the case.20 7
In the late summer of 1875, Hu's committee summoned Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai and Yang Nai-wu  for  interrogation.  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  was  appar-
ently intimidated by this new tribunal and was unwilling  to repudiate
the  confession  she  had  originally  given  to  Magistrate  Liu.208  Yang,
however, stuck by the repudiation  he had made earlier.  According to
the Shen Pao's account of this session, when Hu asked him why he had
chosen to repudiate his confession, Yang made an effort to describe the
major errors that he felt had been made in his case.2 0 9  However, con-
tinued the report, when Hu responded to these answers of Yang's with
criticism and sarcasm, Yang  exploded.  He first declared bitterly  that
the torture  inflicted  upon him  by the  Hangchow  Prefect  Ch'en  Lu's
staff was responsible for his confession and then angrily denounced the
officials who had heard his case for covering up the errors of their pre-
decessors.  Notwithstanding  these  strong  words,  Yang failed  to  per-
suade Hu of his innocence. 2 0
By early November  1875,  Hu and his  colleagues had  concluded
204.  TUNG-HUA  REcOuDs,  supra  note 32, at 365-66.  This same memorial is also reproduced
in the KiangsiNieh-ssu  Ting-liHu-pien  [The Established  Regulations  of  the KangsI  Provincial  Judi-
cial Commissioner's Office], a compendium  of rules, regulations, and other information  pertaining
to national administrative affairs.  See Chen, Provincial  Documents ofLaws and  Regulations  in the
Ch ing Period,  in 3  CH'ING-SHIH WEN-TI No. 6, at 28 (Dec.  1976).
205.  Chao K'e-chtin,  Injustice, supra note 33,  at  20.
206.  See TUNG-HUA  REcoRDs,  supra  note 32, at 366 for the names of the five members of this
committee; see also Chao K'e-chtln, Injuztice, supra note 33,  at 20.  By the time the case of Yang
Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai arose, special commissioners were assigned only in extraordinary situ-
ations.  Shiga,  CriminalProcedure  (I), supra note 30, at 33-34.
207.  Chao K'e-chtln, Injustice, supra  note 33,  at 20.
208.  Shen Pao, Dec.  17,  1875.
209.  Id.
210.  Id.
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their  investigation.  The  findings  of  Magistrate  Liu,  memorialized
Hu,2 ' were essentially correct, save for a few minor factual discrepan-
cies pertaining to matters such as the day upon which the poison was
purchased.  The  charges  and  claims  made  by  Yang  Nai-wu  in  his
two  petitions,  continued  the  memorial,  could  easily  be  dismissed.
Magistrate  Liu's  son was named  Liu  Hai-sheng,  not Liu Tzu-han  as
stated by Yang, and, moreover, he was a fifty-year-old  man who had
left Yti-hang  for his home some months  before the murder occurred.
Ho Ch'un-fang and Yian Te clearly had not had any involvement with
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai.  Mrs.  Shen  had not mentioned  Yang  and  Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai in her initial petition because  at that time  she feared retribution
from her son's killers.  Yang's alibi that he had been in Nan-hsiang on
November 24,  1873 was not credible since only his close relatives could
corroborate it.  The animosity which Yang said characterized  the rela-
tionship  between  Shen T'i-jen and Ko Fin-lien  simply  did not  exist.
Shen  and Ko had gotten  along well  and the  death  of Shen's relative
that Yang had spoken of in his first petition was the result not of foul
play,  but  of illness.  In  light  of all  this,  concluded  Hu,  the  Throne
should adopt the recommendations made by Magistrate Liu in his orig-
inal report. 2
The  Throne  was  pleased  to  receive  Hu  Jui-lan's  report,  for  it
seemed that on the basis of this careful investigation, a rather long and
bothersome murder case could at last be brought to an appropriate end.
Therefore, the Throne instructed the Board of Punishments to conclude
the case in accordance  with Hu's findings.  Not all members of the im-
perial bureaucracy,  however, shared this view  of Hu's work.  On No-
vember  15,  1875,  the  censor  Pien  Pao-ch'ian  submitted  a  strongly
worded  memorial to the Throne  attacking the report and asking  that
the Throne  order  the Board  of Punishments  to try the case  anew  in
Peking.2' 3  It  had long  been  known  in  certain  official  circles,  stated
Pien,  that Hu  Jui-lan  was  a close  friend  of the  Chekiang  Governor
Yang  Ch'ang-chfln.  Nonetheless,  members  of those  circles  had  re-
frained from protesting  Hu's appointment  as  special  commissioner in
the hope that he might place duty above friendship.  Now it was evi-
dent that he had not:  Hu's report had glossed over the inconsistencies
in the record and unreservedly  endorsed the findings  of all Chekiang
officials  involved in the case.214
Yet, continued  Pien, the problems  manifested  by this  case  went
211.  TA-CH'ING  TE-TSUNG  CHING  HUANG-TI  SHIH  LU  [THE  VERITABLE  RECORDS  OF  THE
KUANG-HSO  EMPEROR]  19:166-70  (Taipei reprint 1964).
212.  Id.
213.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS,  supra  note 32, at  151.
214.  Peking  Gazette, Dec.  2,  1875.
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beyond those posed by the friendship of Hu Jui-lan and Yang Ch'ang-
chtun.  In recent  years, even the most independent  of special commis-
sioners  had  failed  to  find  fault  with the work  of provincial  officials.
This did not result from the uniform excellence of provincial  adminis-
tration,  but  rather  had  two  causes:  provincial  officials  had  greater
power than middle-level representatives  of the central government and
special  commissioners,  who  generally  had  small  investigative  staffs,
had to rely  heavily  upon local officials.  The present  case  should  be
brought to Peking, Pien concluded,  not only to resolve its apparent in-
consistencies,  but  also  to  show  provincial  officials  that  there  were
bounds to their authority.215
The Throne did not issue an immediate response to Pien's memo-
rial, but instead sent it to the Board of Punishments  with orders to de-
vise recommendations  by November  23.216  One of the first high-level
Board officials  to act upon this  edict was  the young  Emperor's  tutor
Weng T'ung-ho, who had taken up the post of Junior Vice-President of
the Board only during the previous August.217  Weng launched into the
matter of Yang Nai-wu by ordering the Board archivist to supply him
with a complete copy of the Board's file on this case.21 8  To his surprise,
the Board's archivist was hesitant to fulfill this order and finally did so
only after receiving a rebuke.  According to his diary, once Weng had a
chance to study the file, he began to suspect that there might be a good
reason for the archivist's  hesitancy.2 19  There was an odd  discordance
between the findings of fact in the case, which contained a number of
unresolved discrepancies, and the air of total assurance that marked the
recommendations of the various officials who had heard it.  In particu-
lar, Weng  was puzzled  by  three unexplained  items.22 0  The first  two
concerned Ko P'in-lien's financial resources.  Ko had expended  a con-
siderable sum at the time he had married Hsiao-pai-ts'ai.  Additionally,
according  to  Magistrate  Liu's  report,  both  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  and  Mrs.
Shen had stated that as he lay ill, Ko Fin-lien had given Hsiao-pai-ts'ai
more than  1000 cash for the purchase of medicines.  How, Weng won-
dered, could  a mere bean-curd  shop  attendant  have accumulated  the
sums that Ko apparently had? 221  The other item troubling  Weng was
the  failure  of Governor  Yang  Ch'ang-chtin  and Literary  Chancellor
215.  Id.
216.  TUNG-HUA RECORDS,  supra note 32, at  151.
217.  CH'ING-SHIH  LIEH-CHUAN  [BIOGRAPHIES  OF  PROMINENT  PERSONS]  63:56-58  (Chung-
hua shu-chu comp.  1928);  EMINENT  CHINESE,  supra note 195,  at 860; WENG  T"UNG-HO,  DIARY,
supra note 32, at 825.
218.  WENG  T'UNG-HO,  DIARY, supra note 32, at 826.
219.  Id.
220.  Id  at 826-27.
221.  Id.
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Hu Jui-lan both to investigate seriously Yang Nai-wu's charge that the
magistrate's son was somehow improperly involved in the case and to
interrogate  Magistrate  Liu directly.
The doubts Weng claimed had been generated by a reading of the
case record were accentuated in the following days as Weng had con-
versations both with fellow officials of the Board and with private indi-
viduals.  Weng's  diary  for  the  17th,  18th,  and  19th  of November 222
notes discussions  on this matter with five individuals. These  included
fellow  imperial  tutor  and Board of Punishments  Vice-President  Hsia
T'ung-shan, 223  the middle-level  official  Lin Kung-shu, who worked in
the section of the Board responsible for criminal  cases arising in Che-
kiang, a YtU-hang  resident named Wu Chung-yl,  and one of Weng's
own  nephews  who  had  been  following  the  case.  The  conversations
with Hsia may have been influential in Weng's decision to involve him-
self more deeply in the case.  Although Hsia clearly favored  granting
Yang a new trial, he may have feared that since he was a native of Yuf-
hang,  he  might  be  accused  of  local  partisanship  if  he  were  too
outspoken.
In  any event,  from  November  17 to  25,  Weng,  Hsia, and  other
major officials  of the Board including the Chinese  and Manchu Presi-
dents224  Sang  Ch'un-jung  and  Tsao-pao, the  Manchu  Vice-President
Tsao-chi,  and the Director of the Autumn  Assizes225 Yu Chuan  met
repeatedly to consider the recommendations that they were to send to
the Throne.  According to Weng's diary, he, Hsia, and Yu believed that
the Board should urge the Throne to bring the case  to Peking, while
Sang and Tsao-pao  felt that to do so would embarrass Magistrate Liu,
Governor  Yang,  Literary Chancellor  Hu,  and the other officials  who
had been involved with the case.226  Finally, with the imperial deadline
almost upon them, the Board officers agreed to send a memorial to the
Throne that did not question the competence of any of the officials who
had  heard the case  previously.  Instead,  it merely  suggested  that the
case warranted a new trial in Peking because of the threat that the mur-
der by an adulteress  of her husband posed to the preservation of Con-
fucian ethics.227
222.  Id.
223.  EMINENT  CHINESE,  supra note  195, at  860.
224.  Under the Ch'ing, two individuals-one Manchu and one Chinese-were appointed  to
each major position on the Six Boards.
225.  The Director of the Autumn Assizes was an important Board official who assumed major
responsibility  for  the  review  of capital  cases arising  from  the provinces.  H.  BRUNNERT  & V.
HAGELSTROM,  supra  note 28,  at 147-49.
226.  WENG T'toN-Ho, DIARY,  supra note 32, at 826-27.
227.  Id  at 827.  Unfortunately, Weng Tung-ho does not seem to have played an active role in
the case after this date, although  he again makes  mention of the case later in his diary. This  is
probably  due to the fact that before the case again  reached the Board of Punishments  (in  1877),
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Shortly after taking the Board's memorial under advisement,  the
Throne announced that it would not grant Pien Pao-ch'tdan's request to
have the case brought to Peking  for a retrial. 28  If a new trial before
the Board of Punishments were  granted in this instance,  others might
request retrials in the future, and the already busy Board might well be
overburdened." - 9  In order to resolve the questions raised by Pien about
Hu Jui-lan's investigation, however, the Throne ordered Hu to recon-
sider all materials pertaining  to the case  and then to  memorialize the
Throne as to the course of action it should pursue.23 0
Among those in the capital  distressed by the Throne's decision to
remand the case to Hu Jui-lan was a group of middle and upper mid-
die-level  officials  from  Chekiang.  Eighteen  of these individuals  took
the highly unusual step of involving themselves publicly in a legal mat-
ter entirely outside of their official responsibilities. 23'  Led by the Impe-
rial Chancellery Secretary Wang Shu-p'ing, the Hanlin Academy Sub-
reader Chung Po-sheng, and the Imperial Academy Tutor Wang Ming-
luan, they submitted a memorial to the Throne on December  19,  1875,
asking that the case be brought to Peking for a retrial.
Their memorial was a masterpiece of indirection.  It indicated that
they had initially feared that the abuses and errors that they found in
the case of Yang Nai-wu were a product of Magistrate  Liu Hsi-t'ung's
desire either to extort money  from Yang or to reap  revenge  for past
troubles that Yang might have caused  him. 232  Closer investigation  of
the case materials in Peking as well as further conversations with indi-
viduals on the scene in Chekiang, however, had indicated to them that
Liu was wholly innocent of any conscious error and that the problems
with the case could all be attributed to Hsiao-pai-ts'ai.  In her effort to
lighten the punishment that was sure to befall her for committing adul-
tery and murdering her husband, that unconscionable woman had wo-
ven an intricate pattern of falsehoods that had both wrongly implicated
Yang  Nai-wu  and  led  Liu  Hsi-t'ung  astray.  Liu's  determination  to
solve the heinous murder of Ko P'in-lien had led him to commit four
basic errors.  First, he had failed to consider  the questions  raised by
Mrs. Shen's delay in reporting the death of her son and by the coroner's
imprecision  as to the type of poison used.  Second, he had  not taken
seriously the exculpatory evidence provided by Yang's brother.  Third,
Weng T'ung-ho resigned his position on that Board in order to accept the more important position
of Vice-President of the Board of Revenue.
228.  TUNG-HUA  REcoRDs, supra  note 32, at 152-53.
229.  Id
230.  Id
231.  Chao K'e-chtln, Injustice, supra  note 33, at 27.  At least one other source suggests that 28
officials  from Chekiang  were involved.  CAsE HisTORy, supra note  100, at 359.
232.  Shen Pao, Mar. 29,  1876.
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Liu had allowed his  yamen staff to badger the druggist Ch'ien T'an into
saying that he had sold Yang arsenic.  And fourth, Liu had not both-
ered to point out how  sharply Mrs.  Shen's initial statements  diverged
from her later testimony.
Due to his "inadvertent"  errors, continued the memorial, Liu had
produced  a  record  for  Prefect  Ch'en Lu that  made  the  case  against
Yang Nai-wu seem far more definite than it actually was.  This, in turn,
had stirred a zeal in Ch'en that led him to fall into a number of unfor-
tunate, unintended errors.  Prime among these were the application of
excessive  torture  to  Yang,  the  omission  of a confrontation  between
Yang  and the druggist, and the failure to spot inconsistencies  between
testimony  given at the district level  and that given at the prefectural
level. Ch'en's  innocent errors  had, in turn, made it extremely difficult
for higher officials  to discern the case's  true problems,  with the result
that at each  appellate  level the  original judgment had been  affirmed
and the conduct of those lower level officials  who had heard the case
had been  approved.  The  special imperial  commissioner  Hu  Jui-lan
was a worthy official, as were all those who had earlier sat in judgment
on this case; but because the problems were buried deeply in the rec-
ord, even he had finally been led to ratify the initial verdict and absolve
those below him of any wrongdoing. Surely, concluded the memorial,
if such  worthy  officials  could  be misled  by the case  record,  the  only
hope of finally reaching the truth of the matter lay in having the entire
case brought to the Board of Punishments in Peking for a retrial. 233
The memorial  of Wang  Shu-p'ing  and his  seventeen  fellow  offi-
cials  from Chekiang succeeded  where memorials  from the Censorate
and the Board of Punishments had failed.  Within  days  of its receipt,
the Throne granted their request  for a new trial before the Board  of
Punishments.  It was  now apparent,  declared  the imperial  edict,  that
nothing short of a full new trial in Peking would  serve justice  and set
the public mind at ease.234  Governor Yang Ch'ang-chan was therefore
ordered to arrange for the safe passage to Peking  of the corpse of Ko
P'in-lien and all relevant  witnesses and documents.235
"Although the imperial  edict ordering the  case brought  to  Peking
did not countermand  the earlier  one ordering Hu Jui-lan to reinvesti-
gate the case, Hu was astute enough to recognize the import of this new
order.  In February of 1876 he submitted a report to the Throne stating
that upon reinvestigation, it was clear to him that the case was so com-
plex that he was unable to dispose of it by himself.
236  In light of this,
233.  Id.
234.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS, supra note 32, at  165-66.
235.  Id.
236.  Li Tz'U-MING,  DIARY, supra note 32,  at 4498-99.
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he expressed hope that the Throne would either appoint additional spe-
cial commissioners or arrange for representatives of the Board of Pun-
ishments  to  assist  him  in reaching  a  more  definite  conclusion.  The
Throne neither granted  nor denied  Hu's request, but  simply  ordered
that his memorials be made part of the record of the case to be retried
by the Board of Punishments.237
Rather than comply immediately  with the imperial order that all
steps be taken to ensure the safe and expeditious transfer to Peking of
the various  individuals and materials needed for the retrial, Governor
Yang  Ch'ang-chiin  responded  by  expressing  his  disapproval  of the
Throne's  decision. 238  Governor  Yang  was at least temporarily jolted
out  of this  early  resistance,  however,  by  the  death  of the  druggist
Ch'ien T'an.  Although Ch'ien's family reported that he had died of a
sudden  and mysterious  illness, many in both Hangchow  and Peking
were inclined to believe that the pressures of his involvement with the
law had driven Ch'ien to kill himself.2 39  The embarrassment that this
apparent suicide caused Governor Yang (and perhaps not a few unsub-
tle hints from Peking) stirred him to begin rounding up witnesses.  Still,
Governor Yang moved with deliberate slowness, taking such obstruc-
tionist steps as at first sending to Peking as witnesses many individuals
who had no real knowledge of the case and later striving to prevent the
attendance  of two  important  witnesses.  Notwithstanding  Governor
Yang's maneuverings,  the necessary  individuals  and documents  were
finally assembled in Peking by January of  1877.240
F.  The Case is Retried  in Peking
The retrial of the case of Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai by the
Board of Punishments commenced in the early morning hours of Janu-
ary 22,  1877 in the Hai-hui Temple located near the Ch'ao-yang Gate
to the city.241  Presiding officers from the Board of Punishments  began
the session  by  asking  Magistrate  Liu a series  of questions  about the
early history of the case.  After completing their questioning, these offi-
cials called forward a specially chosen group of coroners headed by a
venerated  eighty-year-old  former  Board  coroner  who had  been  sum-
237.  Id
238.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS, supra note  32, at 345-47.
239.  Li T'ZU-MING,  DIARY, supra  note 32, at 4497-98; see also Shen Pao, Apr. 4,  1876.  Suicide
was  a not  altogether infrequent  response  of individuals  who  found themselves  unwillingly  en-
meshed in legal matters.  Hsieh & Spence, Suicide and  the Family in Pre-modern China,  in  NOR-
MAL  AND  ABNORMAL  BEHAVIOR  IN  CHINFSE  CULTURE  (A. Kleinman &  T.  Lin eds.  1980).
240.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES, supra note 32, at 2:5a; TUNG-HUA  RECORDS,  supra  note 32, at 345-
47.
241.  Shen Pao, Mar. 7,  1877.
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moned  from retirement  for this assignment.242  The presiding  officials
then ordered that the coffin of Ko P'in-lien be opened and the corpse
placed on a special platform so that an examination  could start.
The coroners  decided, with the presiding  officials'  approval,  that
because the deceased's flesh had entirely decomposed during the years
since burial, they would  attempt to ascertain the cause of death from
the coloration of the bones.24 3  The coroners  Sun I and Lien Shun then
described to the assemblage the color of the various parts of the skele-
ton.244  According to their description, all parts bore a  yellowish-white
hue, save for the sternum which was a darker yellow shading almost
into orange.  Sun I and Lien Shun and the other coroners then huddled
together to discuss the implications  of their findings.
The coroners' deliberations  were brief, as all came quickly to the
same conclusion.245  Ko  Fin-lien,  declared  Sun I and  Lien  Shun as
spokesmen for their colleagues, had died of illness.  Both their own ex-
perience and the Hsi-yian lu indicated that if poison had been involved
in Ko's  death, his jaws,  sternum,  fingers,  and  toes would  now  be a
greenish-black  and his skull a light red.  Only  Ko's sternum bore an
unnatural color that might be even faintly suggestive of poisoning and,
continued  Sun and Lien, in all probability this shading had been pro-
duced by  internal hemorrhaging  caused by Ko's fatal  illness.  Given
the present color of Ko's bones, they added, it seemed likely that the
greenish-black  fluid  that  the  initial  Yff-hang  coroner  found  on  his
probing needles had resulted from his failure to wash the needles prop-
erly before inserting them into the corpse.
After the coroners had stated their conclusions, the presiding offi-
cials left their podium in order to verify the observations  and results
announced to them.2"  Having  satisfied themselves  as to the accuracy
of the coroners'  findings, the  Board officials  then recalled  Magistrate
242.  CASE  HISTORY, supra  note  100, at 359.  There  is considerable  discrepancy  among avail-
able sources as to who presided over this session, how many other officials were in attendance, and
what Magistrate Liu had to say in response to the initial inquiries  made of him.
243.  Li TZ'U-MING,  DIARY,  supra note 32, at 4921-23;  Shen Pao, Mar. 7,  1877.
244.  Shen Pao, Mar. 7,  1877.
245.  Id,  Apr. 5,  1877.  Foreign (to China) forensic science--both contemporaneous with the
case and more modem-is inconclusive  about whether  arsenic (the poison allegedly used) would
produce the effects  noted by  the coroners  examining  Ko  Fin-lien's corpse in Peking.  Many  of
Ko's symptoms in his last hours broadly  fit those of arsenic poisoning, but they  also broadly  fit
those of cholera.  The mild discoloration of Ko's sternum noted by the coroners could, conceiva-
bly, have resulted from the discoloration (usually of a reddish hue) of stomach tissue often caused
by arsenic poisoning.  But the fact that Ko's body decomposed  with unusual rapidity suggests that
arsenic poisoning may not have been the cause of death.  Both  19th and 20th century toxicologists
indicate that arsenic typically causes  slow  decomposition.  H. CiAMBERS,  A MANUAL  OF MEDI-
CAL  JURISPRUDENCE  AND  TOXICOLOGY  189-98  (1882);  C.  MALLIK,  A  HANDBOOK  OF  MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE  AND  TOXICOLOGY  276-85  (1st ed.  1969).
246.  Shen  Pao, Mar. 7,  1877; id, Apr. 5,  1877.
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Liu  in order  to confront  him with these  results.  Magistrate  Liu had
heard the coroners  deliver their findings, and after first trying vainly to
contest the issue, he made a statement indicating his acceptance of both
the  Board coroners'  hypothesis  as  to  the probable source  of his own
coroner's  error  and  their  conclusion  as  to  the  likely  cause  of Ko's
death.247
With Liu's statement in hand, the presiding officials adjourned the
retrial so that a report could be prepared for the Throne  setting forth
the new information which had been uncovered  and making appropri-
ate recommendations.  According to the diary of Li Tz'u-ming, consid-
erable debate ensued  over two matters-the sentence  that Liu  should
be  given  and the  extent  to  which the  retrial should  be  continued.2 4 8
With  regard  to  the  first,  Board  President  Tsao-pao  reportedly  con-
tended that in dealing with  Liu, the Board should  be mindful  of the
fact that he was a classmate (t'ung-nien) of the influential Grand  Secre-
tary  Pao-y0in.249  With  regard  to  the  second,  Board  President  Sang
Ch'un-jung  argued  that in deciding whether  to inquire  into the han-
dling  of the  case  above  the prefectural  level,  the  Board  should  not
forget that Yang Ch'ang-chttn  had received the Governorship  of Che-
kiang  because  of his  political  connections.  The  report  that  finally
emerged from these deliberations was a compromise.  It stated that the
Board would conclude the retrial by looking in more depth at the man-
ner in which the case had been handled at the district and prefectural
levels  and  by  recommending  that  pending  further  findings  of error,
Magistrate  Liu  should  be  stripped  of his degrees  and  removed  from
office.
25 0
On January 29, the Throne accepted the Board's recommendations
and urged it to press forward with its investigation.25'  As had too often
happened before in this case, however, the Throne's edict stirred strong
reactions  outside of the court.  In this particular instance, the Throne's
action prompted not one but two sharply worded responses.  The first
was delivered verbally during an imperial audience by Ting Pao-chen,
the Acting Governor General of Szechuan.252  It would be a grave mis-
take, he said, to reverse the original verdict.  Notwithstanding  the Hsi-
yiAan  u, how could evidence derived from the bones of a man who had
died many years earlier possibly be believed over the reasoned conclu-
sions of skilled officials such  as Liu Hsi-t'ung, Yang Ch'ang-chtln, and
247.  Shen Pao, Mar. 7,  1877; id., Apr. 5,  1877.
248.  Li TZ'U-MING,  DIARY,  supra note 32,  at 4941-42.
249.  Id  The bond created among individuals who passed imperial examinations  in the same
year (f'ung-nien) was an  extraordinarily  strong one that has no true analog in the West.
250.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS,  supra note 32, at 343.
251.  Id.
252.  LI  TZ'U-MING,  DIARY,  supra note  32,  at 4942.
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Hu Jui-lan?253  A recommendation  such as that made by the Board in
its latest memorial, continued Ting, could have come from the pen of
the weak,  senile  Sang  Ch'un-jung  and  so  should not be  given  great
weight.  Magistrate  Liu,  concluded Ting, should be  restored,  and the
original  verdict ought to be reinstated.
The sharpness of Ting's statement was more than matched by that
of an unsolicited memorial from the censor Wang Hsin.  In no uncer-
tain terms, Wang Hsin declared that although the errors of Magistrate
Liu were  reprehensible  and should  be  punished, they were  far more
understandable than those of men such as Yang Ch'ang-chtin  and Hu
Jui-lan, who had been entrusted with positions of major responsibility
by the Throne. 254  These high-level officials had failed to uncover the
errors  committed  at the district  and prefectural  levels  when they  first
reviewed the case.  Moreover, they later had the effrontery to resist the
Throne's  clear desire  to have  a thorough reinvestigation.  These  men,
continued  Wang, were so audacious  only because  they knew that the
Kuang-hsi!  Emperor had not yet  reached his  maturity  and therefore
was aided in governing by the two Empress Dowagers.  Because these
officials sought to take advantage  of the Emperor and his regents, they
ought to receive more severe punishments than those ordinarily given
for similar errors. 255
The infliction  of especially severe sentences  upon Hu Jui-lan and
Yang Ch'ang-chtin, continued Wang, would not only redress the injus-
tices  committed  in the case  of Yang Nai-wu, but would also  serve to
heighten the impact the case had already had upon high provincial offi-
cials  and  special  imperial  commissioners  handling  appeals  in  other
cases.256  In the past, charged Wang, such officials had often sought to
cover up the  errors  of their  friends  and subordinates;  in fact, it had
been years since an appeal from the provinces had led to a major case
being overturned in Peking.  The salutary impact of the case of Yang
Nai-wu  could  already  be  seen  in the  recent  decision  of a high-level
Szechuan official to confess spontaneously that he had shaded the truth
in order to protect subordinate officials investigating an attack made on
missionaries.  It was  most unlikely,  stressed  Wang,  that this  unusual
confession would have been forthcoming  but for the publicity created
by the case of Yang Nai-wu.  Therefore, he concluded, it was impera-
tive that the Throne see that all culpable  officials  in the case of Yang
Nai-wu  receive  stern sentences.257
253.  Id.
254.  Id.  at 4975; TUNG-HUA  RECORDS, supra note 32, at 345-47.
255.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS,  supra note 32, at 347.
256.  Id. at  346.
257.  Id.
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G.  Punishment  is Meted Out
The Throne chose to adopt neither the suggestions made by Ting
Pao-chen  nor those made by Wang  Hsin, but instead declared  that  it
would  reserve  decision  until  it  had received  a  final  report  from  the
Board of Punishments setting forth its further findings and making  ap-
propriate recommendations.  Taking less than ten days to respond, the
Board recommended  sentences  for  seventeen  indivduals  and  specifi-
cally absolved eight others of any blame. 258  In light of the seriousness
of the  case,  the Board  took the additional  and  unusual  step  of sug-
gesting that the imperial  amnesty which had been  declared  when the
Kuang-hsii Emperor ascended the Throne ought not to apply to any of
the offenses committed in this case.25 9
The most severe recommendation  contained in the Board of Pun-
ishments'  final report regarded  Magistrate  Liu Hsi-t'ung, who had al-
ready been removed from office in accordance with the Board's earlier
recommendations.260  Although Liu was found not to have been moti-
vated by malice or greed, said the Board, he nonetheless failed to  su-
pervise  personally  the  initial  investigation 26'  and  therefore  wrongly
stated that the coroner's report was in order, extorted a confession from
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  through  excessive  torture,  permitted his underlings  to
badger Ch'ien T'an into making a false statement, and ignored various
discrepancies.  For these  transgressions,  Liu  should  be  sentenced  to
permanent  hard  labor  in  the  far  northern  region  of Heilungchiang.
Furthermore, because this case would not have been so vexing save for
his errors,  Liu should be made to suffer  even more heavily  by being
denied the privilege, normally available both to officials and to men of
his  age,  of being able to make monetary payments in lieu  of actually
undergoing punishment.262
258.  IMPORTANT  POLICIES,  supra note 32,  at 2:5a-8a.
259.  Although amnesties apparently were declared  more frequently in the period prior to the
Yuan conquest (of 1279 A.D.), many of the Ch'ing emperors issued amnesties when ascending the
throne or in the early years of their reign.  B. McKNIGHT, THE QUALITY  OF MERCY:  AMNESTIES
AND  TRADITIONAL  CHINESE JUSTICE 95-98  (1981).
260.  TUNG-HUA RECORDS, supra note 32,  at 366.  For a discussion of the penalty  of removal
from office,  see T. METZGER,  supra note 28,  at 276-397.
261.  The particular offense Liu was found to have committed was that of chlen.yen shih-.shang
puishih  [failing to carry out an accurate examination of a corpse].  CH'ING  CODE, supra  note 76, at
§ 412;  HSOEIJ YON-SHENG,  THOUGHTS  ABOUT  DOUBTFUL  MATTERS,  supra  note 182,  at § 412:00.
The summary of the case of Yang  Nai-wu  and  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  is  found  in the  part of ,4 New
Supplement to the Conspectus  devoted to that offense.  A NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO THE CONSPECTUS,
supra  note 32, at  15:1543.  One major reason that the Ch'ing Code required magistrates, with only
limited exceptions,  personally to  supervise  the examination  of corpses  in  murder  cases arising
within  their districts  was the  fear  that otherwise  coroners  might  deceive magistrates  with  false
reports.  CH'ING  CODE, supra note 76,  § 412; see also supra note  143;  infra note 431.
262.  In being  sentenced  to "deportation"  (fa-ch'ien) beyond the  boundaries  of the  Middle
Kingdom,  Magistrate  Liu  received  the  most  severe  penalty  under  Ch'ing  law  short  of
1222 [Vol. 72:1180IMPERIAL CHINESE LEGAL PROCESS
The  Board also  recommended  punishments  for five  members  of
Magistrate  Liu's staff.  The coroner  Shen Hsiang, declared the Board,
went about his work sloppily and prepared a report that put the lives of
two innocent people in jeopardy.2 63  He should be sentenced  to eighty
blows of the heavy bamboo and two years in jail.  The watchman Shen
Ts'ai-ch'ttan helped cause the coroner's error by arguing with him dur-
ing the autopsy, spread rumors about the case, and generally abused his
master's authority.26  He should receive  100 blows of the heavy bam-
boo and be exiled  3,000 Chinese miles (i)  from his home.  For having
badgered the late Ch'ien T'an into giving an inaccurate  statement, the
District  Sub-Director  of Studies  Chang  Chfin  should  receive  eighty
blows  and be removed from  his position.26 5  And  the yamen servants
Chiang Wei-lung  and Liu Tien-ch'en should each receive forty blows
of the light bamboo for having meddled in a situation that was none of
their business.266
The Board also suggested sentences  for a number of middle-level
officials.  The  former  Hangchow  Prefect  Ch'en  Lu,  said  the  Board,
failed to scrutinize the judicial work of his subordinates with care, ap-
plied  excessive torture to elicit a confession, refused to confront Yang
with the druggist, and showed wanton disregard for human life.267  The
Chekiang  Judicial  Commissioner  K'uai Ho-sun did not  carefully  re-
view the case but instead casually seconded the original verdict.2 68  The
Ning-po Prefect Pien Pao-hsien, the Chia-hsing Magistrate Lo Tzu-sen,
and the expectant magistrates Ku Te-heng  and Kung Shih-t'ung, con-
tinued the Board, all ignored appreciable inconsistencies  in the record
while aiding Hu Jui-lan in his first review of the case.2 69  The expectant
death.  Professors Metzger and Ch'tI note that it was often possible for Ch'ing officials to redeem
severe penalties, notwithstanding the efforts of the Yung-cheng Emperor and certain of his succes-
sors to narrow that privilege. CH'0 T'UNG-TSU,  LAW  AND SoctrY,  supra note  16,  at  173-75; T.
METZGER,  supra  note 28, at 303-07.  Bodde and Morris indicate that under Ch'ing law, individuals
over the age of 70 were entitled to redeem or reduce physical punishments, including banishment,
through  monetary  payments.  D.  BODDE  &  C.  MORRIS,  supra note  26, at  42;  see also CH'ING
CODE,  supra note 76,  at lxxiii; Bodde, Age, Youth  and  Infrmit.  in the Law of Ch'ing China,  in
ESSAYS  ON  CHINA'S  LEGAL  TRADITION,  supra note 10,  at  137,  147-50.
263.  A NEw  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE CONSPECTUS,  supra  note 32, at 15:5143-44.
264.  Id  at 15:5144.  The offense of abusing a master's authority was a catch-all used to punish
misconduct byyamen staff members.  HSOEH YON-SHENG,  THOUGHTS  ABOUT UNCERTAIN  MAT-
TERS,  supra note  182,  at 365:03.
265.  A  NEW SUPPLEMENT  TO THE CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5145.
266.  Id.  Chiang and Liu's specific offense appears to have consisted of providing Mrs. Shen,
before her trip to Peking, with letters seeking financial help for her from their former master, Wen
Ch'ao, who was now employed at the Board of Punishments.  IMPORTANT POLICIES, supra  note 32,
at  2:6b-7a.  Typically,  in the late  Ch'ing, the state  did not provide adequate  living  expenses  for
witnesses.
267.  A NEw SUPPLEMENT  TO THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at  15:5144.
268.  Id
269.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS, supra note 32, at 366.
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magistrate Cheng Hsi-kao failed to carry out a thorough  secret investi-
gation when assigned to do so by Governor Yang Ch'ang-chiln.  All of
these officials, with the exception of K'uai Ho-sun, who passed away in
late  1875,270  should therefore be punished by being removed from the
offices that they now hold. 27'  On the other hand, continued the Board,
the Hu-chou  Prefect  Hsi Kuang and those  who worked with him did
not reach any conclusions  when they  investigated the case  and there-
fore reported no misinformation.  No recommendation  of punishment
ought to be made for them.272
As  for higher  officials,  the Board noted that Chekiang Governor
Yang Ch'ang-chutn not only proved incapable of ferreting out the injus-
tices perpetrated by officials under him when he initially  examined the
case,  but  also  failed  to  ascertain  the  truth  when  later  asked  by  the
Throne to review  the case  following  Yang Nai-wu's  ching-k'ung peti-
tion. 273  Moreover, Governor Yang subsequently  protested against the
decision to retry the case in Peking.  The Board also criticized Hu Jui-
lan for disregarding the significant factual discrepancies  he uncovered
and  for  accepting  without  reservation  Magistrate  Liu's  original  re-
port.27 4  Through his indifference to the truth and his inability to reach
the bottom of the matter, stated the Board, Hu demonstrated  that he
lacked the reliability and skill that are to be expected of officials of his
rank.  Both  men,  concluded  the  Board,  should  be  removed  from
office.275
Turning  to  the  original  instigator  of the  case  and  to  those  who
aided her, the Board noted first that while it was evident that Mrs. Shen
had been  upset by the strange  death of her son, that fact should  not
wholly  excuse  her from punishment  for having altered  her statement
and knowingly made  a false accusation  of murder against Yang Nai-
wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai.2 76  The Board, however, taking  account of the
circumstances,  urged that she be sentenced to a punishment one degree
lower  than  that  normally  accorded  individuals  making  false  accusa-
tions of murder that do not result in the accused's execution. It recom-
mended  that  she  be  given  100  blows  of the  heavy  bamboo  and  be
270.  A NEW  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE CONSPECTUS,  supra note  32,  at  15:5144.
271.  Id. at  15:514446.
272.  I'd at 15:5144.  The Board of Punishments'  treatment of Hsi Kuang and the members of
his commission suggests  that inaction may have been the key to survival in the  bureaucracy, de-
spite many laws imposing  affirmative obligations  upon officials.  Examples of such laws are  dis-
cussed in T. METZGER,  supra note 28,  at 391-96.
273.  A  NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32,  at  15:5144.
274.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS,  supra  note 32,  at 366.
275.  Id  at 366.
276.  A  NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO THE CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32,  at  15:5144-46.  Imperial Chi-
nese law  dealt with false accusations  severely.  CH'ING  CODE, supra note 76, § 336.
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sentenced to four years in jail.277  Her husband  Shen T'i-jen, his rela-
tive Wang Hsin-p'ei, and the neighborhood  official Wang Lin, contin-
ued the Board, all offered testimony at the district  yamen in support of
her initial petition.  However, as none of these people were involved in
her subsequent falsehoods, they ought all to be spared punishment. 27 s
On  the other hand, were he  still alive, the licentiate  Ch'en Chu-shan
ought to be punished for the way in which he helped bring about the
druggist Ch'ien Tan's erroneous statements  about Yang Nai-wu. 279
Finally, the Board moved to Hsiao-pai-ts'ai and Yang Nai-wu. 2 80
Although Hsiao-pai-ts'ai was innocent of the major charges of commit-
ting adultery with Yang Nai-wu and murdering her husband, declared
the Board, she ought to receive  eighty blows of the heavy bamboo for
two lesser transgressions.
2 8'  The first was that of laying  false accusa-
tions  and fabricating evidence  under extreme  duress produced by tor-
ture.  The second, which derived from her eating and joking with Yang,
was that of acting  in a manner  inappropriate  for a  married  woman.
Yang Nai-wu  was similarly innocent  of the major charges  of adultery
and murder.
2 82  However, in eating and joking with Hsiao-pai-ts'ai and
reading the Classics  to her, he did not act as a holder of the  chi-jen
degree  ought to  have  acted.
283  Additionally,  although  Yang  was not
motivated by malice but was merely trying to secure his own freedom
when he accused  Ho Ch'un-fang  and others of having cavorted  with
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai,  the  fact  remained  that he  did commit the  offense  of
being a convict who knowingly accuses an innocent person of a crime.
Therefore, it recommended that Yang  receive  100 blows of the heavy
bamboo and that he not be allowed  to recover his chit-jen degree.
On March 30,  1877, the Throne finally brought this case to its con-
clusion by  ordering that all sentences  recommended  by the Board  of
Punishments  be implemented  at once.284
To the extent records are available, it is evident that the sentences
277.  A NEW  SUPPLEMENT TO THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5145.
278.  Id
279.  Id.
280.  Id  at 15:5145-46.
281.  Id.  In rendering  its final judgment, the Board of Punishments does not appear to have
addressed  the  possibility that Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  committed  adultery with  anyone other than Yang
Nai-wu.  This  raises some  question as  to the accuracy of various  nasty rumors  that circulated
about her.  See supra text accompanying  notes  104,  188.
282.  A NEW  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note 32, at 15:5144-46.
283.  In the Board's estimation, by  eating and joking together, Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai had violated the section of the Ch'ing Code which prohibited that which "ought not to be
done."  CH'ING CODE, supra  note 76, § 386; D. BODDE & C. MORRIS,  supranote  26, at 178; HSOEH
YON-SHENO,  THOUGHTS  ABOUT UNCERTAIN  MATTERS,  supra note 182,  at 386:00;  see also supra
text accompanying note  87.
284.  A  NEW  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE  CONSPECTUS,  supra note  32,  at  15:5143;  TUNG-HUA
RECORDS,  supra  note 32, at 365-66.
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recommended  were  implemented,  at least initially.  Of the three  offi-
cials most directly implicated  in the case's  errors, two-Liu Hsi-t'ung
and Hu Jui-lan-never recovered sufficient stature to be reappointed to
official  positions. 2"5  The third,  Yang Ch'ang-chtin,  spent almost  two
years  without  a government  position  before  using his  own  influence
and that  of his major  benefactor, Tso Tsung-t'ang,  to  secure  an  ap-
pointment as an aide to Tso, who was then leading the imperial govern-
ment's  fight  against  the  Moslem  rebels  of the  Northwest.2"6  As  a
reward for his efforts at suppressing  the Moslems,  Yang  Ch'ang-chtin
was later appointed Governor of Kansu. 287  Of the three censors who
wrote  memorials  criticizing  the  manner in  which  the  case  was  con-
ducted,  only Pien Pao-ch'Uan  is mentioned  in any of the thirty-three
standard  sources  of Ch'ing  biography. 8  The  memorial  which  Pien
submitted on November  15,  1875  proved to be the cornerstone  of his
reputation  as  a  pillar  of integrity.  Pien  subsequently  had  a  distin-
guished official career which included service  as Governor-General  of
the provinces of Chekiang and Fukien."s9  None of the three leaders  of
the group of eighteen Chekiang officials who memorialized for a retrial
is treated in any of the standard biographies.  After the completion  of
the  case,  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  entered  a  Buddhist  nunnery  where  she  re-
mained  for the  rest of her life.  Yang Nai-wu reportedly  returned  to
Yt-hang briefly and then moved to Shanghai, where he eventually be-




THE NATURE  OF  THE  FORMAL CRIMINAL  JUSTICE PROCESS
IN  LATE  IMPERIAL  CHINA
A.  The Process as It  Was Meant to  Work
The case of Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai merits our attention
because  it provides a comprehensive understanding  of the manner in
285.  CHAMBER  RECOLLECTIONS,  supra  note  100,  at 388-89.
286.  For biographical  information  on Tso Tsung-t'ang,  see  W. BALES,  Tso TSUNO-T'ANO
(1937);-G.  CHEN, Tso TSUNG-T'ANG  (1938);  EMINENT  CHINESE, supra note  195,  at 762-67.
287.  FANG  I, CHINESE BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY, supra note  179, at  1266;  H. GILES,  BiO-
GRAPICAL  DICTIONARY,  supra  note  179,  at 894.  The Governorship of Kansu in China's north-
west was far less desirable  a post than the Chekiang  Governorship  that Yang Ch'ang-chtln  had
earlier held.
288.  The names  of all  individuals  treated in the  33  major Chinese  language  collections  of
Ch'ing  biographies  are  indexed  in  SAN-SHIH-SAN-CHUNG  CH'ING-TAI  CHUAN-CHI  TsUNo-HO
YIN-TE  [INDEX  TO  THIRTY-THREE  STANDARD  COLLECTIONS  OF  CH'INo  BIOGRAPHIES]  (Fang
Chao-ying  & Tu Lien-che  comps.  1932).
289.  For biographical  information  on Pien, see FANG  I,  CHINESE  BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTION-
ARY, supra  note  179,  at 1760.
290.  Chao K'e-chln, Injustice, supra note 33,  at 31.
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which the imperial  criminal justice process  was intended to work and
did, in fact, work.  Four major types of formal checks upon the district
magistrate's  discharge  of his legal responsibilities  are apparent  in the
case.291  Although  these  checks  clearly  did  not  always  work  as  in-
tended, it is useful initially to review how they were meant to operate.
The first check consisted of elaborate sets of rules designed to reg-
ulate virtually every aspect of the magistrate's official duties.  Penal and
administrative  laws and  regulations  established  comprehensive  stan-
dards regarding matters including the apprehension, interrogation, try-
ing, and sentencing  of felons.292  For example,  these rules prescribed
that all persons  accused  of committing  a single  crime  be confronted
with one another.  They also  specified in detail the type and degree of
torture that could be applied in order to extract needed confessions.293
Violations  of these  rules  by  magistrates  carried  a  variety of punish-
ments,  ranging  from nominal  demerits  to  removal  from  office,  after
which the former official  could be tried as a common criminal.294
The second check built into the formal criminal justice process was
the  so-called  "obligatory  review  system."  Magistrates  could  impose
and carry out sentences  only in cases  involving penalties no more se-
vere than beating with a heavy bamboo, 2 95 a relatively minor sanction.
In cases involving more serious punishments, magistrates were limited
to passing provisional sentences  (ni) that had to be reviewed as a mat-
ter of course by higher level  officials.  The heavier the sentence given,
the more levels of official  review it had to pass before it could be car-
ried out.  Prior scrutiny by the Emperor himself was mandated in virtu-
ally all death penalty cases.296
291.  There were  also informal, nongovernmental  checks upon the judicial behavior of magis-
trates, including the influence  of local  gentry.  See I  CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM,  supra note
30,  at  155;  CH'0 T'UNG-TSu,  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT,  supra note  16,  at  168-92;  HsLAo  KUNG-
CHUAN,  RURAL  CHINA, supra note 59, passim; J. WATr, supra  note 29, passim.
292.  These  laws  and regulations are described generally  in CH'0 T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT,  supra  note 16, at 116-29; T. METZGER,  supra  note 28,passim; Shiga, Criminal  Procedure
(II), supra note 30, passim. They are contained, for  example, in  CH'ING  CODE,  supra note 76;
CH'IN-TING  CH'UNG-HSIU  CH'U-FEN TSE-LI  [THE IMPERIALLY  ENDORSED  AND  REVISED  REGULA-
TIONS  ON ADMINISTRATIVE  PUNISHMENTS]  (1887);  TA-CH'ING HUI-TIEN  [THE COLLECTED  STAT-
UTES  OF THE GREAT  CH'ING DYNASTY] (Taipei reprint 1963);  and TA-CH'ING  HUI-TIEN  SHIH-LI
[PRECEDENTS  AND  REGULATIONS  SUPPLEMENTING  THE  COLLECTED  STATUTES  OF  THE  GREAT
CH'ING  DYNASTY]  (Taipei reprint 1963).
293.  See, e.g.,  CH'ING CODE, supra note  76, § 404.
294.  CH'0 T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL GOVERNMENT,  supra  note 16,  at  128-29.
295.  D.  BODDE  & C.  MORRIS,  supra note 26, at 116.
296.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure (I), supra note 30,  at  16-19.  There  were  two situations in
which  officials were not required to seek imperial approval before  carrying out death sentences,
although in each case they were required to file detailed reports immediately afterward.  The first
exception permitted the execution of rebels on the spot (chiu-fi cheng-fa ch'ang-cheng). D. BODDE
& C.  MORRIS,  supra note 26, at 142-43.  Although the largest  rebellions in Chinese  history were
quelled during this period, we know too little to determine how widespread summary executions
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An  appellate  procedure  known  as  the  shang-k'ung, 29 7  through
which  an  individual  could  protest  a  decision  to  higher  authorities,
served  as  a third check.  As soon  as one's district level trial was  com-
plete, one could directly petition either those officials  of the provincial
government responsible for that district magistrate or specified entities
in Peking. 98  At the time that the case of Yang Nai-wu  arose, Ch'ing
law299  provided  that officials  in  Peking  receiving  appellate  petitions
could either refer the case at issue to the Emperor or send it back to the
governor of the province in which it had originated for further consid-
eration.3"  The Emperor could  affirm  or reverse the  original verdict,
dispatch  a  special  commission  to  investigate  the  matter,  order  the
Board of Punishments  to reexamine the case itself, or refer the case  to
the appropriate provincial  governor. 3 '
The fourth major  formal  check  lay  in the supervisory  authority
that the magistrate's direct provincial superiors, circuit (tao) intendants,
and censors were required by law to exercise.  This authority took three
distinct forms.  First, those officials directly above the magistrate in the
line of official authority-prefects, judicial commissioners,  and gover-
nors-not only heard cases  arising through both the obligatory review
and appellate  systems  but also  had an affirmative  legal  obligation  to
uncover  and  report  all  wrongdoing  committed  by  officials  beneath
them. 2  Second, circuit intendants were empowered to conduct annual
reviews  of all  cases heard at the district  level.3°3  And third, imperial
censors  who,  at  least  nominally,  enjoyed  a high  degree  of indepen-
dence, were responsible for ferreting out abuses  committed by  officials
and for remonstrating  with the  Emperor ° .3 4  To  foster their indepen-
dence, imperial  censors were  not supervised by the Board  of Punish-
were in  the late  Ch'ing.  The second  exception  concerned  persons  found  to have  committed  a
small number of particularly heinous offenses  (such as killing one's parents).  This was viewed as
carrying out the Emperor's will  by proxy (kung-ch'ling wang-ming).  Shiga, Criminal Procedure (1),
supra note 30, at 21.
297.  See supra note  184.
298.  CENSORATE  REoULATIONS,  supra note  184,  at  14:9b; see  also  supra notes  184-86  and
accompanying text.
299.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure  (I), supra note 30, at 33.
300,  Prior to  1799,  officials  in Peking  were also  free to issue  final rejections  of ching-k'ung
petitions.  See  infra note 316.
301.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure  (I), supra note  30, at 33-34.  Bodde and Morris question  the
degree to which Emperors took seriously their task of reviewing all death  sentences.  D. BODDE &
C.  MORRIS,  supra note  26, at  140-42.  The  diligence with  which the  K'ang-hsi  Emperor  (who
reigned from  1662-1722)  approached  this task suggests that at least  some Emperors  took this re-
sponsibility  to  heart.  J.  SPENCE,  EMPEROR  OF  CHINA:  SELF-PORTRAIT  OF  K'ANO-HSI  32-34
(1974).
302.  T. METZGER,  supra note 28,  at 294-97,  390-96  & passim.
303.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure  (1), supra note  30, at 37-38.
304.  See generally C. HUCKER,  THE CENSORIAL  SYSTEM  OF MING  CHINA  (1966);  T. METZ-
GER,  supra note 28,  at 269-71.  See also infra notes 362-68 and accompanying text.
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ments,  but  were  allowed  to  communicate  directly  with  high-level
authorities, including the Emperor. 5
B.  The Process as It Actualy  Worked
As  the  case  of Yang  Nai-wu  and  Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  illustrates,  in
practice the four major formal checks  upon a magistrate's exercise  of
authority did not always operate as intended.3°6  Compliance with the
elaborate  rules  governing  a magistrate's  judicial  behavior,  including
those provisions  designed  to limit the degree of torture that could be
applied  to  elicit  an  acknowledgement  of guilt, ultimately  depended
heavily upon the individual magistrate and his staff.3 07  If he  chose to
transgress these bounds, as Magistrate Liu Hsi-t'ung did when applying
torture to Hsiao-pai-ts'ai, or if his staff erred,3 8  as Magistrate Liu's did
305.  I. HsO, supra  note 5,  at 53.
306.  For examples of the way in which a range of persons in the late Ch'ing viewed difficulties
of the type found in the case of Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  as afflicting the operation of the
formal  criminal justice  process  in general,  see  CENSORATE  REGULATIONS,  supra note  184,  at
14:49b-50a (edict of the Kuang-hstl Emperor) &passim; the memorial of the censor Ch'en I found
in the Peking Gazette of July 20, 1875;  the memorial of the censor Teng Ch'ing-lin found in the
Peking Gazette of Aug.  18,  1875;  supra  text accompanying notes 215,  256-57; infra text accompa-
nying notes 315-31,  370-77.  See also Chao K'e-chtln,  Injustice, supra note 33,  at  15.  To say that
the problems encountered  in this case were viewed by many observers  at the time as being wide
spread is not, of course,  to suggest that all cases of this era were beset with such troubles.  For a
more extended  discussion of factors that we  must consider before  forming  definitive judgments
about  the operation  of the  imperial  criminal justice process,  see  infra text accompanying notes
399-432.
307.  CH'0 T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT,  supra  note  16, passim; HsIAO  KUNG-CHUAN,
supra  note 59, passinr, J. WATT, supra  note 29, passim. This is not to suggest that the ch'u-fen tse-li
and related laws and regulations specifying how officials were to carry out their duties were mean-
ingless. Administrative  sanctions  could be  imposed  upon  officials  violating  these  rules.  These
sanctions included dismissal from office,  after which an official could receive severe criminal pun-
ishments-as  did former Magistrate  Liu Hsi-t'ung.  See supra text accompanying  notes 260-62.
Nonetheless, judging  from  the memorials  of the censors  Wang  Shu-jui,  Pien  Pao-ch'flan  and
Wang Hsin in this case, one might conclude that at least in the late Ch'ing, enforcement may have
been less than ideal.  See supra  text accompanying notes 213-15, 254-57.  Kao I-han suggests that
in the late Ch'ing, the principal responsibility for enforcement was entrusted  to line officials (i.e.,
to the  violating official's  superiors in the normal hierarchy).  KAO  I-HAN,  CHUNG-KUO  Yfi-SHIH
CHIH-TU TE YEH-KO  [THE EVOLUTION  OF THE CHINESE  CENSORIAL  SYSTEM]  77-89 (1926)  [here-
inafter cited  as  KAO  I-HAN,  EVOLUTION].  If SO,  this practice may partially explain  the enforce-
ment  problems.  For just  as  superior  line officials  handling  automatic  reviews  or shang-k'ung
petitions were often loath to review the actions of subordinates rigorously, so too, they may have
hesitated to enforce the ch'u-fen Ise-li and related laws strictly.  They might have been motivated
by  lassitude,  friendship  with subordinates,  or a  fear that too many  violations  might lead  their
superiors to assume that they were doing a poor job of supervising their subordinates.  Professor
Metzger  acknowledges  that administrative  discipline  was not  as well  enforced during  the late
Ch'ing as in earlier times, but attributes this decline to the corruption engendered by the Empress
Dowager Tz'u-hsi.  T. METZGER,  supra note 28,  at 398.
308.  As a number of the scholars cited  supra in notes  14,  16-18  and 29-30 have  shown, the
potential of district magistrates and their staffs for administering the law incorrectly ought not to
be minimized.  Magistrates  rarely received formal training in law.  As a consequence, they appear
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both in examining  Ko  P'in-lien's  corpse  and in interrogating  Ch'ien
T'an, there was  nothing that those suffering  at his hands could  do by
way of redress until the damage had been inflicted.  And even then, the
possibility  that  such  individuals  could  vindicate  themselves  through
either the obligatory review system or the shang-k'ung  was limited in at
least four key respects.
The first problem in the obligatory review system and  shang-k'ung
appellate  procedure  lay  in the willingness  of higher level  officials  to
legal matters.  Among  the  magistrate's  most  important  aides,  the  legal  secretary  typically  had
acquired his legal expertise  either through  informal study or through experience  with other legal
secretaries  or magistrates.  His tasks included  drafting initial orders,  determining hearing  dates,
counseling the magistrate before and after trial (typically he was not permitted to attend trial, but
had to rely upon written statements supplemented verbally by the magistrate), drafting reports of
cases going  to higher levels,  and preparing  preliminary  responses  to questions  raised  at  those
higher levels.  CH't)  T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL GOVERNMENT,  supra  note 16, at 93-107.  Not surprisingly,
good legal secretaries were hard to come by, as evidenced by efforts-often involving considerable
artifice--to  evade  a law limiting their term  in any  one district  to  five years.  I CHANG  WEJEN,
LEGAL SYSTEM,  supra  note 30, at 162-63.
The complexity of the law also  compounded the possibility  that magistrates  and their legal
secretaries would make mistakes.  The laws were many and intricate.  In the late Ch'ing the impe-
rial code,  which itself ran to some 436 articles  (W0),  was supplemented  by over  1000 sub-statutes
(i).  Many provisions were highly specific and yet "[i]n  determining a sentence, a magistrate could
refer to only [the] one particular law or statute [most]  applicable to that case."  CH'D T'UN O-TSU,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT,  supra  note  16,  at 126.  Conversely, other provisions,  like the one  allowing
the execution of rebels without imperial permission,  were quite vague.  See supra  note  296.
To  make  matters  worse,  the  law  imposed  upon  magistrates  deadlines  for  apprehending
criminals and resolving related  legal matters that were  strict and that  may, at times,  have  been
unrealistic.  These deadlines, enforced by substantial penalties,  created pressure  upon the magis-
trates to resolve matters rapidly.  Moreover, there were no systematic case reports and only limited
official glosses, although private commentaries were of considerable significance to Ch'ing dynasty
magistrates and legal secretaries (even if few were willing to cite them in their case reports).  Chen,
Shen Chih-ch X supra note 29, at  170,  203-04.
Another probable source of error was the size  of the magistrate's staff, which might number
many hundred in a typical district and more than a thousand in a larger district.  So-called "run-
ners,"  who  might  be  coroners, jailers,  policemen,  guards,  grooms,  messengers,  watchmen,  or
others, were the magistrate's most direct link with the people.  As the case of Yang Nai-wu shows,
they were not always the most skilled or careful of employees.  See, e.g., supra  text accompanying
notes 147-50.  To make matters worse, runners and even higher level members of the magisterial
staffs, including  legal secretaries,  were expected  to earn  most of their upkeep  by collecting  fees
from  the people  and so  had  an  incentive  to  prey upon  the  populace  and  to accept  bribes.  I
CHANG  WEJEN,  LEGAL SYSTEM,  supra note  30, at 234 n.166.
Finally, the nature of the legal profession in imperial China may have contributed to errors at
the magisterial level.  At least in the late Ch'ing, there may have been more and better educated
individuals providing legal  advice to the populace  than  the stereotype  of the litigation  trickster
suggests.  Yang  Nai-wu  was one.  Nonetheless,  because  there were  no minimum  standards  for
such advisors and because criminal defendants were not free to bring legal advisors with them into
the magistrate's yamen, there were clear limits to the ability of such specialists  to aid persons not
versed in legal matters.  Presumably such counselors were not necessary in the yamen because the
magistrate was not viewed as an advocate  for either side, but instead  was obligated  by law and
morality to find the truth.  Nonetheless, it is plausible that access to a legal advisor like Yang Nai-
wu would have appreciably assisted a typical peasant appearing  before a highly educated district
magistrate who  could consult his legal secretary.
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accept  without  serious  reexamination  the  findings  of subordinates," 9
notwithstanding  laws requiring  prefects, judicial commissioners,  pro-
vincial  governors, and capital officials  thoroughly to reinvestigate and
retry cases  coming to them from lower level courts, particularly when
those  cases  included  repudiated  confessions.  Although such  officials
were subject to administrative punishments if they affirmed judicial er-
rors,310 the behavior of Prefect Ch'en Lu, Judicial Commissioner K'uai
Ho-sun, and Governor Yang Ch'ang-chtin  suggests that at least some
late Ch'ing officials acted as if the possibility of being sanctioned were
an empty threat.31   Another factor  reinforcing this attitude may have
been  the Ch'ing  practice of punishing not only magistrates, but their
superiors as well, for errors made at the magisterial level. 312  Reversal
of a  conviction  in a  murder  case  by  a  magistrate's  superiors  would
leave that magistrate and his superiors  with an unresolved  murder,313
which could be a serious impediment to bureaucratic advancement.  If,
as the case suggests, this tendency of higher officials to accept the find-
ings  of their  subordinates  more  readily  than complaints  of the  con-
victed was widespread,3 1 4 it would have  significantly undermined  the
effectiveness  of the obligatory  review system and the shang-k'ung.
A second and related  flaw lay in the manner in which  high-level
provincial officials  reviewed  major appeals directed  to them from Pe-
king.  The case of Yang Nai-wu  was but one of many  appeals that the
Throne  came  to believe had not been reviewed  in a serious  and fair
fashion.315  Whether attributable to the unrelenting increase in appeals
during the nineteenth century,31 6  to the tendency of officials in Peking
309.  See, e.g., supra  notes 179-83,  200-01  and accompanying  text.
310.  CH'0  T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT,  supra  note 16,  at  128.
311.  Shiga Shuzo states that "[a]  governor in all  probability, seldom  rejected [a] provisional
sentence approved  by the judicial commissioner."  Shiga, Criminal  Procedure  (I), supra note 30, at
24.  Bodde and Morris state that "the.  . . prefecture  . . . in legal  matters seems often  to have
functioned merely as an agent  for transmitting cases to a higher level."  D.  BODDE & C. MORRIS,
supra note  26,  at  115.  Bodde and  Morris' notion,  which has since been shown  by  both Shiga
Shuzo and Chang Wejen to be erroneous, may have arisen from the apparent tendency of prefects
and provincial authorities to approve provisional sentences  reached by magistrates.  See I CHANG
WEJEN,  LEGAL  SYSTEM,  supra note 30, at 169-70.
312.  CH'  T'UNG-TSU,  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT,  supra  note  16,  at 121-22,  128.
313.  Even if a conviction were overturned within the specified time period, there would be a
significant  risk  that  a  renewed  investigation  long  after  the  fact  would  not  turn  up  a  new
perpetrator.
314.  See supra text accompanying notes  187-91,  256-57,  306.
315.  CENSORATE  REGULATIONS,  supra note  184, at  14:49b-50a.
316.  By the  late Ch'ing, more  than  100 ching-k'ung appeais were being made annually from
each major province.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS,  supra note 32, at 1414.  The Throne attributed this, at
least in part,  to the  incorrect interpretation  by timid capital officials of instructions  given by the
Chia-ch'ing Emperor (who reigned from 1796 to  1820) to entertain all ching-k'ung petitions.  The
Chia-ch'ing Emperor's real intention, said the Throne in  1882, was that capital officials receive all
major cases (in part because such cases provided him a picture of life in the provinces  not other-
wise available), but dispense rapidly with those that were minor.  See general,  CENSORATE REG-
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to send appeals back to officials who had previously heard them,3 17 to
the aftermath of the mid-century rebellions,31 8 or to other factors, this
problem  seems  to  have  been  on  the  rise during  the  T'ung-chih  and
early Kuang-hstl  reigns.  To be sure,  special imperial commissions  of
the type seen in this case were meant to be a device for alleviating these
particular difficulties.319  By the late nineteenth century, however, such
commissions were  appointed  only in extraordinary  situations,  such as
that created  by Yang Nai-wu's  second  and more sharply  worded  ap-
peal. 320  Moreover, they were handicapped by their relative unfamiliar-
ity with the regions to which they were sent and their concomitant need
to  rely  on  the  very  local  officials  whose  work  they  would  be
scrutinizing. 321
The publicity generated  by the case of Yang Nai-wu  and Hsiao-
pai-ts'ai helped spur efforts to reform the ching-k'ung procedure.  In a
May  1875  memorial, the censor  Wang Hsin  urged the Throne  not  to
view the troubles that had arisen in the official disposition of the case of
Yang Nai-wu as explicable solely by the inadequacies of the particular
individuals involved.322  These troubles ought also, urged Wang, to be
seen  as outgrowths  of the practice of remanding  appeals  back to offi-
cials who had previously been involved in the case that was the subject
of the appeal.3"
While the Throne did not act upon Wang's memorial,  the general
points he made appear not to have gone unheeded  in  official  circles.
Others holding the opinion that the ching-k'ung  was no longer operat-
ing  as intended  took it upon themselves  to express  their views to  the
ULATIONS,  supra note  184.  I  am  indebted  to  Mr. Chen Mingmian  of the  Law  Department  of
Zhongshan  University for helping me to understand this point.
317.  Shiga, Criminal  Procedure  (I),  supra note 30, at 24-25, 33-34.  The rationale for returning
a case to officials who  had previously  heard it appears to have been that such  officials would be
more familiar with it than  someone not previously  involved.
318.  See infra notes 351-55  and accompanying text.
319.  Shiga,  Criminal  Procedure (),  supra note 30, at 33-34.
320.  CENSORATE  REGULATIONS,  supra note  184,  at  14:34b.  Scholars  have  yet to  undertake
comprehensive empirical studies of the background of persons utilizing the ching-k'ung  procedure.
It would be interesting  to know  more about both  the extent to which persons  initiating such ap-
peals were  members of imperial China's social,  financial, or educational  elite and  the degree  to
which legal counselors were involved in shaping such petitions, especially  outside of the imperial
capital.  Obviously, being both a chti-jen and a person skilled at preparing  legal papers, Yang Nai-
wu  was unusually  well  suited  to utilize this  procedure.  It  would  also be  worthwhile  to  try  to
determine the accuracy of statements by the Throne in  1882 to the effect that at least some persons
making such appeals were knowingly doing so improperly in order to intimidate local officials  and
other persons.  Id. at 14:49b-50a.
321.  The small size of special commission staffs was a particular problem, given the range  of
dialects and local customs found throughout China.
322.  T'UNG-HUA  REcoRDs,  supra note  32, at 345-47.
323.  Id.
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Throne. 324  One such official was Hunan Governor Pien Pao-ti, who in
an  1882  memorial  argued that the ineffectuality,  injustice, and  delay
that increasingly marked the handling of ching-k'ung  appeals could not
be cured without substantially reducing the number of cases that high-
level provincial and capital officials were responsible for reviewing.325
Only if such officials were spared the need to focus upon cases involv-
ing  relatively  minor  matters  could  they  approach  more serious  ones
with appropriate  care and concern for justice.
3 26
The Throne was receptive to Pien's analysis of the problems with
the  ching-k'ung procedure. 327  In  September  of  1882,  it  ordered  the
Commandant of Gendamerie  and others  in the capital  charged with
receiving ching-k'ung  petitions to clear away relatively minor appeals in
order  that  appropriate  attention  could  be  concentrated  upon major
cases.328  Henceforth,  capital officials should direct cases  that they be-
lieved to be minor to independent  supervisory personnel  at the locality
from which the case had arisen, provided that the remanding  authori-
ties were certain that the case would be reviewed fairly.329  Major cases
were  to be treated  with far greater  care.  They were not to be sent to
such low-level officials  but rather were to be directed to either provin-
cial governors  or their judicial commissioners.33 °  Moreover, to  guard
against any unfairness on the part of such officials, the Throne ordered
that henceforth  in each such  case  provincial officials  both  be charged
with special imperial instructions to review the matter as scrupulously
as possible and be  required to explain in detailed periodic  written re-
ports  why  they  reached  the decision  they  did, rather than  merely  to
state their conclusions.
33'
Although  the  changes  ordered  by  the  Throne  in  1882  were
designed to alleviate problems in the ching-k'ung  of the type manifested
by the case  of Yang  Nai-wu  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai, the  extent to  which
they attained that end is unclear.332  But however much they may have
improved the ching-k'ung procedure,  they did little to remedy two fur-
ther problems  with the  formal  criminal justice process  evidenced  by
this case.  The first was that of undue political influence333 arising from
324.  See, e.g.,  the memorial  of the censor Teng Ch'ing-lin.  Peking Gazette, Aug.  18,  1875.
325.  T'UNG-HUA  RECORDS,  supra note 32,  at  1414-16.
326.  Id. at  1415-16.  Pien also urged that steps be taken to deal harshly with those abusing the
ching-k'ung procedure.
327.  Id  at 1414-16.
328.  Id.
329.  Id  at  1415.
330.  Id  at  1416.
331.  Id.
332.  The degree to which these changes transformed the manner in which high-level provin-
cial officials  actually  reviewed  appeals  remains to be examined.
333.  Although less felicitous,  the phrase  "undue political  influence" has been used instead of
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regional or ideological loyalties, shared preparation for the imperial ex-
aminations  (t'ung-hsiieh), and friendship.  The second was tension be-
tween the provincial  and central governments.
A  recurrent  phenomenon  throughout  Chinese  history,  especially
when the imperial figure and central government were weak, the prob-
lem of undue political influence was particularly acute during the dec-
ade of the 1870's.  In this period imperial authority was eroded by the
aftereffects of the mid-century rebellions, the incursions of the Western
powers,  and the attempts of the Empress  Dowager Tz'u-hsi to ensure
her power by breaking  the rules of succession  and installing  a three-
year-old child  as Emperor. 34
The problem of undue political influence had a  deleterious  effect
upon the formal criminal justice  process.  It often led  to the appoint-
ment  of relatively  unqualified  individuals  to  official  positions,  as  is
demonstrated  by  the  examples  of Liu  Hsi-t'ung  and  Yang  Ch'ang-
chiin.335  Liu  Hsi-t'ung  may  have  been  appointed  to  three  separate
terms as magistrate of Yfi-hang because  he had been a  classmate and
friend of the powerful  Grand  Secretary Pao-yn. 336  There is nothing
in the records to suggest that he was a man of such unusual abilities or
accomplishments  as to warrant three distinct appointments.337  To  the
contrary, the Yff-hang gentry  seem to have held Magistrate  Liu in low
esteem,  and  there  is  even  a  suggestion  that  he may  have  been  cor-
rupt. 338  The appointment of Yang  Ch'ang-chUn as  Governor  of Che-
kiang shows that the problem of political connections was not limited
to  the district level.  Although  he had neither  a chin-shih degree  nor
experience  in civil administration, Yang was named  Governor  of that
the term  "factionalism"  because of the particular connotations  of the  latter term  in Chinese his-
tory.  See, e.g.,  CAMBRIDGE  ENCYCLOPEDIA  OF CHINA,  supra note 6,  at 212.
334.  For a discussion of these three factors in the context of China's  struggle to modernize  in
the  late  19th century,  see R. SMITH,  supra  note  17,  at 242-53.
335.  Governor  Yang's background  is discussed  supra in note  179.  Professor Liu observes  in
his insightful essay for The Cambridge History  that "[t]he  quality of most office-holders seems...
to have  deteriorated  in the  meantime  [1850-1870]."  Liu Kwang-ching,  The  Ch'ing Restoration
[hereinafter  cited as Liu Kwang-ching,  Restoration],  in  10 THE  CAMBRIDGE  HISTORY  OF  CHINA,
LATE  CH'ING,  1800-1911,  PART I, at 478 (J. Fairbank & D. Twitchett eds.  1978) [hereinafter cited
as THE  CAMBRIDGE  HISTORY  OF  CHINA];  see also id  at 478-81.  Notwithstanding  this  decline,
Professor Liu is of the view that later, in the  1870's, the imperial government was able to reassert
some measure of control over official appointments.  Id.  at 481-90.
336.  By  the mid-1870's,  the  Manchu  Pao-ytan,  who  had earned his  chin-shih in  1838  along
with  Liu  Hsi-t'ung,  was  a  Grand  Secretary,  Grand  Councillor,  Chancellor  of  the  Hanlin
Academy, and  leading official  at  the Tsungli Yamen.  H.  GILES,  BIOGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY,
supra note 179, at 620; M. WRIGHT,  THE LAST STAND  OF CHINESE  CONSERVATISM  82, 228-29, 248
(1966).
337.  CASE HISTORY, supra note  100, at 358.  The tenure  for district magistrates actually  grew
shorter during the period of the T'ung-chih Restoration (1862-1874).  Liu Kwang-ching, Restora-
tion, supra note 335,  at 479.
338.  See supra text accompanying  notes 231-33.
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important province at a relatively young age on the strength of his mili-
tary successes and the political alliances he had forged in the effort to
suppress the great mid-century T'ai-p'ing uprising.339
The problem of undue political influence further hindered the for-
mal legal process by minimizing the possibility that well-connected  of-
ficials  would  receive  punishments,  thus  reducing  their  incentive  to
follow  closely the many rules designed to govern their behavior.  The
hesitancy  of the  Board  of Punishments  to  apply  clearly  appropriate
sanctions  to  politically  well-aligned  officials  is  illustrated  by  the
Board's  deliberations  regarding  Liu Hsi-t'ung,  Hu Jui-lan, and Yang
Ch'ang-chtln.  After the Board had retried the case in Peking and Liu
had confessed  his errors,  Board  President  Tsao-pao  and others  were
still reluctant to recommend punishment for Liu, in spite of his being a
mere magistrate, apparently because he was linked to a major official in
the capital.340  The Board's  unwillingness  to enforce  the  law  against
officials  with powerful friends is more  evident in the cases of Hu Jui-
lan and Yang Ch'ang-chuin.  Even after the Board had determined that
Liu's original report had been laced with errors, in deliberations held
immediately after the retrial in Peking the Board chose not to consider
whether any of Liu's superiors had committed the offense of ratifying
the conviction of an innocent individual.  This was primarily because
the Board's presiding officers  were well aware that Yang Ch'ang-chiin
and  Hu Jui-lan  were fellow  provincials  and friends  of the  powerful
General Tso Tsung-t'ang, who had played a major role in suppressing
anti-imperial  rebels.341  And  even at the  end of the  case,  when  the
Board did recommend punishments for them, it did so hesitantly.
Moreover, undue political influence frequently prevented the cor-
rection of judicial errors.  In Yang Nai-wu's case, this was most evident
in the willingness  of the Special Imperial Commissioner Hu Jui-lan to
affirm  the convictions  of Yang Nai-wu  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai,  notwith-
standing  the  many  discrepancies  his  Commission  had  uncovered.
While available materials  do not reveal whether  Governor Yang may
have influenced  the selection of Hu Jui-lan  as Special Commissioner,
they indicate that these two Hunanese, who had earlier jointly memori-
alized the Throne regarding  other political matters, were  indeed quite
friendly.342  Political connections  may also  have  been  at work  in the
refusal of the Throne to follow Pien Pao-ch' Uan's memorial accusing
Hu and Yang of collusion  and asking that the case be brought to Pe-
339.  FANG  I,  CHINESE BIoGRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY, supra note 179,  at  1266; H. GILES,  BIo-
GRAPHICAL  DICTIONARY,  supra  note  179,  at 894.
340.  LI TZ'U-MING,  DIARy,  supra note 32, at 4941-42.
341.  Id.
342.  Peking Gazette, Jan.  10,  1876;  Id, Mar.  9,  1876.
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king for retrial, although the relative paucity of material about the in-
ner workings  of the imperial  court at this point makes this suggestion
difficult to prove.343
Interference in the criminal justice process by gentry, despite statu-
tory restrictions  upon their  involvement  in judicial  matters  to  which
they were  not party, may have  constituted yet another form of undue
political  influence.  Although  the  involvement  of officials  from  Che-
kiang in Yang Nai-wu's case ultimately proved to be salutary, the pos-
sibility  exists  that  tensions  between  Magistrate  Liu  Hsi-t'ung  and
members of the Yai-hang gentry may have had as much to do with their
involvement  as  any  sympathy  for the  defendants  or even  any gener-
alized concern with seeing justice done.  One important source suggests
that Magistrate  Liu was at odds with the local gentry,344 and the local
gazetteer  indicates  that Liu  was  abruptly  removed from  office  during
his  term.345  The  eighteen  officials  from  Chekiang  who  asked  the
Throne to bring the case to Peking may have been motivated in part by
a sense that Magistrate Liu Hsi-t'ung was now vulnerable and perhaps
could be dislodged from Ytt-hang.  Confirmation for this view  can be
found in three places.  First, those  sources  discussing  Yang Nai-wu's
relations  with  the Yti-hang  gentry prior to the commencement  of his
case state unequivocally that he was generally held in low esteem by his
peers. 3 46  These sources further indicate that Yang Nai-wu's arrest gen-
erated not sympathy but, if anything, an outburst of ill will and a spate
of rumors. 347  Second,  there  is no  clear record that any  officials  from
Chekiang tried to influence the outcome of the case during its first two
and  one-half years,  when  presumably  such  efforts  would  have  been
more likely to succeed.  Third, by implying in their memorial that Liu's
error consisted of allowing himself to be duped by an illiterate peasant
woman  into committing all manner  of errors,  the eighteen  Chekiang
officials  seemed to  be suggesting  to the Throne that Liu  was not well
suited to his post as magistrate.348
Political influence may also have worked to Yang Nai-wu's advan-
tage both in the findings  of the select group  of coroners  assembled in
Peking in January  1877 and in the February  1877 memorial of the cen-
343.  Although Preston Torbert is principally concerned  in his study of the early Ch'ing Impe-
rial Household Department  with questions of structure and function, our inquiries  into the impe-
rial decisionmaking process during the late Ch'ing would no doubt be greatly facilitated if we had
a study for this period of the quality ofP. TORBERT, THE CH'ING IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD  DEPART-
MENT:  A  STUDY  OF  ITS ORGANIZATION  AND  PRINCIPAL  FUNCTIONS,  1662-1796 (1977).
344.  Shen Pao, Mar. 29,  1876.
345.  YO-HANG  GAZETTEER,  supra note  112, at 2.
346.  See, e.g.,  Li TZ'U-MING,  DIARY,  supra  note 32,  at 4194-95;  WRITINGS  ON  ADMINISTRA-
TION,  supra  note  100,  at 4:727-28.
347.  See, e.g.,  LI  TZ'U-MING,  DIARY, supra note  32,  at 4475-80; Shen Pao, Apr. 4,  1877.
348.  Shen Pao, Mar. 29,  1876.
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sor Wang Hsin.349  There is no firm evidence available showing that the
expert  coroners'  determination  that Ko  P'in-lien  had  died  a natural
death was politically  motivated.  Nonetheless,  given the political  cir-
cumstances  of the case,  the state of Ko's remains,  and  the nature  of
nineteenth-century  forensic science, the unanimity of these coroners  at
least  raises  the possibility that  science may not have  been  their  only
guide.  The lack of reliable biographical data for Wang Hsin precludes
any conclusive statements regarding his political affiliations, but his re-
fusal to rest content with the vindication of Yang Nai-wu and his ar-
dent  plea  for  exceptionally  severe  punishments  for  Governor  Yang
Ch'ang-chiln and Literary Chancellor Hu Jui-lan at least raise the pos-
sibility that he may have been motivated as much by national political
considerations  as by a desire to  see justice done.
3 50
The difficulties  that undue political influence  caused for the late
Ch'ing criminal justice process were compounded by a fourth problem:
the tension between China's central and provincial governments.  As a
result  of this  tension,  essentially  legal  or  administrative  issues  were
often transformed  into full-blown  political  disputes.  Thus,  questions
raised in  Peking  through  the  obligatory  review  system  or  the  ching-
k'ung that might in a more stable age have been resolved on their mer-
its became tests of strength between  the Throne and its governors.
The age-old tension between Peking and the provinces was partic-
ularly serious throughout much of the nineteenth century.  During the
half-century preceding Yang Nai-wu's case, the gradual breakdown of
the  government's  authority  in  large  areas  of  central,  southeastern,
southwestern, and northwestern China, in combination with other fac-
tors including overpopulation and racial discrimination, led to the out-
break  of  large-scale  uprisings  known  as  the  T'ai-p'ing,  Nien,  and
Moslem rebellions.35 " '  At various times during that half-century, one or
another of these popular  rebel movements  exercised  effective  control
over large portions of the empire,  including most of Chekiang.  After
imperial army  efforts to suppress  the T'ai-p'ing  rebels had failed,  the
central  government  turned  in  desperation  to  officials  such  as  Tseng
Kuo-fan, Tso Tsung-t'ang, and Li Hung-chang and urged them to take
349.  TUNG-HUA  RECORDS, supra note 32,  at 345-47.
350.  Recollections  from the Hua-sui-jen-sheng  Chamber suggests, without  offering convincing
proof, that such political considerations may have been at play.  CHAMBER  RECOLLECTIONS, supra
note  100,  at 389.  Specifically,  it treats  Wang  Hsin's memorials  about this  case as  a ploy in an
interregional political struggle against the two Hunanese, Yang Ch'ang-chtln and Hu Jui-lan.  Id.
Indeed,  it further suggests  that these memorials  were prompted  by the censor Pien  Pao-ch'ttan
(who, it intimates, was related to Wang  Hsin by marriage).  Id.
351.  See generally CHIANG SIANG-TSEH,  THE NIEN REBELLION  (1954);  CHIEN YU-WEN,  THE
T'AI-P'ING  REVOLUTIONARY  MOVEMENT  (1973);  CHU  WEN-DJANG,  THE MOSLEM  REBELLION  IN
NORTHWEST  CHINA  1862-1878  (1966);  Kuhn,  The  T'ai-p'ling Rebellion, in  10 THE  CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY  OF  CHINA,  supra  note 335,  at 264.
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whatever  steps were necessary to restore order.3 52  Aware of the hope-
lessly corrupt and ineffectual nature of the imperial  army, Tseng, Tso,
and  Li  formed  private  armies  manned  by  their  fellow  provincials.
Over a number of years these armies were able, with military assistance
from certain Western governments and individuals, to squelch the T'ai-
p'ing.
The cure for the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion,  however,  proved nearly  as
deadly as the disease.  Although Tseng, Tso and Li were  all Confucian
generals  loyal to the Throne, 353  the creation  and  success of regionally
based private armies served only to accelerate further the decline of the
central government's  strength and authority. 354  In the years  following
the suppression of the T'ai-p'ing, Nien, and Moslem rebels, the central
government's  failure fully to reassert  its authority and the emergence
from  these private  armies  of regional  leaders  less dedicated  to  Con-
fucian values and the Throne contributed even more to the diffusion of
power from Peking to the provinces.355  The central government's  au-
thority was further impaired both by its inability to halt the West's  ex-
traterritorial  encroachments  and  by  the  scandal  surrounding  the
Empress Dowager  Tz'u-hsi's manipulation  of the imperial  succession.
In its later phases, the case  of Yang Nai-wu  appears to have be-
come embroiled in the political tension between the central and provin-
cial governments.  Governor Yang Ch'ang-chtln was in many respects
typical of the generation of men who assumed the empire's governor-
ships during the T'ung-chih and early Kuang-hsti  reigns.  Having  by-
passed  the  examination  system,  with  its  heavy  dose  of  Confucian
indoctrination,  and  having  received  the  Chekiang  Governorship
through his military and political  exertions, Yang  Ch'ang-chiln exhib-
ited greater  independence  from  the Throne than  a model  Confucian
official  would  have.  The  case  of Yang Nai-wu provides  at least  two
examples.  First, when the Throne was weighing  the censor Pien Pao-
ch'ftan's  request  that the case  be  brought to Peking,  Governor  Yang
indicated to it his displeasure with that deliberation.35 6  Both Governor
Yang's  attitude and the terms in which he chose to express it suggest
352.  Liu Kwang-ching, Restoration,  supra  note 335,  at 410, 435-36; A. Hsieh, Tseng Kuo-fan:
A  Nineteenth-Century  Confucian  General  66-165  (1975)  (unpublished  doctoral  dissertation  in
Sterling Memorial  Library, Yale University).
353.  J. FAIRBANK,  E. REISCHAUER  & A.  CRAIG,  EAST ASIA:  TRANSFORMATION  AND  TRADI-
TION 565-66  (1978).
354.  S.  SPECTOR,  Li  HUNG-CHANG  AND  THE  HUAI  ARMY:  A  STUDY  IN  NINETEENTH-CEN-
TURY  CHINESE  REGIONALISM passim (1964).
355.  This is not to take issue with Professor  Liu's findings that the  central government reas-
serted some measure  of control  over many official appointments during  the T'ung-chih Restora-
tion period,  see supra note 335,  but rather  to suggest that viewed  in a longer time  frame,  this
resurgence of the central government's  authority was a limited phenomenon.
356.  LI TZ'U-MING,  DIARY,  supra note 32, at 4498-99;  Shen  Pao, Mar. 7,  1876.
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not only that he viewed the Throne's legitimate concern about judicial
administration in Chekiang as something of an unwarranted intrusion,
but that he was hardly overcome  with the awe that Confucian officials
were supposed to experience when addressing their Emperor.
The tensions between  the Governor  of Chekiang and the central
government were further evidenced when the Throne decided  to have
the case brought to Peking and ordered Yang Ch'ang-chiin to arrange
for the safe  and expeditious  passage of all necessary individuals  and
documents to the capital.357  Governor Yang complied with this order
only after a lengthy period of open defiance and obstruction.  Judging
from his behavior and from the comments of Wang Hsin and others, it
seems  that the Governor's  resistance was prompted less by a desire to
cover up his underlings'  errors than by his distinct displeasure with at-
tempts of the central government to assert genuine control over provin-
cial matters.
358
Governor  Yang's  actions were  not  the  only indications  that  the
case  concerned  more  than the  plight of the  two  individuals  charged
with murder or  even that of the magistrate who  initially tried  them.
The memorials  submitted  by the censors  Pien Pao-ch'dan  and Wang
Hsin 3 59 clearly stated that the case raised the issue of relations between
the central and provincial governments.  In his memorial,36 0  Pien Pao-
ch'tIan did not restrict his criticism to Yang Ch'ang-chfn  and Hu Jui-
lan.  Instead, he argued that Hu's conclusion that Governor Yang had
handled the case  properly was but  one example  of the  devolution  of
power from the central government to the provinces and of its corrosive
impact upon the obligatory review system,  the ching-k'ung procedure,
and the formal criminal justice process generally.  Wang Hsin's memo-
rial361 was even  more  focused  than  Pien's upon the authority  of the
central government.  But for the recent diffusion of power to the prov-
inces and the presence of a child Emperor in Peking, he argued, Yang
Ch'ang-chtin,  Hu Jui-lan, and others like them would never have  as-
sumed such cavalier attitudes toward the Throne.  Similar attitudes had
already done much to undermine the integrity of the legal system and
disrupt the proper workings of the empire.  Therefore, it was important
to make an example  of Yang and Hu so that in the future, provincial
officials would better appreciate their correct roles.  The Throne in ef-
fect endorsed the positions advanced in Wang Hsin's memorial by for-
357.  TuNG-HuA REcoRDs, supra note 32, at 165-66.
358.  Id at 345-47.
359.  Id
360.  Pien Pao-ch'llan's memorial is  discussed supra in text accompanying notes 213-15.
361.  Wang Hsin's memorial is  discussed supra in text accompanying notes 254-57.
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warding  it to  the Board of Punishments  and by ultimately approving
the Board's recommendation  that Yang and Hu be punished.
As the above discussion indicates, serious problems tended to dis-
tort, if not undermine, three of the four formal checks  designed  to in-
sure the proper functioning of the formal criminal justice process.  For
example,  in Yang  Nai-wu's  case,  Magistrate  Liu  did not follow  the
elaborate  rules regulating  the  exercise  of his official  responsibilities.
Nor did the obligatory review system or the ching-k'ung appellate pro-
cedure fully succeed in uncovering the errors committed  at the district
level.  One such check, however, did function as intended.  By submit-
ting memorials attacking errors committed by officials and by prodding
the Throne to reverse its earlier decisions not to pursue the case vigor-
ously, the censors Wang Shu-jui, Pien Pao-ch'itan, and Wang Hsin ful-
filled the  Censorate's  traditional tasks  of overseeing  officialdom  and
remonstrating  with  the Emperor.  Indeed,  in  so  doing  they not only
sought to resolve correctly this particular  case, but they also suggested
general improvements  for the late imperial  criminal justice process.
Unfortunately,  as  Charles  Hucker,  the leading modem  authority
on the Censorate, has indicated, neither Chinese nor Western scholars
have yet produced a definitive study of the Ch'ing Censorate.  Accord-
ingly, we cannot definitively evaluate the Censorate and related super-
visory bodies  during the nineteenth  century.362  Although nineteenth-
and early twentieth-century observers as different as W.H. Medhurst 363
and Sun Yat-sen36  praised the Censorate, the work of Kao I-han and
others indicates that during the Ch'ing, the Censorate did not have as
active and independent a presence outside the capital as in earlier dy-
nasties.365  Instead, Kao suggests that the Ch'ing made up for a dimin-
ished provincial  censorial presence by relying upon line officials in the
regular bureaucracy to perform traditional censorial supervisory  func-
tions in addition to their routine responsibilities.366  This arrangement
could  easily  have  produced  difficulties  of the type  already  discussed
above with respect to the monitoring by higher officials of appeals from
their  subordinates'  decisions.367  For  now,  we  simply  do  not  know
whether any ill effects of diminished provincial censorial presence were
362.  C. HUCKER, supra note 304, at 3-4.  In addition to this excellent book-length study of the
Censorate, see Hucker,  Confucianism and  the Censorial System, in CONFUCIANISM  IN  ACTION  182
(D. Nivison & A. Wright eds. 1959) (a discussion of the censorial system with special reference  to
the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)).
363.  W. MEDHURST,  CHINA:  ITS  STATE AND  PROSPECTS  130 (1838).
364.  SUN  YAT-SEN,  SAN  MIN  CHU  I  [THE  THREE PRINCIPLES  OF  THE  PEOPLE]  356-57  (F.
Price trans. & L. Chen ed.  1943).
365.  KAo  I-HAN,  EVOLUTION,  supra  note 307,  at 77-89.
366.  Id
367.  See supra  text accompanying notes 309-27.
1240 [Vol. 72:1180IMPERIAL CHINESE LEGAL PROCESS
mitigated by  active  censors in the imperial  capital,  such  as the  three
who played  prominent roles in this case, or by other supervisory  per-
sonnel, such as circuit intendants.368
If the case  of Yang  Nai-wu  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai points out short-
comings of those checks built into the formal criminal justice process, it
also  provides one  of the  first illustrations  of a new  type of informal
nongovernmental  check.  The articles  that  the  Shen Pao ran  on this
case represented  a radical departure from tradition, both in their gen-
eral goal and in their particular substantive commentary upon this case
and  the  formal  criminal justice  process.  The  unprecedented  aim  of
these articles was to influence officials by appealing through "mass me-
dia" to  "public opinion,"  albeit the opinion of a public composed  al-
most exclusively of officials and other members of the elite.  Although
daily journals had been published by the imperial government from the
time of the Sung  dynasty  (960-1279  A.D.), it  was not until the mid-
nineteenth-century advent of newspapers  such as the Shen Pao  that the
Chinese press undertook to criticize and influence governmental affairs
through independent criticism. 369
The substance of the Shen Pads  comments on the case and on the
criminal justice  process  also  represented  a departure  from  tradition.
The paper not only accused  officials of colluding with each  other and
breaking the law, but also  called into question the very  soundness  of
certain aspects of the formal criminal justice process.37  Indeed, its edi-
tors went so far as to suggest that the abuses evident in Yang Nai-wu's
trial were endemic. 37'  The Chinese criminal justice process compared
poorly  with  that of Western  nations,  they  suggested.  Therefore, the
foreigners' insistence upon the extraterritorial application of their crim-
inal law372 may have been somewhat warranted and not a mere facade
through which to take advantage of China. 373  Examining the imperial
criminal justice process in light of their understanding of Western legal
368.  Professor Fairbank is of the opinion that by the late Ch'ing, the Censorate focused more
upon its surveillance  tasks  than its remonstrance  responsibilities.  Fairbank, Introduction to  10
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY  OF CHINA, supra note 335, at 25.  Professor Metzger, on the other hand,
is of the opinion that "even in the realm of surveillance, offices besides the Censorate  [for exam-
ple,  that of the circuit intendant]  played a major role, especially  outside the capital."  T. MEaTz-
GER,  supra note  28, at 269.
369.  E.P. LINK,  MANDARIN  DUCKS AND  BUTTERFLIES:  POPULAR FICTION  IN  EARLY TWEN-
TIETH-CENTURY  CHINESE  CITIES  97-103  (1981).  Undoubtedly,  the fact that  the  Shen Pao and
similar newspapers were published in the international settlement of Shanghai and in Hong Kong,
and were thus beyond the  reach of Ch'ing authorities,  greatly facilitated their outspokenness.
370.  Such criticisms-as  well  as some  of the  more  lurid  accounts  of Yang  Nai-wu's  and
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai's travails--may also have been prompted by a general effort to boost circulation in
the mid-1870's.  See id at 97-98; infra Appendix  4.
371.  Shen  Pao, May 4,  1877.
372.  For a discussion of extraterritoriality, see supra  note 45.
373.  Shen Pao, Sept.  17,  1875.
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practices, the editors of the Shen Pao  concluded that serious shortcom-
ings of the Chinese process included the use of torture to extract confes-
sions, 374  the absence  of laws providing individuals  accused  of crimes
with the opportunity  to confront  witnesses  offering testimony  against
them, 375 and the fact that Chinese officials with judicial responsibilities
lacked legal training.376  Accordingly, the editors urged that those  offi-
cials in Peking responsible for the formal criminal process take steps to
correct these specific deficiencies and to "modernize"  the process gener-
ally.  These steps would not only speed the end of extraterritoriality but




The case of Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai does not answer  all
the questions that one might have about the late imperial criminal jus-
tice process, nor could it.  It does, however, aid efforts to evaluate for-
mer and current portrayals  of that prozess and to frame questions  for
future research.
At a minimum, the case should lead us to question the view that in
the absence of certain restraints and practices familiar to us in the West
(most notably, a separation of powers, procedural due process, and an
independent legal profession), the imperial criminal justice process was
little more than a vehicle for the consolidation  of state control by the
district  magistrate. 37  The case  of Yang  Nai-wu  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai
clearly  illustrates  that  the  imperial  criminal  justice  process  encom-
passed  a broad range  of sophisticated  procedural  and administrative
measures designed to convict the guilty and acquit the innocent, even
at the expense of magistrates and other members of Confucian  official-
dom.3 79  The ch'u-fen (se-li and selected laws were at least partially in-
tended to foster the attainment of such results in criminal cases.  They
performed  this  function  by  sharply  circumscribing  the  discretion  of
magistrates (and, for that matter, every official of the imperial state) in
favor of uniform, comprehensive rules governing all aspects of criminal
374.  Id
375.  Id; see supra  note 203.
376.  Id
377.  Id  The editors of the Shen Pao  were not alone in expressing this sentiment.  Kuo Sung-
tao and others advocated the reform of China's law both to help bring an end to extraterritoriality
and to promote the welfare of the Chinese people.  J. CH'EN, supra  note 17,  at 325-26;  Hao Yen-
p'ing & Erh-min Wang,  Changing  Chinese Views of Western Relations  1840-1895, in II  THE CAM-
BRIDGE  HISTORY  OF CHINA,  LATE  CHiNG,  1800-1911,  PART  II, at  142,  195  (J. Fairbank  & D.
Twitchett eds.  1980).
378.  See, eg., J. COHEN,  CRIMINAL  PROCESS, supra note  11,  at 5-7.
379.  See supra notes 260-62, 267-75,  291-305 and accompanying text.
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investigation,  interrogation,  and trial?"°  Furthermore,  appellate  and
supervisory measures could be brought to bear on official behavior by
independent  oversight  personnel  in  the  Censorate  and  related  enti-
ties,38' by persons utilizing the voluntary appellate procedures,382 or by
higher officials through the obligatory  review process.383  And, at least
in theory, even the Emperor had a legally prescribed  role in the effort
to see that justice was done in each case:  he was required to review and
pass upon virtually all death sentences, 384 and his imperial bureaucracy
had to include  a  Censorate  charged with  admonishing  him, if neces-
sary, in criminal matters, among others. 385
The presence  of measures  designed to facilitate the conviction  of
the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent through the control of offi-
cial  discretion does not, of course,  mean that such  results were  regu-
larly reached  or  that such  discretion was  always properly  controlled.
Unfortunately, we  are not now in a position to form conclusive judg-
ments  as to how the process worked across  China throughout the late
imperial period.386  Indeed,  the case of Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-
ts'ai itself hardly provides  us with a single answer.  For although the
case graphically illustrates many serious practical  imperfections in the
process, particularly with respect to its inability to deter magisterial de-
viations from the ch'u-fen tse-li and related laws,38 7  at least in this cele-
brated instance two seemingly incorrect capital sentences were reversed
and  officials who acted improperly were punished.
The  case  also illustrates  that a range  of persons  in late  imperial
China from ordinary peasants to the Throne viewed the process as hav-
ing the capability of dispensing justice.  Thus, we ought not to assume
that the process was then seen only as a tool of state control little con-
cerned  with  the  attainment  of individual justice.38 8  Whatever  other
380.  T. METZGER,  supra note 28,  at  247-75; see also supra notes 292-94 and  accompanying
text.
381.  See supra text accompanying notes 303-05.
382.  See supra note 184 and text accompanying notes 297-301.
383.  See supra note 295  and accompanying text.
384.  See supra text accompanying notes 296,  300.
385.  See supra text accompanying notes 304-05.
386.  See infra text accompanying notes 399-434.
387.  See supra notes 307-08  and accompanying text.
388.  For a discussion  of this  assumption,  see supra text accompanying  notes 89-97.  In an
account of his tenure as British consul in the North China city of Weihaiwei during the late 19th
century, Reginald  Johnston inadvertently provides evidence  suggesting  that the stereotype of a
population  fearful of formal courts may not have been wholly  warranted.  R. JOHNSTON,  LION
AND  DRAGON IN NORTHERN  CHINA  195-210 (1910).  While serving as British consul in Weihai-
wei,  Johnston  observed that the  Chinese  availed  themselves of the opportunity  to seek redress
through British courts with little of their reputed hesitancy to use formal legal processes.  This was
particularly true of Chinese women,  who would have had  difficulties in vindicating themselves
through  either the formal  Chinese criminal justice  process or such  informal processes  as media-
tion.  Id  Michael Moser's research on Taiwan also indicates that during the late Ch'ing at least in
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political or economic factors may have been at play, the work of Yang
Nai-wu and Ch'en Chu-shan as informal legal advisors of Yti-hang res-
idents, 3 89 Yang Nai-wu's utilization of the ching-k'ung  procedure in his
own case,390  the decision of the Chekiang officials  led by Wang  Shu-
p'ing to take up Yang Nai-wu's case,391 the complaints of various offi-
cials  about the breakdown  of the ching-k'ung procedure, 392 the persis-
tent  efforts  of Wang  Hsin  and  his  fellow  censors  to  influence  the
case,393  and the involvement of the Shen Pao 394  all evidence some be-
lief that the process, although imperfect, was not a mere facade.
The Throne itself seems  to have  seen the process as  having some
vitality in practice.  Throughout the case it took steps, albeit with some
prodding, to ensure  that a  decision  challenged  through  utilization of
the ching-k'ung  be reviewed  and that even important officials adhere to
administrative  and procedural rules.395  Further, in  1882,  the Throne
attempted  to  eliminate  deficiencies  in  the  process  by  amending  the
ching-k'ung  procedure  so that appeals involving serious crimes (includ-
ing capital crimes) would be far more rigorously and fairly reviewed. 396
Clearly, much  more  work must be  done before  we can  begin to
evaluate how well the formal criminal justice process  in late imperial
China actually worked.  Until such work is  done, however, we should
not rest content with the assumptions that the process was incapable of
doing more  than  vesting magistrates  with  unbridled  power  and  was
viewed by the populace  as having little to do with justice.
Although the case of Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai leads us to
question certain of the principal  rationales  for characterizing  the for-
mal criminal justice process as little more than a vehicle of state con-
trol, it also raises the possibility of another, more subtle justification for
so characterizing the process.  It could be argued that the process' elab-
orate procedural and administrative measures were indeed designed to
circumscribe  the discretion of district magistrates and their provincial
superiors,  but  with  the  ultimate  goal  of consolidating  power  in  the
hands of the central government. 397  Viewed in this light, the generally
evidenced  concern  with the attainment of individual justice  might be
that  island province,  there may not have been  as much ideological  opposition to litigation as  is
often  suggested.  M.  MOSER,  LAW  AND  SOCIAL  CHANGE  IN  A  CHINESE  COMMUNITY:  A  CASE
STUDY  FROM  RURAL  TAIWAN  176-83  (1982).
389.  See supra  notes  108,  110-12,  141  and accompanying text.
390.  See supra notes 186-88,  192-94 and accompanying text.
391.  See supra  notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
392.  See supra  notes 214-15, 322-31  and accompanying  text.
393.  See supra  notes 204-06, 214-16,  254-57,  322-23  and accompanying text.
394.  See supra  notes 369-77 and accompanying  text.
395.  See supra  notes 206, 216, 234-35,  251,  284 and accompanying text.
396.  See supra  text accompanying notes 315-32.
397.  For a discussion of how procedural  regularity  can serve to reinforce state  control in a
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explained as  an unintended by-product of the larger  effort to coalesce
power centrally,  as a short-term tactical  device in the struggle  against
opponents  whose strength lay at the provincial  level, or as  a carefully
chosen instrument for impressing upon the populace the legitimacy and
control of the central government.
The case itself does not enable us to evaluate definitively this justi-
fication for characterizing the criminal justice process as a tool of state
control  at  most instrumentally  concerned  with  individual justice.  It
may be that the Chekiang  officials in Peking who involved themselves
in the case, other  Board officials who took an interest in it, and, to a
lesser extent, even the imperial censors were motivated  more by post-
T'ai-p'ing 398  struggles between central and provincial authorities  than
by any intrinsic interest in insuring that the accused be treated justly.
Conversely,  one could argue that these individuals were primarily  in-
terested in seeing justice done in this particular case, but believed that
they could best make their point by emphasizing broader problems in
the Throne's efforts to supervise the criminal justice process and to con-
solidate power generally.  Moreover,  at least one other key factor-the
role of the Shen Pao, and particularly its substantive  comments on the
case-cannot  readily be explained  in terms  of the power  struggle be-
tween the central government and the provinces.
Before  we  can  arrive  at  definitive judgments  about  the  formal
criminal justice process  in  late  imperial  China, we  must  greatly  en-
hance our understanding of it at three different levels.  First, we must
endeavor to elaborate our picture of the various components of the pro-
cess,  their  intended function  and  their  actual  operation.  Second,  we
must further explore its larger historical, philosophical, political, social,
and economic contexts.  Finally, we must sharpen our awareness of the
enormous  difficulties inherent in such cross-cultural judgments.
At the level of the intended function and actual operation  of the
imperial criminal process, we need to explore topics such as the follow-
ing: the prevalence, training, and role of sung-kun and other unofficial
legal advisors; 399 the degree to which magistrates and higher level offi-
cials  were able on their own and through their assistants  to acquire  a
serious working understanding of the law;4"  the reasons for official dis-
dain of sung-kun and particularly the extent to which officials with legal
responsibilities  (from legal  secretaries  to the  Board  of Punishments'
different setting, see Hay, Property,  Authority and  CriminalLaw,  in ALBION'S FATAL TREE:  CRIME
AND  SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY  ENGLAND  17,  58-59  (D.  Hay ed.  1975).
398.  For  more  on  the  chaos generated  by the T'ai-p'ing  uprising  and  other  mid-century
events,  see supra text accompanying  notes 351-55.
399.  See supra notes 108,  135,  308.
400.  See supra notes 70, 308 and accompanying  text.
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members) sought to "monopolize"  access to the law's meaning;4 01  the
uses and abuses of torture;4 02 the extent to which convictions were en-
tered  without  confessions;40 3  the  consistency  of  sentences  given
throughout  China; the extent  to which  individuals were  punished  for
the crimes of others because of family or  pao-chia  relationships;4 4 the
frequency  with  which  errors  committed  at  lower  levels  were  subse-
quently corrected  on review  or on appeal;4 0s the extent to which  offi-
cials carried  out executions  without first  seeking higher approval  and
the degree  to which such actions were subsequently  scrutinized  by the
central government; 406 the impact of the requirement  that magistrates
designate a single law in passing judgment;4 0 7 the ease with which way-
ward officials  were  able to invoke  their immunity  or otherwise  avoid
punishment;4 8  the  background  of persons  utilizing  the  shang-k'ung
procedure and the success of their petitions;409 the extent to which those
in the imperial  bureaucracy  controlling  "legislative"  drafting  viewed
the shang-k'ung as a means through which individuals  could vindicate
themselves; 41 0  the degree to which prefects and higher level provincial
officials  carried out the de novo investigations called for by law;4 1t the
organization  and  effectiveness  of  the  Censorate,  particularly  in  the
provinces; 4 1 2 the relationship of the provincial governors and the Board
of Punishments;41 3 the utilization of coroners and other such experts in
the review of appeals;414 the frequency of special commissions and the
procedures  for appointing  their members;4 15  the full  scope of the  role
401.  At first blush, the notion that magistrates and others charged  with legal responsibilities
may have been  interested  in monopolizing  access to the  law seems an interpolation  of Western
concerns upon the Chinese scene.  This initial reaction, however,  derives largely from  the stereo-
types of the magistrate  as knowing and caring little  about the law and of the sung.kun as little
better than an unschooled charlatan.  If these stereotypes need modification  (as may be the case),
the possibility that magistrates and sung-kun were interested in monopolizing  the law takes on an
added importance.  I am indebted to Professor Martin Shapiro for alerting me to this question first
through the essay  on traditional Chinese law in his book  CouRTS:  A  COMPARATIVE AND  POLIT-
ICAL ANALYsIs  (1981)  and  then in correspondence.
402.  See supra notes 78,  151  and  accompanying text; see  also text accompanying  notes 293,
308.
403.  As indicated suprain  note  161,  technically the law did not require that a defendant  make
a confession  before conviction.
404.  See supra note 85  and accompanying text.
405.  See supra  note 308 and accompanying  text.
406.  See supra note 296 and accompanying  text.
407.  See supra  note 308.
408.  See supra note 262 and accompanying  text.
409.  See supra notes  184,  320 and accompanying text.
410.  Id
411.  See supra notes  163-64  and accompanying text;  see also text accompanying  note  309.
412.  See supra notes 362-68  and accompanying text.
413.  See supra text accompanying notes 238-40, 254-56,  273.
414.  See supra text accompanying notes 241-47.
415.  See supra notes 206,  320 and accompanying text.
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provided for the Emperor in the formal criminal justice process;
4 16  the
manner in which various Emperors discharged their responsibilities;417
the involvement of newspapers such as the Shen Pao  in other cases, and
their overall concern  with the criminal justice process; 41 8  and the im-
pact of legally trained  Westerners resident in China.419
Questions  about  the  broader  contexts  within  which  the  formal
criminal justice process operated are no less vital.  For example, Con-
fucian  doctrine did not posit  a relationship  of equality between ruler
and ruled, at least with respect to issues of governance.420  To the con-
trary, the Emperor  and those who exercised  power in his name occu-
pied a position relative to the populace akin to that of parents to their
children.42'  The district magistrate, who was for most Chinese the em-
bodiment of imperial authority, was known as thefu-mu kuan (literally,
"father and mother official" 422), while imperial edicts and other official
statements  often took on a parental tone.423  Did this notion impose  a
fiduciary-like obligation upon the Emperor and his officials to exercise
a restraint beyond that found in the formal law governing the criminal
justice process?  Or did it merely underscore in the minds of the power-
ful the insignificance of the powerless?  424
To take another example, scholars have assumed that the Chinese
populace typically viewed the formal criminal justice process as prom-
ising nothing but trouble and therefore were  fearful of it.425  The case
of Yang Nai-wu  clearly  illustrates  what may have  given rise to such
anxieties,426 but also reveals expectations  on the part of many that the
process  could be just.427  Were these expectations  an aberration attrib-
416.  See supra  notes 296, 300 and accompanying text; see also Shiga, Criminal  Procedure  (),
supra note 30,  at  15,  16.
417.  See supra note  300.
418.  See supra notes 369-77  and accompanying text.
419.  See infra note  428  and accompanying  text.  To date  relatively  little  has  been  written
about the activity of legally trained  Westerners  in China during the  late  imperial period.  One
longs for a study in this area of the quality  of S. COCHRAN,  BIG  BUSINESS IN CHINA  (1980).
420.  See, e.g.,  Wang K'ang-nien on Democracy,  in  CHINA's  RESPONSE, supra note 47, at  161-
64.
421.  See, e.g., L. PyE, supra note  17,  at 61.
422.  See J. WATT, supra note 29,  at 85-87.
423.  See, e.g., the discussion of the Yung-cheng  Emperor's rhetoric in S. Wu, COMMUNICA-
TION AND  IMPERIAL CONTROL IN  CHINA:  EVOLUTION  OF THE PALACE MEMORIAL SYSTEM  1693-
1735,  at 73-75  (1970);  see also J. SPENCE,  supra  note 300, passim.
424.  Drawing  upon Tdnnies  and Weber,  Eugene Kamenka  and Alice Tay suggest "the em-
peror's seemingly arbitrary exercise ofjudicial and police powers [could be] taken to be part of his
parental function."  Kamenka & Tay, supra  note  16, at 23; see also L. STOVER,  supra note  17,  at
89-91.
425.  See supra text accompanying notes 89-97.
426.  One example is the concern,  apparently justified, of the druggist alleged to have sold the
arsenic to Yang Nai-wu.  See supra  text  accompanying notes  170-75, 239.
427.  See supra  text accompanying notes 389-96.
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utable to the unusual nature of late imperial China and in particular to
the havens  from Ch'ing jurisdiction provided by the Western presence
in  China?428  Or, alternatively,  in eras  other than  the late  Ch'ing,429
were  comparable  expectations  as or even more  prevalent?  And how
did these expectations shape the willingness of the populace  to utilize
the formal criminal justice process?
430
Finally, we must address a third tier of inquiries:  what are appro-
priate standards for evaluating  the criminal justice process of a society
removed from our own both culturally and temporally?  Simply stated,
should we view convictions of the guilty and acquittals  of the innocent
in late Ch'ing China as less than fully just because they were attained
through a process very different from our own?  Are the results of the
Chinese process-in which the individual was relegated  to a relatively
passive role and a  single official  was charged with promptly  ferreting
out the truth-any  less just than the  results of the  latter process-in
which the individual is given  a greater opportunity  to present his ver-
sion of the truth, but faced with a concomitantly greater responsibility
to see that his version comes before the adjudicator?43'  Should we say
that the late  imperial  Chinese  process  was more  interested  in justice
than  is the  modern  American  criminal  process  because  our  process'
stated objective  of "insuring  the respect of the dignity of the  individ-
ual" may result in guilty persons going free rather than being forced to
confess? 4 2   Or, should  we conclude that the Chinese process  was  less
"just because  of its  concern  that  all  crimes  be  resolved  within  pre-
428.  The importance of the sanctuary  provided by treaty port areas  beyond Ch'ing jurisdic-
tion is emphasized in M. RANKIN,  EARLY CHINESE  REVOLUTIONARIES:  RADICAL  INTELLECTUALS
IN SHANGHAI AND  CHEKIANG,  1902-1911,  at 48-50 (1971); and E.P. LINK, supra  note 369, at 79-80.
429.  Even if the  late Ch'ing era has been the  chief focus  of Western scholars because  of its
relative  accessibility  and contact  with  the West,  P.  COHEN,  DISCOVERING  HISTORY  IN CHINA:
AMERICAN  HISTORICAL WRITING  ON THE  RECENT CHINESE  PAST (1984),  it was in many respects
the  nadir of more  than  2000 years of imperial  Chinese  history,  B.  SCHWARTZ,  IN  SEARCH  OF
WEALTH  AND  POWER:  YEN FU AND  THE WEST  1-19 (1964).  Professor  Zhang Guohua  is of the
opinion that this period was also a low point in Chinese legal history.  See Zhang Guohua, Chi-
nese Legal Thought, supra  note  14,  at 5.
430.  At present, we do not know the degree to which the  Chinese populace  adhered  to those
provisions of Ch'ing law requiring all disputes, whether criminal or civil in nature, (save for those
concerning "petty matters") to be brought to the magistrate rather  than settled through  alternate
means, such as mediation by clan or village elders.  See Cohen, Chinese Mediation,  supra  note  16,
at  1211.
431.  The official's  fiduciary-like obligation  to ferret  out the truth may help explain  why the
ch'u-fen ise-li required punishment of official misfeasance as well as official malfeasance.  CH'ING
CODE,  supra note  76, §§ 7-8;  see also In  re Hsa Chung-we! (unpublished  translation  by  Fu-mei
Chang Chen and others in the Harvard East Asian Legal Studies Group of a Chinese case decided
in 1780),  in I CHINESE LAW II, C,  109 (W. Afford 2d ed.  1984) (unpublished  text available at the
U.C.L.A. Law Library).  In that case, a nearsighted  magistrate was punished for failing to detect a
small  head wound  on a corpse  and so  erroneously  accepting a corrupt coroner's  determination
that death was attributable to suicide by poison.
432.  Kadish, Methodology and  Criteria  in Due Process  Adudication-A Survey and Criticism,
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ordained time periods, especially if we subsequently determine that this
concern had more to do with the maintenance of communal harmony
than the vindication of the individual?  There are no ready answers for
these normative  questions, but we must thoughtfully  consider them as
we  seek  to make  sense  of the  late  imperial  formal  criminal  justice
process.
The enterprise that awaits scholars of that process is vast, but that
vastness need not be daunting. To  the contrary, with archives  and li-
braries in the PRC becoming  more  accessible  to Western  scholars433
and with  scholars in the PRC beginning to have increased  opportuni-
ties to turn  their attention  to legal  history, 434  this  is an  exciting  and
important time.  We are now in a position to examine, with a fresh eye,
China's rich but much neglected legal history.  In so doing, we can be-
gin to ascertain  the  degree,  if any,  to which  images of China's  legal
history that have long dominated our thinking warrant retention.  Only
in that way will we be able to understand China's  legal heritage  and,
through that, her present and ambitious projected undertakings in the
field of law.
66 YALE LJ. 319  (1957).  For a cogent discussion of the values underlying concern in the United
States for the protection of the right to procedural due  process, see id.  at 346-49.
433.  See, eag.,  HUMANISTIC  AND  SOCIAL  SCIENCE  RESEARCH  IN  CHINA:  RECENT HIsToRY
AND  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  (A.  Thurston  & J. Parker  eds.  1980);  MING  AND  QING  HISTORICAL
STUDIES  IN THE PEOPLE'S  REPUBLIC  OF  CHINA (F. Wakeman ed.  1980).
434.  Legal  history  is  now  an integral  part  of the  curriculum  of  all  leading  Chinese  law
schools.  See, e.g.,  WUHAN  DAXUE  JtAOXUE  ZHIDASHU  1981-1983  [THE  CATALOGUE OF WUHAN
UNIVERSITY];  R. Edwards & W. Alford, Summary Report on the Schools of Law at Beijing Uni-
versity, Wuhan University, East China School of Political Science and Law, Jilin University, and
the  People's University  (1982)  (unpublished report for the Ford  Foundation).  Articles  on legal
history appear in Chinese law journals and legal newspapers far more frequently than they do in
the United  States.
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APPENDIX  A
In the  course  of reconstructing  and  analyzing  the  case  of Yang
Nai-wu  and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai,  it  has been  necessary  to refer  to  a  wide
variety of materials, ranging from detailed edicts issued in the name of
a five-year-old Emperor, to quasi-official legal reports, to the libretto of
a  Peking  opera.  Although the original  documentation  is probably  as
extensive  as that for any case in imperial  Chinese history, no contem-
poraneous or other source provides a comprehensive picture of the case
and  its  significance.  Six  primary  sources,  however,  when  taken  to-
gether and supplemented with a range of other primary and secondary
materials, enable one to reconstruct much of the case.
The  most  comprehensive  account  of  the  case  is  found  in  the
KUANG-HS0  CH'AO  TUNG-HUA  LU  [RECORDS  FROM  WITHIN  THE
TUNG-HUA  GATE FOR  THE KUANG-HSO  REIGN]  (Chu Shou-p'eng  ed.
1958)  (Beijing reprint).  The twelfth in a series of quasi-official histories
compiled during the Ch'ing by scholars employed by the State Histori-
ographer's  Office,  this  work  was  modeled  after  the  first  Tung-hua
Records,  which was compiled by the renowned historian Chiang Liang-
ch'i between  1765  and  1779.  The  editor of the  Tung-hua Records for
the Kuang-hsU  reign, Chu  Shou-p'eng,  included  in his work virtually
all edicts issued in the Emperor's name, as well as most important me-
morials  submitted  to the  Throne  during  that  reign.  Because  it  was
compiled by a skilled historian with access to  official  records and be-
cause it is so comprehensive, the Tung-hua Records  is considered, along
with the TA-CH'ING  TE-TSUNG  CHING  HUANG-TI  SHIH  LU  [THE VERI-
TABLE RECORDS  OF THE KUANG-HSO  EMPEROR]  (Taipei reprint  1964),
to be one of the two best sources for the history of the Kuang-hsfl reign.
Indeed,  many  scholars  feel  that  the  Tung-hua Records is  the  better
source because it contains a greater number of memorials, which gener-
ally provide more  detailed  information  than  do  edicts.  Nonetheless,
the Tung-hua Records is not without its drawbacks.  Chief among them
is the fact that the most comprehensive memorials about the case that it
contains  were  written  by  officials  who  were  involved  in the  case.  A
second problem  is that because  it consists  exclusively  of official  docu-
ments,  the Tung-hua Records tends to reflect  a pro-Confucian,  pro-im-
perial bias and to ignore information that might not ordinarily make its
way into communications between  the Emperor and his officials.  Two
further difficulties are that Chu Shou-p'eng failed to include every me-
morial relating to the case and edited certain  of those he did include.
A second major source is the HSIN-TSENG  HSING-AN  HUI-LAN  [A
NEW SUPPLEMENT  TO THE CONSPECTUS  OF PENAL  CASES]  (P'an Wen-
fang & Hsfl Chien-ch'tian eds.  1886).  The Hsing-an Hui-Ian [The Con-
spectus of  Penal  Cases] and its three supplements  (of which this is the
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second) are considered by Professors Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris
to be the  "largest  . . ., broadest  . . ., and  best classified"  of Ch'ing
dynasty  collections  of cases,  (or casebooks,  as  they  were  referred  to
contemporaneously).  D.  BODDE  &  C.  MORRIS,  LAW  IN  IMPERIAL
CHINA  146 (1967).  A New Supplement to the Conspectus  contains more
than 250 important cases.  Neither the Board of Punishments  nor any
other body published regular official  accounts of cases; for this reason
individuals such as P'an and HsUt  were allowed to draw upon materials
from the  archives  of the Board  of Punishments  in order to assemble
collections of the highlights of cases embodying key precedents and il-
lustrating significant legal principles.  These casebooks were widely cir-
culated among officials charged with judicial duties.  The case of Yang
Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai  is included in a section of A  New Supple-
ment to the Conspectus  devoted to official misconduct.  The specific of-
fense under which the case is identified is that of failing to carry out an
accurate  inspection of a corpse-chien-yen shih-shangpu  i shih.  (The
law pertaining  to this  crime  is stated  and discussed  in HSOEH  YPN-
SHENG,  Tu-LI  T'SUN-I  [THOUGHTS  ABOUT  UNCERTAIN  MATTERS
GLEANED  WHILE  PERUSING THE  SUBSTATUTES]  412:00 (Huang Tsing-
hua ed.  1970) (Taipei reprint), translated  in TA TS'ING  LEU  LEE [THE
CODE  OF  THE  GREAT  CH'ING  DYNASTY]  § 412  (G.  Staunton  trans.
1966)  (Taipei reprint) and in  MANUEL  DE CODE  CHINOIS  722-23  (G.
Boulais trans.  1923)  (Taipei reprint).)  The  account  of the  case in A
New Supplement to the Conspectus  provides the most accurate and com-
plete listing of the various  transgressions committed by officials trying
the case but offers  little information about other aspects of the case.
Diaries kept by the officials Weng T'ung-ho and Li Tz'u-ming  are
the third and fourth major sources for the case.  Weng T'ung-ho was a
major official of the late Ch'ing whose various posts included imperial
tutor,  Grand  Councillor,  President  of  the  Boards  of  Punishments,
Works, and Revenue, President of the Censorate, and Vice-President  of
the Boards of Punishments and Revenue.  His diary, the WENG T'UNG-
HO  JIH-CHI  [THE  DIARY  OF  WENG  T'UNG-HO]  (Chao  Chung-fu  ed.
1960)  (Taipei reprint) spans the years  1858  to  1904 and is widely  con-
sidered to be  one of the most valuable  and  accurate  sources  for that
period.  EMINENT  CHINESE  OF  THE CH'ING  PERIOD  861  (A. Hummel
ed.  1964)  (Taipei reprint).  Those portions  of the diary devoted to the
case of Yang Nai-wu and Hsiao-pai-ts'ai contain detailed  information
about  debates  within  the  Board  of  Punishments  that  are  covered
briefly, if at all, in the other sources.  Unfortunately,  Weng was able to
describe the Board's deliberations because he was also a participant in
the struggle that took place in the capital over this case.  See supra text
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accompanying notes 218-27.  Therefore, despite the esteem in which his
diary has been held, the author's possible bias must be kept in mind.
Li Tz'u-ming  served successively  as a department  director in the
Board of Works and as a censor during the late Ch'ing.  His diary, the
YUEH-MAN  T'ANG  JIH-CHI  [DIARY  OF  THE  YDEH-MAN  HALL]  covers
the  years  1863  to  1888  and  is  considered  a  fine  primary  source  by
Arthur Hummel, among others. EMINENT  CHINESE OF THE CH'ING PE-
RIOD,  supra, at 493.  It is not, however, as well  regarded as Weng's di-
ary because Li tends to include unsubstantiated  accounts  of events he
did not witness.  Li's account  of this case includes many unconfirmed,
second-hand  descriptions, particularly of the case's early history.  One
must also take into account the fact that Li was a native  of Chekiang,
as provincial  loyalties proved  to be  important factors in the case.  In
spite of these difficulties,  his diary is useful, both for its breadth of in-
formation  and for the many key memorials  and edicts it includes.
The Shen Pao (also romanized as the Shun Pao) is the fifth major
source for the case.  Prior to the late imperial period, Chinese newspa-
pers were of three  types:  official  gazettes  publishing  court  and other
government  documents,  unofficial  gazettes  reproducing  such  docu-
ments, and sporadic handbills (hsin-wen chih) put out by printing shops.
E.P.  LINK,  MANDARIN  DUCKS  AND  BUTTERFLIES:  POPULAR  FICTION
IN  EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY  CHINESE CITIES 95 (1981).  The Shen
Pao  was founded in 1872 by the British merchant Ernest Majors in the
foreign settlement in Shanghai, which was soon to become the leading
center of the new Western-style  journalism.  Although modeled  after
Western newspapers  and influenced  by Western  commercial  interests,
the Shen Pao was edited by Chinese  and had, as Roswell  Britton has
put it, "no more alien aspect than was warranted by the tastes of Chi-
nese readers  who  were  subject to the alien  influences  of the  growing
port city."  R. BRITTON,  THE CHINESE PERIODICAL PRESS  1800-1912,  at
63  (1933).  Able to attract some of the finest Chinese journalists of the
day, including Ch'ien Cheng and Huang Hsieh-hstian, and later, Wang
T'ao, the Shen Pao overcame poor sales in its early years  to become a
leading paper,  particularly  among  well-to-do  Chinese  families.  E.P.
LINK, supra, at 97-98.  The paper's coverage of the early stages of the
case of Yang Nai-wu was sporadic, but by the start of the Kuang-hsil
reign, the Shen Pao  had taken an active, if partisan, interest in the case.
Its columns  contain  a great  deal  of information not  found  in  other
sources.  In  view of the paper's partisanship  and uneven  concern  for
accuracy,  see id. at  97,  however, one must  approach  this  source  with
caution.
The  sixth major  source for  the case  is the  KUANG-HS0  CHENG-
YAO  [IMPORTANT  POLICIES  OF  THE  KUANG-HSO  REIGN].  This unoffi-
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cial history  of the  34  years of the  Kuang-hsii  reign  (1875-1908)  was
compiled by Shen T'ung-sheng and published in 1909.  It draws heav-
ily upon memorials  and other official documents drafted by high-level
officials.  One of these documents is an  1877 memorandum, most likely
written by Board of Punishments President Tsao-pao, that summarizes
the history of the case.  In utilizing such documents, this work provides
some  data  apparently  not elsewhere  available,  but also  manifests  the
world view of the upper ranks of late Ch'ing officialdom.
Other  sources  contemporaneous  with  the case that  are of use in
reconstructing  its history include:  (1) the YT-HANG  HsIEN-CHIH  KAo
[THE LOCAL  GAZETTEER  FOR THE YP-HANG DISTRICT]  (Chang Chi-an
comp.  1919); (2) the KANGSI NIEH-Ssu TING-LI Hui-PIEN [THE ESTAB-
LISHED  REGULATIONS  OF  THE  KIANGSI  PROVINCIAL  JUDICIAL  COM-
MISSIONER'S OFFICE]  (discussed briefly supra  in note 204); (3)  the Ching
Pao [Peking Gazette] (discussed briefly supra in note 99);  and  (4) vari-
ous yeh-chi (informal private accounts and histories) including the Yu-
HANG  TA-YO  CHI [A HISTORY  OF  THE  GREAT  CASE OF  YO-HANG],  re-
produced  in HUA-SUI-JEN-SHENG  AN  CHIH-I  [RECOLLECTIONS  FROM
THE  HUA-SUI-JEN-SHENG  CHAMBER]  (Huang  Chin  comp.  1965)
(Taipei reprint).
Numerous  secondary  works have also been referred to in prepar-
ing this Article.  Foremost among these are a small number of articles
published  in Taiwan  and in  the PRC  regarding  the case.  The  most
significant of these, which was published in Taiwan, is Chao K'e-chtin,
Ch'ing-mou tsui hung-tung te i-jian  yi*an-yi  [.The Most Explosive Injus-
tice of  the Late Ch'ing], 4 CHtJN-CH'IU  [SPRING  & AUTUMN]  15 (1967).
Chao's article is well-researched  and thoughtful in its description  of a
number of portions of the case itself, but does not endeavor in a com-
prehensive  way to portray  the implications  of the case for  a broader
understanding of the late imperial criminal justice process.  Shorter ar-
ticles  on  the  case  published  in  the  PRC  include  Zhang  Mingxin,
Qingmo Yang Naiwu an shimo [The Late Ch'ing Case of Yang Nai-wu
from Beginning to End], 5 MINZHU  YU  FAZHI  [DEMOCRACY  & LEGAL
SYSTEM]  28  (1980)  and  Dao  Yi,  Yang  Naiwu an gaosongle women
shemma? [  ffhat Does the Case of  Yang Nai-wu Tell Us.1, 5 MINZHU YU
FAZHI  [DEMOCRACY  &  LEGAL  SYSTEM]  30  (1980).
Other secondary works of particular usefulness in locating and as-
sessing the legal history of this era, in addition to the works mentioned
supra in  notes  14  and  28-30,  are  CH'ING-SHIH-KAO  HSING-FA-CHIH
CHU-CHIEH  [THE ANNOTATED  MONOGRAPH  ON CRIMINAL LAW FROM
THE  DRAFT  HISTORY  OF  THE  CH'ING  DYNASTY]  (State  Council, Bu-
reau  of Legal  Affairs,  Office  for  Research  into  Legal  History  comp.
1957);  CHUNG-KUO  FA-CHIH-SHIH  SHU-MU [AN  ANNOTATED  BIBLIOG-
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RAPHY  OF  CHINESE  LEGAL  HISTORY]  (Chang Wejen comp.  1976);  MA
FENG-CHEN,  CH'ING-TAI  HSING-CHENG  CHIH-TU  YEN-CHIU  Ts'AN-
K'AO  SHU-MU  [A  CATALOGUE  OF  REFERENCE  MATERIALS  FOR  RE-
SEARCH  ON  THE  ADMINISTRATIVE  SYSTEM  OF  THE  CH'ING  DYNASTY]
(1935);  and ZHONGGUO  FAZHISHI  CANKAO  SHUMU  JIENJI  [AN  INTRO-
DUCTORY  BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  REFERENCE  MATERIALS  ON  CHINESE
LEGAL HISTORY]  (Li Zuyin comp.  1968).
Among  the many fine  works on the domestic political climate  of
this  period  are  P.  COHEN,  BETWEEN  TRADITION  AND  MODERNITY:
WANG  T'AO  AND  REFORM  IN  LATE  CH'ING  CHINA  (1974);  L.  EAST-
MAN,  THRONE  AND  MANDARINS:  CHINA'S  SEARCH  FOR  A  POLICY
DURING  THE  SINO-FRENCH  CONTROVERSY,  1880-1885  (1967);  RE-
FORM IN  NINETEENTH  CENTURY  CHINA (P. Cohen & J. Schrecker eds.
1976);  M.  WRIGHT,  THE  LAST  STAND  OF  CHINESE  CONSERVATISM;
THE  T'UNG-CHIH  RESTORATION,  1862-1874  (1957);  Wu  HSIANG-
HSIANG,  WAN  CH'ING  KUNG-T'ING  SHIH-CHI  [A  TRUE  HISTORY  OF
PALACE  POLITICS DURING THE LATE  CH'ING]  (1961);  Fairbank, Intro-
duction to  10 THE CAMBRIDGE  HISTORY  OF CHINA,  THE LATE CH'ING,
1800-1911,  PART I  (J. Fairbank  ed.  1978);  and Liu Kwang-ching,  The
Ch'ing Restoration, in  10  THE  CAMBRIDGE  HISTORY  OF  CHINA,  THE
LATE  CH'ING,  1800-1911,  PART  I, supra, at 409.
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APPENDIX  B
The Cast of Characters
Events at the District  Level
The deceased:  Ko P'in-lien, bean-curd seller
The accused:  Yang Nai-wu,  scholar
Hsiao-pai-ts'ai, (Mrs. Ko, ne6 Pi) peasant
Liu Hsi-t'ung, Yti-hang District Magistrate
Ch'en Chu-shan, licentiate
YUan Te, yamen runner
Shen Ts'ai-ch'ian, watchman
Shen Hsiang, coroner
Chang Chiln, District Sub-director  of Studies
Liu Hai-sheng,  Magistrate  Liu's son  (allegedly Liu Tzu-han)
Mrs.  Shen, mother of Ko P'in-lien
Shen T'i-jen, second husband of Mrs. Shen
Wang Hsin-p'ei, Shen T'i-jen's relative
Wang Lin, local constable and witness
Yu Ching-t'ien, witness
Ch'ien T'an, pharmacist (allegedly  Ch'ien Pao-sheng)
Ho Ch'un-fang, alleged lover of Hsiao-pai-ts'ai
Chiang Wei-lung, yamen servant
Liu Tien-ch'en, yamen servant
The Prefectural  Review
Ch'en Lu, Prefect
Provincial  Reviews
K'uai Ho-sun, Judicial  Commissioner
Yang Ch'ang-chtln,  Governor of Chekiang
Cheng  Hsi-kao, Expectant  Magistrate sent to Yii-hang
Governor Yang's Investigating Committee
Hsi Kuang, Prefect of Hu-chou
Kung  Chia-chiin,  Prefect of Shao-hsing
Sun Hsiang-fu,  Expectant Prefect
HsQ Chia-te, Magistrate  of Fu-yang
Ch'en Pao-shan, Magistrate of Huang-yen










Hu Jui-lan, Literary Chancellor
Pien Pao-hsien, Prefect of Ning-po
Lo Tzu-sen, Magistrate  of Chia-hsing
Ku Te-heng,  Expectant Magistrate
Kung Shih-t'ung, Expectant  Magistrate
Board of  Punishments
Sang  Ch'un-jung, Board President
Tsao-pao,  Board President
Weng T'ung-ho, Board Vice President and imperial tutor
Hsia T'ung-shan,  Board Vice President
Tsao-chi,  Board Vice President
Yu Chuan, Director of the Autumn  Assizes
Lin Kung-shu,  middle-level official
Coroners at the Capital
Sun I
Lien Shun
Other Imperial  Officials
Pao-ytin,  Imperial Grand  Secretary
Ting Pao-chen,  Governor  General of Szechuan
Other Natives of Chekiang Involved in the Case
-Wang Shu-p'ing, Imperial Chancellery  Secretary
Chung Po-sheng, Hanlin Academy Sub-reader
Wang Ming-luan, Imperial Academy Tutor
Wu  Chung-ytU,  Yfi-hang  resident  who  discussed  the  case  with
Weng T'ung-ho
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